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During the 1920s, James Joyce remarked that classical writers “show you a pleasant 
exterior but ignore the inner construction, the pathological and psychological body 
which our behaviour and thought depend on. Comprehension is the purpose of 
literature, but how can we know human beings if we continue to ignore their most 
vital functions?”1  
This thesis responds to Joyce’s endeavour, using a theoretical framework 
derived from recent research in cognitive science to analyse human action and 
interaction as portrayed by literary character in Ulysses. Accordingly, it is interested 
in the narrative devices Joyce uses to realistically construct his protagonist Leopold 
Bloom. It questions how cognitive science can further illuminate, respond to, and 
rearticulate both how and why these devices work as they do.  
The cognitive approach employed departs from philosophies of Cartesian 
duality – where the mind is seen as distinct from and yet screened within the body. 
Instead, it aligns itself with more recent theory on actual minds – theory that suggests 
minds are externally interwoven in social and material environments.  
Informed by recent research in situated cognition, this thesis pays particular 
attention to the ways a character’s mind is situated in and accomplished by their 
speech acts and discourse, body and behaviour, environment and material reality. The 
lens provided by situated cognition magnifies the more common critical conceptions 
about Bloom to reveal how intricate threads of meaning criss-cross the character in a 
continuum of the mind as distributed through the social story-world. It demonstrates 
how thematic threads unfold through objects and characters in ways previous 
scholarship has not seen. These thematic threads constitute substrata which further 
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disclose the complexity and depth not only of Bloom’s character but also of Ulysses 
as a whole.  
Consequently, this thesis demonstrates, in response to Joyce, that cognitive 
approaches to literature do enable a better comprehension and deeper understanding 
of the human condition as portrayed by fictional characters. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 James Joyce, cited in Arthur Power, Conversations with James Joyce (Dublin: Lilliput Press, 1999), 
66. 
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PREFATORY 	  NOTE 	  
In general this thesis follows the system of course citation known as the Chicago 
Style (sometimes called “Chicago A”) as specified in The Chicago Manual of Style 
16th Edition (Chapter 14). It does however use in-text citation when citing from 
primary texts. A list of these texts and their corresponding abbreviations is supplied 
on the next page.  
This thesis cites from Declan Kiberd’s (1992) edition of James Joyce’s Ulysses 
instead of the more standard Gabler edition. The first academic paper I took on Joyce 
in 2009 recommended students work from this edition. For the sake of consistency, 
all my subsequent research has kept to this same edition and referencing format. 
Therefore, when citing from James Joyce’s Ulysses, this current study references all 
episode and page numbers in the following format: (episode number: page number). 
For example, (U 18:891) refers to Ulysses episode 18, page 891.  
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INTRODUCTION	  
During the 1920s, Joyce remarked that classical writers “show you a pleasant exterior 
but ignore the inner construction, the pathological and psychological body which our 
behaviour and thought depend on. Comprehension is the purpose of literature, but 
how can we know human beings if we continue to ignore their most vital functions?”1 
This thesis responds to Joyce’s endeavour, using a theoretical framework derived 
from recent research in cognitive science to analyse the human condition as portrayed 
by characters as “model persons.”2 As such, this thesis does what Joyce could not, 
since cognitive science did not exist when Joyce wrote Ulysses. Not only was Joyce 
bound by the scientific and technological limitations of his time; he was inevitably 
influenced by popular Westernised accounts of mind dominating the early twentieth 
century. Joyce relied on what is best described as armchair speculation – his own 
observations of mind and his related literary experiments. In comparison, this thesis 
draws on a broad range of multifaceted research and is armed with tools and concepts 
inconceivable a century ago.  
Even without the resources this thesis takes advantage of, Joyce’s great 
observation skills and his ability to think critically and independently contribute 
toward a surprisingly modern theory of mind. Because of this, Joyce’s treatment of 
mind finds purchase with modern cognitive science, and Ulysses responds well to a 
contemporary cognitive approach. My cognitive approach departs from philosophies 
of Cartesian duality – where the mind is seen as distinct from and yet screened within 
the body. Instead, it aligns itself with more recent theory on actual minds – theory 
that suggests minds are externally interwoven in social and material environments. 
This suggestion is interesting in terms of fictional minds because social and material 
storyworlds are typically not accounted for in character analyses. This is especially 
the case with texts such as Ulysses, where a character’s innermost thoughts are 
rendered directly accessible and apparent. Accordingly, this thesis maintains that the 
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social and material manifestations of the mind disclose just as much about character 
as the author’s direct representations. This thesis therefore seeks to discover how a 
cognitive approach to Ulysses might enhance our understanding of character within 
the social storyworld of the book. My investigation focuses on a single fictional 
mind, that of Joyce’s character Leopold Bloom, but also discusses the secondary 
characters that inalienably influence Bloom’s social mind. 
Finally, this use of cognitive theory does not assume a traditional construction 
of character. A traditional analysis of Bloom’s character in Ulysses is interested in 
how the events of the novel might contribute to his character and reveal who he is. 
Such traditional realist conceptions of character subordinate character to plot, or 
suggest that characters and events are completely interdependent. This sense of 
character is best encapsulated by Henry James’s famous question: “What is character 
but the determination of incident? What is incident but the illustration of character?”3 
By contrast, this thesis aligns with a modernist notion of character. Just as Joyce’s 
narrative strategies exemplify modernism through their experimental form, Joyce’s 
characters exemplify modernism as experimental sites and text-based constructs. As 
such, a modernist view on character focuses on Joyce’s perceptions of behaviour 
rather than his perception of people. Joyce’s multileveled narration works to construct 
character, foregrounding behavioural patterns over appearance, and pathological and 
psychological processes over plot. Accordingly, this thesis is less interested in plot, 
and more interested in how Joyce’s narrative works to construct the psychological 
and physical predicates of character through the social storyworld.  
What	  Counts	  as	  Real?	  	  
Joyce’s Ulysses has a formidable reputation. It is popularly regarded as difficult, 
challenging, even unreadable. Notorious for its stylistic gymnastics, encyclopaedic 
allusions, and technical accomplishments, Ulysses is often assumed to be an anti-
realistic text. Narratorial interference and unreliability will inevitably distort the 
reading experience. However, like a carnival mirror, Joyce’s narratorial distortions 
add different dimensions: they reflect reflections, giving the reader multifarious 
perspectives on reality. Using a multiplicity of styles, Joyce effectively reveals the 
world from every side. In effect, Joyce’s synthetic text could be said to hold not one 
but multiple mirrors up to the world.  
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Rather than prove problematic for a cognitive approach, Joyce’s lack of reliable 
narration and stylistic distortions complement an approach that focuses on character 
and the nexus of mind, body, and world. As a psychological novel, Ulysses encodes 
its characters by directly portraying emotional reactions and internal states. However, 
despite its apparent inward turn, Ulysses also establishes openness to the world 
outside. Joyce blurs the boundaries between inner and outer and breaches the divide 
between public and private to represent his characters in all their superficialities, 
showing, to use Frank Budgen’s words, an “infinite number of contours drawn from 
every conceivable angle.”4 In his 1953 essay “Ulysses: a monologue,” Carl Jung 
complains, “what is outer and what is inner are so constantly intermingled that in the 
end, we are in doubt as to whether we are dealing with a physical or transcendental 
tapeworm.”5 This steady movement from inner thought to outer world mirrors 
Joyce’s interpretation and subsequent representation of the real minds he observed in 
his day-to-day interactions. In blurring the boundaries between a character’s thought 
and action, Joyce effectively breaks down the divides between mind, body, and 
world. As such, Joyce’s construction of character resonates with more recent 
cognitive theory – theory that posits cognition as neither inner nor outer, but a process 
situated across the nexus of the brain, body, and world.6  
What	  Counts	  as	  Evidence?	  
More traditionally, evaluating fictional characters has involved identifying a 
character’s personality traits and dispositions through either direct information (what 
characters say about each other and what the narrator says about the character) or less 
direct suggestion (how the character reacts to certain situations). In the less direct 
cases, we tend to rely on our own experiences in the real world, our intuitions, or folk 
psychology as a basis for our judgments and conclusions.7 Like many modernist texts, 
Joyce’s Ulysses is especially challenging in terms of interpretation. The reader must 
play a participatory role, filling in the gaps, recognising the incongruities and 
puzzling out what it all means. For a literary theorist, close and contextualised 
reading provides evidence to assist in this interpretative process. However, these 
types of readings, while beneficial, are inherently subjective and reliant upon 
(possibly unreliable) perceptual systems. One of the main advantages of a cognitive 
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framework is its departure from such subjective accounts in that it finds answers in 
systematic empirical research.  
My cognitive framework gathers evidence from the sprawling landscape of the 
cognitive-scientific subdomain known as situated cognition. I say sprawling because 
situated cognition inevitably includes the embodied, enactive, embedded, and 
distributed aspects of cognition. Such overlaps are unavoidable since each of these 
areas of research “contribute to a picture of mental activity as dependent on the 
situation or the context in which it occurs.”8 Situated cognition is a research approach 
interested in the “treatment of cognitive phenomena as the joint product of brain, 
body, and environment.”9 Researchers interested in situated cognition examine how 
cognition exploits structure in the natural and social environment, how cognition is 
embodied, and how the boundaries of cognition extend beyond the boundaries of 
individual organisms.10 Put more simply, situated cognition views mental activity as 
dependent upon the situation or context in which it occurs, be it social or material.  
If the discursive psychologist counts close attention to the finer details of talk 
and text as evidence, and the neuroscientist counts fMRIs and case studies as 
evidence, the multidisciplinary enterprise that is situated cognition counts all these 
analytical modes as evidence. There is no fixed thesis on mind, and likewise there 
should be no fixed type of evidence that trumps all. Accordingly, it is crucial that we 
view this cognitive framework for what it is, a comparative guide and a measure. Just 
as Wittgenstein describes his famous language-game model as “an object of 
comparison – a sort of yardstick; not as a preconception to which reality must 
correspond,”11 my framework is likewise a guiding principle that militates against 
essentialism. This methodology can help to remove some of the subjectivities implicit 
in close reading since it is interested in the practice of identity through discursive 
displays within a synchronic sociohistorical setting, rather than how we merely 
perceive character inferentially. My approach grounds critical observation in a way 
that can often be verified or falsified. However, while this thesis argues that some 
evidence is less subjective and less interpretative than others, we cannot ignore that 
all evidence – whether from close reading, discursive cues, brain scans, or 
experiments – inevitably involves some measure of interpretation.  
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What’s	  Been	  Said	  Already?	  
Joyce	  Scholarship	  
Previous scholarship investigating the mind in Ulysses has tended to focus on 
psychoanalytic or traditional narrative theory. These accounts typically discuss 
Joyce’s use of stream of consciousness and interior monologue or examine the text 
through psychoanalytical theory. In terms of major landmarks, the study of mind in 
Ulysses – at least in the form of a comprehensive book-length study – begins as early 
as 1973 with Erwin R. Steinberg’s Stream of Consciousness and Beyond in Ulysses. 
Steinberg’s work offers a detailed account of how the mind is represented through 
narrative technique in Ulysses. Importantly, it is one of the first works clearly to 
distinguish between Joyce’s use of the interior monologue and stream-of-
consciousness techniques. Steinberg’s work was followed by Dorrit Cohn’s 
groundbreaking Transparent Minds (1978), which succinctly examined Joyce’s 
treatment of consciousness and the inner life of Joyce’s character Stephen Dedalus. 
Following these stylistic treatments of mind came a resurgence of criticism on Joyce 
and psychoanalysis, especially during the 1980s. Influential works directing 
traditional narrative theory into the realm of psychoanalysis include Mark 
Schechner’s Joyce in Nighttown: A Psychoanalytic Inquiry into Ulysses (1978); 
Sheldon Brivic’s Joyce between Freud and Jung (1980) and The Veil of Signs (1984); 
and Luke Thurston’s more recent James Joyce and the Problem of Psychoanalysis 
(2004). A review of these previous works in Joyce scholarship reveals one common 
denominator, that being a monadic perspective on mind. These previous studies of 
Ulysses share a view of mind reliant on the individual, indiscernible, and internal 
aspects, and neglectful of the interpersonal and observable dimensions. In effect, to 
reuse Joyce’s words, past scholarship has ignored the most vital functions of the 
human mind as evident in the pathological and psychological body that is inalienably 
situated in a social and material world. 
A long-standing and entrenched misconception that the mind underlies all – that 
it predetermines emotion, action, and behaviour, working like a private puppeteer, 
pulling strings behind the scenes – has misinformed past approaches to Ulysses. 
These approaches, grounded in a Cartesian duality, do not align with the most recent 
advances in cognitive science. Dualism of the Cartesian kind tends to map the mind 
through inner and outer domains – situating the mind within the head, and yet 
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separating the mind from the body that exists as part of the world outside. Although 
these approaches may have some success describing the private dimension of mind, 
they do not recognise the mind as situated in and accomplished by our speech acts 
and discourse, body and behaviour, environment and material reality.12 To date, 
research that investigates this type of mind in Ulysses is lacking. Much has been said 
about the characters’ individual stream of consciousness13 or their internal 
monologues. Many have discussed the hidden and mysterious unconscious mind in 
Ulysses, mostly via Freudian, Jungian, or Lacanian frames. Ironically, however, what 
is most timely, most apparent, and most innate continues to go unnoticed. 
To date there is a noticeable absence of work which leverages recent insights 
gained from the cognitive sciences to explore interconnections between narrative and 
mind in iconic, psychologically complex, modernist novels. Notably, Patrick Colm 
Hogan’s new book Ulysses and the Poetics of Cognition, published just last year, 
does succeed in creating a dialogue between recent cognitive science and literary 
theory. In addition, it is the first major work fully to investigate cognition in Ulysses 
as a mutually beneficial transfer of ideas. Hogan positions his approach within the 
broader class of “worldly” approaches to Ulysses. By doing so, Hogan underscores 
evaluative criticism interested in “the relation of the novel to our understanding of the 
real world.”14 Similarly, this thesis is a “worldly” treatment of Ulysses, in that it 
employs real-world cognitive science to examine how Joyce constructs his fictional 
character, Leopold Bloom, through cultural and cognitive frames. At the same time, 
this thesis also aims to emphasise the idea of mutuality or reciprocity by showing 
how Joyce’s representation of the storyworld, in turn, enhances the reader’s 
understanding of cognitive processes. Joyce’s skilful sketch of mind – of emotions, 
motives, memory, gesture, and speech acts – throw these processes into sharp relief. 
It follows that, in obtaining an enhanced understanding of cognition and emotion, 
Joyce’s readers are in turn able to apply this deeper insight to better understand other 
psychological novels – works that also render these processes accessible. 
Comprehension is indeed an important purpose of literature, and Ulysses certainly 
strives to further our understanding of the human psyche. Rather than simply apply 
cognitive research using predetermined parameters from the cognitive sciences to 
gain insight, this thesis demonstrates how Joyce’s text is not only responsive to 
cognitive research, but how it reciprocates and contributes to the epistemic 
conversation by offering its own parameters. 
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Hogan’s book, like my thesis, seeks to substantiate both the value and the 
validity behind this type of transdisciplinary crossing. However, there are some 
crucial points of difference between Hogan’s work on Ulysses and my own. Unlike 
my thesis, Hogan’s recent work does not position itself against Cartesian duality; it 
does not align itself with a particular perspective on mind (or cognitive approach) 
under the “transdisciplinary”15 umbrella that is cognitive science; nor does it 
concentrate on characterisation. Rather, Hogan’s cognitive investigative strategy is 
somewhat ambiguous, since he stretches to encompass both social and individual 
psychology. Hogan’s work is concerned with simulation, narration, and style, and 
discusses human thought and emotion, targeting thematic concerns such as gender, 
nationalism and anti-colonialism as they relate to shame, sexuality, and identity. As a 
result, Hogan’s treatment of cognition is more conceptual and less technical than my 
own. So while both Hogan and I are interested in a cognitive approach to Ulysses, our 
method of analysis differs greatly. Compare for example, my reading of the 
“Penelope” episode in Ulysses to Hogan’s examination. My approach borrows largely 
from social psychology to discuss the audience-directed and socially situated aspects 
of Molly’s inner speech. I argue that Molly’s interior monologue is directed at a 
social audience and steeped in a social discourse. In contrast, Hogan emphasises 
Molly’s isolation and loneliness, giving both the content and non-relational 
narrational form of the monologue as evidence.16 Although Hogan and I use different 
modes of analysis to argue for different readings, there are some points of alliance. 
Hogan and I do agree that inner speech, which is not audience directed, is 
psychologically misleading. Likewise, we agree that Joyce depicts Molly as lonely. 
However, I posit that Joyce accentuates Molly’s current social isolation not though a 
monadic narrational form, but through a dialogic narrational form – Molly’s 
audience-directed interior dialogue reflects her desire to connect with a social 
imaginary and to the world outside number 7 Eccles Street. 
Cognitive	  Literary	  Criticism	  
Hogan’s interdisciplinary work signals the growth of an emerging field, otherwise 
more broadly known as cognitive literary criticism. The second cognitive revolution 
of the past twenty years paves the way for new directions in literary theory. Much of 
what was previously discounted as unobservable and untranslatable is now rendered 
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visible and verifiable. Or as Uri Margolin so aptly puts it, “it is the rise of cognitive 
science in the last twenty years or so that provides the literary scholar with what I 
believe to be the richest and most powerful framework yet for its systematic 
description.”17 David Herman describes how this new school of thought “seeks to 
avoid the Scylla of cognitivism and the Charybdis of behaviourism.”18 Instead, the 
second cognitive revolution “seeks to situate the mind in material contexts of action 
and interaction without … reducing the mental to bodily activity in the way that the 
behaviourists did.”19 Although the twentieth century saw a dialogue between literary 
studies and psychology in the form of psychoanalysis, it was not until the twenty-first 
century that an exchange of knowledge between the sciences of mind and literary 
criticism became truly transdisciplinary and truly representative of the whole situated 
mind. The cognitive turn in literary theory involves many distinct rubrics and diverse 
investigative frameworks. Cognitive literary studies may focus on the real mind of the 
reader, the fictional mind of the character, or both. An overview of these areas of 
research, and a more comprehensive background outlining the cognitive turn in 
literary studies, can be found in Alan Richardson’s “Studies in Literature and 
Cognition: A Field Map” (2004); Marie-Laure Ryan’s “Narratology and Cognitive 
Science: A Problematic Relation” (2010); and Lisa Zunshine’s Introduction to 
Cognitive Cultural Studies (2010).  
Deserving special mention are David Herman and Alan Palmer – two scholars 
working in cognitive literary theory who have directly influenced my own 
investigative framework. Like Hogan, Herman stresses the importance of reciprocity, 
emphasising that cognitive literary theory should be a mutually beneficial transfer of 
ideas. In doing so, Herman endeared to me the notion that a cognitive literary 
approach should be less an application of ideas and more an exploration of how 
literary works and recent advances in cognitive theory can be put into a productive, 
mutually informing dialogue with one another. This sentiment, echoed in all of 
Herman’s recent works (2006; 2007; 2010; 2011; 2013), examines not only how 
cognitive research can reveal more about a text (in a bottom-up approach) but also 
how a narrative might inform or resonate with recent cognitive research.  
While there have been no previous studies of Ulysses that incorporate an anti-
Cartesian model of mind, Herman’s chapter “Reminding Modernism” includes a 
discussion on Joyce’s text Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man which similarly calls 
into question Cartesian geographies of mind. Herman examines Joyce’s character 
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Stephen, showing how Stephen’s material and social interactions “give rise to the 
world that he experiences or enacts.”20 Herman also astutely notes how “Joyce 
anchored worlds-as-experienced in what Clark (1997) terms ‘action loops’ that ‘criss-
cross the organism and its environment’.”21 Herman’s work does not contradict my 
claims for originality, since my thesis investigates the situated mind in Ulysses and 
focuses on Joyce’s character Leopold Bloom. However, Herman’s investigative 
framework has clearly provided a useful model for devising my own cognitive 
approach.  
While I find Herman’s recent work convincing, the initial motivator for my 
move towards a focus on the situated mind was Alan Palmer’s “externalist 
perspective,”22 as introduced in his chapter “The Mind beyond the Skin in Little 
Dorrit.” Palmer’s similar treatment of mind in his important work Social Minds 
(2010), which advances from his earlier work Fictional Minds (2004), has especially 
influenced my own research. Palmer’s cognitive framework, or his externalist 
perspective, works as a model for my own investigative method. Palmer’s externalist 
perspective on mind informs his “social mind” approach, just as a situated 
perspective on mind informs my “situated mind” approach. In effect, Palmer stresses 
how important, and yet how neglected, the study of social minds in fiction is. He 
notes this in comparison to studies on the individual mind that focus on traditional 
techniques such as stream of consciousness and interior monologue.  
What	  Episodes,	  What	  Cognitive	  Theory,	  and	  Why?	  
As argued throughout this thesis, minds are not closed-off inner spaces; they are 
instead both anchored in and accomplished by social and material structures. My 
thesis locates cognitive processes “not in the heads of solitary thinkers but rather in 
socio-communicative processes unfolding within richly material settings.”23 As a 
result, this thesis focuses on the episodes of Ulysses that consist of scenes both 
socially and materially orientated. In addition, since this thesis aims to provide a 
cognitive reading of Joyce’s protagonist, Leopold Bloom, I’ve chosen to focus on the 
obvious “Bloom episodes.” However, my first chapter, “A Marriage of Minds in 
‘Penelope’,” differs in that it intentionally deviates from both these rules. This first 
chapter unfolds in response to the question: are our thoughts ever truly our own? It 
discusses how interior monologue and traditional ideas about the internal mind can be 
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effectively reevaluated using a situated approach. Although the “Penelope” episode is 
Joyce’s last episode and somewhat of a coda, I begin my thesis with this chapter for 
two reasons. Firstly, the chapter introduces the reader to the post-Cartesian mind by 
demonstrating how thoughts are always inextricably orientated by social and material 
environments – or by the situation of the thinker. Secondly, the chapter establishes 
the importance of Molly’s relationship with Leopold Bloom. This chapter works on 
the premise that we can’t begin to talk about Bloom without first introducing Molly, 
since Molly is an ever-present influence on Bloom throughout the day. Molly is the X 
on Bloom’s mental map. Almost all of Bloom’s actions and interactions are 
orientated by his thoughts of his wife and her suspected infidelity. 
My chapter on the “Penelope” episode borrows largely from the work of James 
V. Wertsch and Rom Harré (who in turn develop the theories of Vygotsky, 
Voloshinov and Bakhtin). Rather than preselecting these theorists and applying their 
ideas, I discovered the relevance of their theories only after an initial review of the 
episode. This method for a selection of cognitive theory, which could more accurately 
described as a refusal to select, succeeds since Joyce’s narrative is always already 
engaged in an epistemic conversation with cognitive theory. The real trick then was 
not to select and apply but to begin with a good enough overview of cognitive theory 
so that I might effectively recognise the cognitive processes being represented on the 
page. Likewise, it was important I read each episode with an open mind, since I relied 
on the first read to direct me to the relevant cognitive theory. I let Joyce’s narrative be 
my guide. This method for selection is further validated by Hogan, who writes: “there 
would be no point relating Joyce’s work to current research if the work did not reflect 
something about the human mind that may be further understood through cognitive 
and affective research.”24 Preselecting cognitive theory inevitably results in a one-
sided conversation and as Hogan states, there is no point in such inquiries. 
Fortunately, more often than not, Joyce’s writing resonates with one distinct 
aspect of mind. For example, the “Nestor” episode calls forth ideas about memory, 
the “Proteus” episode is concerned with cognitive perception and association, and the 
“Lotus Eaters” episode resonates with simulation and imagination.25 However, unlike 
most of Joyce’s episodes, Joyce’s “Hades” episode speaks not to one particular 
theory, but to many. Consequently, my analysis of Bloom in the “Hades” episode is 
strategically placed as my second chapter, since it examines Bloom’s whole mind as 
it is situated in his entire environment – as it is embodied, socially distributed, and 
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externally structured. This chapter therefore provides a useful overview or 
introduction to the diverse range of cognitive theory used throughout the rest of the 
thesis. I limit the scope of this chapter by selecting one passage from the first half of 
the episode, marked specifically by the carriage ride. I focus on the funeral procession 
and not the funeral proper since my approach is largely orientated by the discursive 
within social interactions. As a socially constituted space- and time-bounded event, 
the carriage ride is rich in discursive devices and prolific with social expectation. 
Moreover, unlike the funeral proper, the procession remains predominantly free from 
the ritualistic hierarchy of religion thereby allowing characters to negotiate more 
freely (and characteristically) their own social placement or position. 
Though events as described through discursive psychology help guide an 
analysis of talk as situated in the social storyworld throughout the rest of the thesis, 
this theory is most evident in my second, third, and fifth chapters, which concentrate 
on scenes where Bloom is more actively social. Understanding the ways in which we 
tend to manipulate talk provides fresh insight into Bloom’s character. It is in the 
second chapter of this thesis that we first notice Bloom’s ever-present social 
stratagem. Providing an account of Bloom’s mind as environmentally and socially 
situated reveals the degree to which Bloom socially self-situates. Bloom strategically 
positions himself either in or out of conversations. Likewise, he uses cognitive 
markers throughout his environment to strategically and dynamically negotiate goal-
orientated action and emotion. My third chapter, “Seeing and Saying in 
‘Lestrygonians’,” further substantiates this aspect of Bloom’s character. Like my 
second chapter, the third chapter focuses more specifically on select passages from 
the episode. It begins by looking closely at Bloom’s encounter with Mrs Breen, 
moves on to discuss his interaction with the men in Davey Byrne’s bar, and finishes 
with an account of Bloom helping a blind youth across the road. This chapter 
analyses the intersection of Bloom’s thought, speech acts, and behaviour, as evident 
through his discursive acts and gaze behaviour. Specifically, the chapter addresses 
what Palmer terms the thought-action continuum,26 and in line with my chapter on 
“Penelope,” this chapter examines the intentional, action-orientated aspects of 
thought. Focusing on the junction between thought and action allows us to question 
whether a character’s thoughts and discursive acts can be reinterpreted, authenticated 
or refuted through a close examination of synchronous body language. 
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Like all subsequent chapters, my third chapter deals with one particular area of 
situated cognition. While this chapter examines both discourse and body language, it 
specifically questions how gaze behaviour is used either to establish or suppress 
intersubjectivity. I argue that Bloom knows exactly how to use eye contact and gaze 
behaviour to achieve social regulation in this way. Moving from social regulation to 
emotional regulation, my fourth chapter, “Theatres of Emotion in ‘Sirens’,” similarly 
discusses Bloom’s ability to emotionally self-regulate and socially self-situate 
through intentional action. This chapter uses a cognitive-emotive lens to delineate 
between emotion and feeling. It begins by interpreting Bloom’s “emotional episodes” 
and goes on to question how Bloom enacts27 and reacts to his immediate 
environment, especially to music – which is both emotive (embodied) and co-
determined (situated). Taking its framework from Spinoza’s philosophy on emotion, 
but augmenting this theory with more recent research from cognitive theorists such as 
Antonio Damasio and Evan Thompson, this analysis shows Bloom, even at this late 
stage of the day, to be less passive and more positive than traditionally assumed.  
My fifth chapter also reveals aspects of Bloom’s character not typically 
discussed. However, this chapter delves even deeper to question how dispositions and 
situations contribute to the formation of character, while at the same time 
problematising the very notion of stable character traits. Incorporating a cognitive-
cultural model of attribution, which borrows from studies in attribution theory and 
discursive psychology, this chapter reveals the dynamic nature of Bloom’s 
traditionally accepted character traits. Analysing both reader and character attribution 
underscores problems regarding reliability and bias. This analysis highlights the 
degree to which Bloom’s behaviour is demonstrably reactionary – often resulting 
from situational cues and not purely from dispositional factors. In effect, many of 
Bloom’s traditionally accepted character traits are shown to unjustifiably stem from a 
cognitive bias, otherwise known as the fundamental attribution error.  
My final chapter, on Joyce’s “Telemachus” episode, is constructed as a “Coda.” 
As a coda it comes at the end, is separate from the body (which focuses on Bloom), 
and is formulated to demonstrate how the same cognitive theories used throughout 
the thesis might be used to examine a different character – that character being 
Stephen Dedalus. Unlike the preceding chapters, which primarily aim to illuminate 
Joyce’s novel, and more particularly to gain fresh insight on Bloom’s character, this 
final chapter’s primary objective is theoretical rather than interpretive. Essentially, 
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this coda works as a summation of the cognitive theories that have been used 
throughout the body of the thesis, such as character emotion and active externalism. 
In particular, this final chapter reexamines ideas about discourse and body language, 
using Herman’s mind-body-language nexus to show how Stephen manipulates 
meaning in intentional ways. Finding interpretive insight, while not the primary goal, 
helps further substantiate both the value and versatility of my approach. Ultimately, it 
is my hope that this chapter might provide a model for further investigations of 
literature, demonstrating how a situated mind approach can shed insight on all 
fictional minds constructed as model persons, and proving, in response to Joyce, that 
cognitive approaches to literature can enable a better comprehension and deeper 
understanding of the human condition as portrayed by fictional characters.  
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A	  MARRIAGE 	  OF 	  MINDS 	   IN 	  “PENELOPE” 	  
At first glance, Joyce’s “Penelope” episode appears to oppose, or at the very least 
challenge, a situated mind approach. The action in this episode is predominantly 
mental, so it is easy to overlook the existence of a social and material environment. 
Joyce’s use of the interior monologue technique1 hints at this contention. While 
interior implies an internal/external or Cartesian dichotomy, which locates thoughts 
inside the head and isolates them from the external social storyworld, monologue 
means “a speech by one,” and implies that thoughts are both intramental and 
monadic. However, a situated mind perspective resolves this seeming contradiction, 
locating all cognitive processes in the social and material world. A situated mind 
approach to Ulysses foregrounds the socially situated aspects of Joyce’s characters’ 
minds – character thoughts included. My investigative framework develops from a 
post-Cartesian model of mind to show how thoughts always occur in the context of 
other people – the social group memberships and personal relationships that 
contribute to who we are.2 Accordingly, this chapter works on the premise that 
Joyce’s construction of Leopold Bloom is partly achieved through his wife Molly’s 
characterisation.  
As a coda, Joyce’s “Penelope” episode comes last, formulated as an 
independent episode that paradoxically unites all others. Until “Penelope,” Molly is a 
hazy figure who exists only on the periphery of the narrative, tantalisingly just out of 
reach. Some might ask why this thesis, which seeks to decode Bloom’s character, 
begins at the end with a character that is firstly, not Bloom and secondly, seemingly 
marginalised from the rest of the book.3 In response, it is worth remembering that 
Joyce formulated “Penelope” not as an ending, but rather as a complementary reading 
or a “countersign” that replies to the preceding narrative.4 By responding to the rest of 
the book, the “Penelope” episode incorporates a dialogic dimension, which further 
adds to the depth of Bloom’s character and to Ulysses as a whole.  
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This chapter examines how Molly’s thoughts respond to the social storyworld 
of Ulysses. In particular, it is interested in how Molly and Bloom form a mental 
circularity, responding to one another, back and forth, in imagined conversations. 
Bloom and Molly form a double singularity through unspoken dialogue – creating a 
uniting “we” that exists from the sharing of past and present situations. However, as 
Janine Utell correctly points out, although marriage “demands that two become one, 
that the individual is subsumed into the unit,” at the same time, there inevitably exist 
distance and difference between husband and wife.5 In a similar way, monologue is 
paradoxically always dialogical and yet it must remain at the same time distinctly 
different from dialogue; for there is only ever one active speaker involved in 
monologue. As V. N. Voloshinov explains: “Inner speech, too, assumes a listener and 
is orientated in its constitution toward that listener.”6 This is where ideas borrowed 
from cognitive science, such as Bakhtin’s dialogic and socially distributed cognition, 
can assist in a reading of Molly’s thoughts. This chapter borrows from social 
psychology to foreground intermental thinking over solitary, isolated, or private 
thoughts. However, to better understand the socially situated aspect of all cognitive 
processes, the reader must first understand the principal properties of thoughts.  
Socially	  Situated	  Thoughts	  
There is a misguided assumption that individual thoughts are independently ours, 
existing isolated and unaffected by the external world. Just as human beings are by 
nature social beings, thoughts are by nature social. Thoughts have intent, they can be 
signified, they aim at action, they relate to something, and they are always private.7 
This chapter focuses on the first four of these five thought properties, while this thesis 
more generally questions the accuracy of the last. If each thought has intent and the 
potential for manifestation, then each thought is determined by conditions in the 
material world. If each thought is signified or mediated by sign-systems, then each 
thought is “socially constituted and propagated, being embedded in social groups and 
instantiated in social encounters.”8 If each thought aims at action, then each thought 
is inalienably embodied and formulated with a physical body in mind. Likewise, if 
each thought relates to something or explains something, then each thought is 
structured with a social audience in mind. Thoughts are therefore always 
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interconnected to the context of the thinker – to their body, their social purview, and 
the conditions of their immediate material environment.  
This situated perspective on thoughts resonates with the earlier works of Lev 
Vygotsky, Valentin Voloshinov, and Mikhail Bakhtin. In addition to the intentional, 
sign-based, action-orientated, and explanatory nature of thoughts, a situated approach 
to mental activity also examines how every thought is dialogic, how every thought 
has a voice, how every voice evokes a position, how every position is collectively 
characterised by a particular set of motivational values, and how motivational values 
in turn relate to social languages.9 To successfully incorporate these properties into a 
framework for examining Molly’s thoughts, I borrow largely from the more recent 
works of both James V. Wertsch and Rom Harré. These contemporary theorists adopt 
a sociocultural approach to mind to examine how mental action is situated in cultural, 
historical, and institutional settings. Wertsch and Harré draw on the theories of 
Vygotsky, Voloshinov and Bakhtin, discussing in particular voice, social language, 
and dialogue. In addition, Harré usefully advances these earlier theories to introduce 
positioning theory, which is described as the next step in thought analysis.10  
Positioning theory and the closely related reversal theory are two important 
elements notably absent in the work of Vygotsky, Voloshinov, and Bakhtin. 
Positioning theory is based on the idea that speakers position themselves, or take up 
positions, as negotiated “parts” or “roles.”11 In keeping with the adaptive aspect of 
positioning, Moghaddam’s term “reflexive positioning” similarly describes the 
“process by which one intentionally or unintentionally positions oneself in unfolding 
personal stories told to oneself.”12 Finally, complementing positioning theory is 
reversal theory, which is based on the central idea that the way we “see the world and 
act in it depends on the values that we are pursuing at a given time.”13 While these 
values may be partly rooted in biology, they are more commonly associated with 
social categories such as family, gender, economic status, religion, race, ethnicity, 
and culture.14 People formulate and change values depending upon their current 
situation. As such, a person’s values are inherently connected to their concurrent 
needs – whether material, spiritual, or emotional. For example, a need for shelter 
might be reconstituted as a value for security or the need for companionship 
reconstituted as a value for love.  
A framework established from the above theory works effectively to examine 
the values and related social categories underpinning Molly’s thoughts. Throughout 
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this chapter, this framework progresses from a micro to a macro level of analysis, 
identifying the different voices evident within Molly’s inner speech, voices which 
point to Molly’s reflexive self-positionings, and then employing reversal theory to 
question how Molly’s self-positionings are indicative of her differing values. Finally, 
this framework works to demonstrate how Molly’s values and related social 
languages orient her to the world in which she lives and to her husband Bloom.  
 
The	  Bakhtinian	  Voice	  and	  Reflexive	  Positioning	  
A cognitive framework interested in the voice, social language, and the dialogic 
nature of Molly’s inner speech helps to relocate Molly’s thoughts (which are 
traditionally viewed as intramental) onto an intermental plane. A socially situated 
perspective on thoughts reveals the extent to which Molly’s inner speech is socially 
signified – laden with sediments of meaning and semiotic value. Just as the tide is 
disrupted by the pull of the wind and the obstruction of the shore, breaking upon itself 
and dividing into waves, language moves through different ideological and value 
systems – different “ways of seeing” and “forms of thinking”15 – drawn by the 
various social forces of the day into different social languages. The same is true for 
mental language, which is also irremediably divided into multiple discourses. 
Engaging with the voice of Molly’s silent speech allows the reader to examine the 
idea of social categories and social languages at a micro level since every voice 
points to a position, and every position implies certain values, which in turn belong to 
different social categories. Using this thought framework brings Molly’s character 
increasingly to the surface, while at the same time exposing the highly fraught, 
socially situated nature of her character. 
In order to engage with the voices of Molly’s silent speech it helps to introduce 
the Bakhtinian voice, which stands for “the speaking personality, the speaking 
consciousness.”16 If the voice is the “speaking personality” and the first-person 
pronoun “I” indicates “our selfhood, our personal identity”17 at any particular 
moment in time, it follows that a voice speaks for the occurrent “I” just as the “I” 
indicates a voice. However, as Bakhtin states, a voice is always embattled and must 
live in “dialogic communion between consciousnesses.”18 Therefore, the synchronic 
“I” that marks the voice of the speaking personality and expresses one’s position is 
always in conflict, shifting, and open to renegotiation. Just as the Bakhtinian voice is 
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more correctly regarded as “a process rather than a location,”19 personal identity too 
should be regarded as a process, something actively negotiated and achieved by an 
individual rather than something that is ascribed to an individual.20 In the following 
examples, Joyce effectively constructs a literary representation of this process, 
showing how Molly achieves her identity through the negotiation of many different 
voices.  
Molly expresses her perspective using “I” as a discursive device to index 
different styles of voice.21 Molly’s “I” in this episode is played off against the 
respective “Me” of her persona. This process demonstrates Molly as a virtuoso, trying 
on different voices and negotiating her identity.22 The following extract from the 
“Penelope” episode demonstrates this exchange occurring: 
…and its so much smoother the skin much an hour he 
was at them Im sure by the clock like some kind of a 
big infant I had at me they want everything in their 
mouth all the pleasure those men get out of a woman I 
can feel his mouth O Lord I must stretch myself or I 
wished he was here or somebody to let myself go with 
and come again like that I feel all fire inside me   
                   (U 18:893; emphasis mine) 
Here Molly’s I/Me exchange signals tension between her own passivity and 
assertion of sexual pleasure. Molly’s belief that men get all the pleasure out of sex is 
apparent in the exchange: “I had at me.” Molly’s preposition “at” indicates passivity 
– she felt acted upon and encumbered. It does not indicate a reciprocal act of mutual 
pleasure. Moreover, Molly’s use of the expression “get out of” adds to this notion. 
Just as getting a secret “out of” a person implies the coercion or manipulation of 
someone who otherwise would have remained tight-lipped, Molly’s phrase about the 
pleasure those men “get out of” women implies an imbalanced or enforced act upon 
an unwilling subject. The “I” of Molly’s voice in these instances points to Molly 
positioning herself against men in general and to her feelings of enforced compliance 
and inequity. The tone of Molly’s voice supports this claim. Her reference to “those 
men” implies shades of derision, division, and animosity. Just as previously, she 
sarcastically thinks: “nice invention they made for women for him to get all the 
pleasure” (U 18:877). 
	   20	  
Molly repositions herself in the last half of the above excerpt to adopt a 
negativistic stance.23 In a contradictory switch from passively bemoaning “the 
pleasure those men get out of a woman,” she thinks “I can feel his mouth O Lord,” an 
assertion of the pleasure she, a woman, received from a man. This thought in 
conjunction with her next I/Me exchange, “I feel all fire inside me” and the brazen 
expression of her own sexual desire – she wishes for somebody (anybody) “to let 
[her]self go with” – points to her adopting a counter position. Molly repositions 
herself in an attempt to bring balance back to a desired status quo. She strives to 
reframe her own sexuality, by matching herself against her perception of male sexual 
aggression and male sexual desire. 
Mentally acting out sexual freedom, regardless of actuality or true desire, 
allows Molly to readjust and rearticulate her earlier sexual experience with Boylan 
and her own sexuality more generally. Molly’s thoughts provide an example of what 
William James describes as the reflexivity of the “I.” James marked a distinction 
between the self-as-knower (self as subject, or the “I”) and self-as-known (self as 
object, the “Me”).24 The “I” positions the “Me” from one moment in time to the next. 
Trying on different voices is like trying on different types of hats – a person will 
eventually assume the style that best suits their requirements at any given time. In a 
similar vein, the “I” that marks the present self shifts in response to repositionings 
and renegotiations. As Fathali Moghaddam explains: “The inherently dynamic 
character of the self is apparent in the problem of the ‘fleeting I’: as the I positions the 
Me the I of the previous moment becomes the Me which can then be repositioned by 
the I.”25 The above excerpt shows Molly’s “fleeting I” shifting from passivity to 
assertiveness in a short space of time. She begins by taking a conformist stance – 
through which a prudent and petulant voice speaks – and suddenly switches to a 
negativistic and/or mastery stance, adopting a rebellious style of voice that is 
unconventional, dissident, and challenging.26 
 
Reversal	  Theory	  
Joyce’s literary representation of Molly’s reflexive positioning is evident through her 
I/Me exchanges. Past scholarship aligns Molly’s multivoicedness with her 
contradictory nature. In comparison, this chapter argues that Molly’s contradictions 
are generally more therapeutic than they are an authentic indicator of character. As 
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Harré and Van Langenhove explain, “The more somebody engages in rhetorical 
redescriptions of his/her self, the more (s)he will become a ‘round’ character taking 
responsibility for his/her life, rather than the ‘flat’ or formal subject of a sequence of 
accidental episodes.”27 While Molly’s I/Me exchanges demonstrate clear reversals 
and contradictions in her dialogue, rather than seeing these reversals as indicative of 
Molly’s contradictory tendencies, a cognitive framework reveals them as 
inconsistencies essential for mental health and healthy living.28 
Molly’s multivoicedness and contradictory reflexive positionings suggest that 
Joyce recognised the dialogic nature of inner speech and that he strove accurately to 
represent it in “Penelope.” Joyce represents “rhetorical redescriptions” in Molly’s 
self-talk, and in doing so, he contributes to Molly’s character, increasingly portraying 
her as more complex or “round.” However, this is not to say Molly’s character 
develops or progresses. Molly’s rehearsal of behaviour does not equal a change in 
her behaviour. Rather, it simply demonstrates the indeterminate nature of thought 
processes, and the adaptive nature of identity processes more generally. Ironically, 
Joyce’s presentation of Molly’s contradictions adds to the reader’s impression of her 
as a convincingly coherent identity – complete with insecurities, inconsistencies, and 
complexities. In this way, Molly represents a complete social mind, since she 
“confounds generalisations and emerges as a highly complex individual.”29 Molly 
cannot be encapsulated by a list of particular traits.30 Rather, Molly’s identity unfolds 
as a direct response to her current situation. Like her situation, her character is fraught 
and complex – subject to shifts, moving in ebbs and flows.  
To effectively examine how Molly’s contradictory switches and reversals 
contribute to the construction of her character, I borrow from Michael Apter’s 
reversal theory model – a theoretical model of relations among motivational types of 
values. Apter’s model outlines how a person regularly reverses between 
psychological states, and how these states in turn reflect the meaning and value the 
person attaches to a given situation. As Apter states, the contradictory switches and 
reversals a person makes depend on the “values that we are pursuing at a given 
time…values [that] are continually changing in the course of everyday life.”31 Apter’s 
model outlines four main motivational domains of: “Goals and Activities,” “Rules 
and Conventions,” “Transactions,” and “Relationships.” Within each of these 
domains, two pairs of motivational values can occur. For example, the first domain, 
“Goals and Activities,” is divided by the values of “achievement” and “enjoyment.” 
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Each value is further distinguished by a diametric position and style of voice. For 
example, the style of voice matched to “achievement” is telic – a serious style 
suggesting “one gains satisfaction from feeling that one is making progress toward 
some important future goal, even if the current activity is not in itself very 
pleasant.”32 In comparison, the stance associated with “enjoyment” is paratelic – a 
playful style of voice, which indicates “one gains satisfaction from immediate 
pleasures” and does things for immediate gratification rather than for future benefit.33  
Apter’s guide allows the reader to recognise Molly’s current values by way of 
determining how she positions herself through different styles of voice. The style of 
voice Molly adopts to remember her past, rehearse the day’s prior events, and 
imagine her future reveals much about her current motivational values and beliefs. 
This chapter has already detected the reversals of Molly’s negativistic and conformist 
stances, which in turn refer to “freedom” and “duty” as motivational types of values. 
In the above example, Molly rearticulates her experience of sexual pleasure – 
renegotiating her earlier sexual experience with Boylan and her own sexuality more 
generally – by adopting an unconventional negativistic stance. In Apter’s model a 
negativistic stance corresponds to the value of “freedom,” which in turn belongs to 
the domain of “Rules and Conventions.” A negativistic stance is marked by “a 
rebellious style of voice, in which one gains satisfaction from breaking the rules, 
being unconventional, dissident and challenging.”34 Also belonging to the domain of 
“Rules and Conventions” is the motivational value of “Duty,” which in turn is 
identified by a conformist stance. A conformist stance is marked by a conservative 
style, “in which one gains satisfaction from fitting in and adapting” and from “doing 
things because they are right, because they are expected, or because they are 
traditional.”35 Molly’s conformist stance is evident in the first half of the above 
excerpt, where Molly thinks of Boylan being “an hour he was at them Im sure by the 
clock like some kind of a big infant I had at me they want everything in their mouth 
all the pleasure those men get out of a woman” (U 18:893). Here, Molly’s conformist 
style of voice suggests she is motivated by “duty,” or the need to comply with 
someone else’s expectations. In addition, as Molly’s negativistic/mastery stance 
shows, these motivational values can combine across the pairs.36 As the previous 
example demonstrated, Molly’s negativistic voice, which speaks of unconventional 
female sexuality, is principally adopted to regain control and compete with (or 
master) male sexuality.  
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Molly sometimes imagines sexual scenarios or reframes past sexual encounters 
in ways that affirm freedom through sexuality. However, Molly’s reflexive 
positioning and conformist style of voice often undermine her attempts to represent 
and maintain this position. When Molly positions herself as motivated by sexual 
“freedom” and “enjoyment” her discourse is frequently at odds with her imaginings. 
When Molly thinks about sex she tends to use abstract nouns for impolite things. As 
María Ángeles Conde-Parrilla contends, when Molly does dwell on sex she is not 
always direct and explicit; rather, she conforms to social etiquette by using similes, 
euphemisms and circumlocutions, or more general expressions.37 For example, Molly 
describes the male appendage as “like a hatrack” (U 18:892), “like a sausage” (U 
18:893), “a thing” (U 18:877), a “tube” (U 18:908), “that thing they have” (U 
18:924), and as “some kind of thick crowbar” (U 18:877). Similarly, Molly frequently 
uses the inexplicit “it” as a marker: for example, “put it into me” (U 18:887), “they 
hide it with a cabbageleaf” (U 18:892), “standing out for me to see it” (U 18:892), 
“always trying to show it” (U 18:892), and “it had a kind of eye in it” (U 18:902). In 
contrast, Molly’s attempts at profanity and at using less conventional or more direct 
sexual terms are few. She uses the terms “mickey” (U 18:929) and “cock” – used to 
describe “the lovely young cock” on a statue (U 18:923) – only once each. With 
regards to the female anatomy, she refers to her “hole” twice – “my hole is itching” 
(U 18:906) and “a big hole in the middle of us” (U 18:877) – and to her menstruating 
as “that thing” (U 18:913). Of the act of sex itself, Molly refers to sexual intercourse 
as “it”: “like the dogs do it,” “hed do it to me” (U 18:903), or more sentimentally as 
making love – “I like the way he made love then” (U 18:884).  
Although Molly sometimes uses vulgar vocabulary in her inner speech, she 
more often uses ambiguous terms “such as the indefinite ‘thing,’ ‘that,’ ‘it,’ and the 
verb ‘do’.”38 Just as Molly’s self-positionings are frequent reversals, Molly’s 
infrequent use of profanity demonstrates “two contradictory aspects – her rebellion 
against social norms by employing censored terms, and her prudish acceptance of and 
conformity to the limitations that public opinion imposes on language [which] 
influence the manner in which she expresses her thoughts on ‘indecent’ subjects.”39 
Some may argue that Molly’s lewdness and sexual indecency are evident in the way 
her thoughts frequently dwell on sex and the human body. However, it is hardly 
surprising that her thoughts recirculate this subject matter, considering the day’s 
events. Only hours earlier, Molly engages in sexual intercourse for the first time in 
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eleven years.40 Her tendency to dwell on this “indecent” subject matter is therefore 
unsurprising.  
Comparably, Molly’s word choice is idiosyncratic. Her choice of contradictory 
articulations shows that she is experimenting with and rediscovering her sexuality – 
she stages her sexuality in different lights, but is not yet fully comfortable with or 
committed to any of her expositions. The value Molly places on sexual “freedom” 
and “enjoyment” never fully escapes the pull of public opinion and conventionality, 
as evident through her underlying conformist style of voice. This is hardly surprising 
since Molly gets little chance to entertain or process these same positions in the 
physical world. Until June 16th 1904, Molly’s sexual enjoyment and freedom remain 
limited to her pornographic books and to Bloom kissing her behind. Even as she 
experiments with her most indecent positionings, Molly’s language is ultimately 
stratified by different ideological systems – drawn increasingly back to the 
conventional social discourse of her time.  
Likewise, Molly’s inability to resolve the values of “duty” and “freedom” is 
further evidenced by her inability to imagine balanced sexual scenarios. The 
following example further substantiates this pattern in Molly’s discourse: 
Ill wipe him off me just like a business omission then 
Ill go out Ill have him eyeing up at the ceiling where 
is she gone now and make him want me thats the only 
way             (U 18:930) 
Molly uses the term business omission rather than the more typically used term 
business emission, which means “The issuing or setting in circulation (bills, notes, 
shares, etc.).”41 Comparably, the word omission, which means “The action of 
omitting, leaving out, or not including a person or thing,”42 highlights Molly’s belief 
that the action and pleasure connected to this event are one-sided. In effect, Molly 
discursively removes herself from any active participation. She entertains the idea of 
this sexual act, without anticipating any immediate pleasure for herself. However, 
Molly’s intended word, emission, suggests that what Molly does hope to achieve is 
some type of financial reward. Molly imagines seducing Bloom with a few “smutty 
words” (U 18:930) and letting him “do it off on [her]” (U 18:930) because she knows 
that “when hes like that he cant keep a thing back” (U 18:930). Molly’s insecurities 
about her age and her weight lead her to worry she is losing her powers of sexual 
allure. Molly’s plans to seduce Bloom are therefore motivated by both her financial 
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and personal insecurities. These insecurities are reconstituted as a motivational value 
for “achievement.” Due to the dynamic nature of the voice, the reader hears Molly’s 
voice as not only negativistic – rebellious, dissident, challenging, and even hostile – 
but also, more notably, as telic. The only satisfaction Molly gains in imagining this 
act is the satisfaction that comes from making progress toward some important future 
goal. Even though Molly does not imagine the sexual activity in itself as very 
pleasant, she sees it as “the only way.” Molly believes it is “the only way” she can 
regain a certain degree of control, within both her marriage and her personal life.  
Molly fabricates possible sexual acts in response to her unease at her current 
unstable situation. Such imaginary scenarios are conceived out of necessity, posing as 
potential answers to her immediate insecurities rather than as responses to her own 
sexual proclivity. The following example furthers substantiates this idea: 
if he wants to kiss my bottom Ill drag open my 
drawers and bulge it right out in his face as large as 
life he can stick his tongue 7 miles up my hole as hes 
there my brown part then Ill tell him I want £1 or 
perhaps 30/- Ill tell him I want to buy underclothes 
then if he gives me that well he wont be too bad 
   (U 18:929) 
This is not a sexual fantasy Molly entertains in response to her immediate sexual 
desires. Again, Molly conceives of a scenario that might resolve her material needs. 
The satisfaction she would receive if this sexual event were actually to occur is the 
satisfaction gained from financial or material reward. Molly’s negativistic and telic 
styles of voice in each of the previous examples show her mentally playing out 
scenarios that allow her to appropriate control. She experiments with solutions which, 
in varying degrees, address her lack of independent financial security, her unstable 
and sexless marriage, her insecurities about her body, and the unknown consequences 
of her affair.  
The third of Apter’s four motivational domains is the domain of 
“Transactions.” Within this domain, reversals between the motivational values of 
“power” and “love” are possible. While the value of “power” corresponds to a 
mastery stance, which is identified by its competitive style of voice, the value of 
“love” corresponds to a sympathetic stance, which is identified by a caring style of 
voice.43 A sympathetic stance values interactions in terms of affection, sensitivity, 
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and intimacy. As Apter writes: “Here one gains satisfaction from friendship and being 
close to others.”44 Accordingly, Apter’s final motivational domain “Relationships,” is 
closely related to that of “Transactions.” Within this domain, the motivational value 
of “individuality,” with an autic or self-orientated style of voice, closely relates to the 
value of “power” with its competitive style of voice. Likewise, the value of 
“transcendence,” with its alloic or “other-orientated style of voice,” is closely related 
to the value of “love” and a sympathetic style of voice.45  
Again, this chapter has already detected the contradictory switches between 
Molly’s mastery and sympathetic stances. As previously discussed, Molly adopts a 
mastery style of voice in the first example when she aims to compete with (or master) 
male sexuality. However, Molly more naturally reverts to a sympathetic stance when 
recalling past interactions. She often articulates her memories of past relationships in 
terms of affection, sensitivity, and intimacy. The fact that Molly hardly ever refers to 
her past companions by name, preferring instead to use the pronouns “he” or “she,” 
further establishes this intimacy. Molly sentimentally remembers being comforted 
one stormy night by her friend Hester’s “arms round [her]” (U 18:896). Molly often 
articulates pleasure or enjoyment when recalling romantic scenes, reminiscing, for 
example, about the time Bloom “kissed her heart at Dolphins barn … it simply feels 
like nothing on earth” (U 18:884), and claiming that “it never entered her head what 
kissing meant” until she kissed her sweetheart Harry Mulvey under the Moorish wall 
(U 18:901). She grumbles: “why can’t you kiss a man without going and marrying 
him first” and remarks that “theres nothing like a kiss long and hot down to your 
soul” (U 18:875). She remembers that Lieutenant Gardner embraced well (U 18:884) 
and believes that “a woman wants to be embraced 20 times a day almost to make her 
look young no matter by who so long as to be in love or loved by somebody” (U 
18:925). Finally, later in the text when Molly thinks, “O thanks be the great God I got 
somebody to give me what I badly wanted” (U 18:899), it’s not the sex she wanted; 
rather, it is “someone to put some heart up in to” her (U 18:899; emphasis mine). 
Molly is bored with her love life and with life more generally. She wishes that 
“somebody would write…[her] a loveletter” (U 18:899). She expresses her 
disappointment at Boylan’s letter and then thinks how “[love] fills up your whole day 
and life always something to think about” (U 18:899). Most famously, Molly 
expresses love through an affectionate style of voice when she remembers Bloom’s 
proposal at Howth’s head, describing in intimate terms how Bloom kissed her and 
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how she put her arms around him and said “yes and drew him down to me so he 
could feel my breasts all perfume yes and his heart was going like mad and yes I said 
yes I will Yes” (U 18:933). 
When it comes to sex, Molly more often finds value or motivation in a sense of 
achievement than she does in love or enjoyment. While Molly remembers past kisses 
and embraces favourably, she tends to think less romantically about penetrative sex. 
Molly frequently denies that a woman can gain any pleasure from the physical act of 
sex. She defines her adultery as “done now once and for all” (U 18:875) and 
renounces sex more generally: “with all the talk in the world about it people make its 
only the first time after that its just the ordinary do it and think no more about it” (U 
18:875). She pretends to like sex “till he comes” (U 18:875); claims “there is no 
satisfaction in it” (U 18:875); only touches Bloom’s trousers outside … to keep him 
from doing worse” (U 18:883; emphasis mine); and bemoans “its well for men all the 
amount of pleasure they get off a womans body” (U 18:924). She thinks that women 
“are so beautiful of course compared with what a man looks like” (U 18:892). She 
unfavourably describes Boylan’s body: his weight, his big hip bones, his hairy chest, 
(U 18:887), how he pulls “off his shoes and trousers … barefaced without even 
asking permission … standing out that vulgar way in the half of a shirt they wear to 
be admired like a priest or a butcher or those old hypocrites in the time of Julius 
Caesar” (U 18:924). She also does not like how Boylan slapped “[her] behind” (U 
18:876), nor does she like “having to lie down for them” (U 18:887). Furthermore, 
Molly frequently thinks of sex negatively in terms of male sexual aggression. She 
remembers the “determined vicious look” in Boylan’s eye and claims she had to shut 
her own eyes in response. She thinks of men as “stallion[s] driving it up into you 
because thats all they want out of you” (U 18:877); she thinks “arent they fearful 
trying to hurt you” (U 18:893); and she reflects on how men are so “savage for it” (U 
18:883) – how they want “to do it too quick take all the pleasure out of it” (U 
18:883). 
 In terms of companionship, Molly often evokes what Apter terms a 
sympathetic stance or style of voice, indicating she is more often motivated by love. 
However, Joyce rarely depicts her as sympathetic or unselfish in Ulysses. In this way 
Apter’s terminology is somewhat problematic, since love in terms of affection and 
physical intimacy does not necessary equate to an unselfish sympathetic love. As 
Shelly Brivic writes: “The spiritual, unselfish side of love and its physical, selfish 
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side can’t be held in mind at once.”46 Rather, what is most notable about the way 
Molly values love is how she recalls past companionship from a self-orientated 
perspective. This suggests that while Molly values love and is motivated to seek 
companionship and romance, she is not motivated by benevolence or transcendence. 
Rather, Molly’s autic style of voice suggests she is more selfishly motivated by her 
own emotional needs. Molly is rarely motivated by other people’s needs and she does 
not demonstrably consider other people’s feelings. Instead, Molly’s memories are 
distinguished by the satisfaction or comfort she gained from her past relationships.  
 
Social	  Languages	  	  
So far, this chapter has demonstrated how Molly’s motivational values orient her to 
the world in which she lives. This chapter moves now to discuss how these same 
values situate Molly within certain social categories. As Voloshinov writes, “each 
person’s inner world and thought has its stabilized social audience that comprises the 
environment in which reasons, motives, values and so on are fashioned.”47 Just as 
Molly’s language is an “act of identity,”48 Molly’s orientation to the outside world is 
likewise expressive of her values, beliefs, and motivations.  
Recognising what social languages are present within Molly’s discourse works 
to further substantiate and situate Molly’s motivational values. This chapter borrows 
primarily from Bakhtin’s work on social languages, which best describes social 
languages as “a type of category of voice rather than an individual speaking 
personality.”49 Some examples of social languages that Bakhtin mentions are “social 
dialects, characteristic group behaviour, professional jargons, generic languages, 
languages of generations and age groups, tendentious languages, languages of the 
authorities of various circles and of passing fashions, [and] languages that serve the 
specific sociopolitical purposes of the day.”50  
To identify what social languages are present in Molly’s inner speech and relate 
them to a categorical social audience, it is first necessary to detect the “open slots”51 
which show Molly actively engaging in an intersubjective interchange through her 
dialogic thought. The “open slot” is marked most notably by the pronoun “you,” but 
is also found through the inclusive pronouns “we” and “us.” These discursive devices 
are indexes for what directs Molly’s inner speech and her social audience. Molly’s 
“you” in the “Penelope” episode points to a socially imagined addressee, to whom 
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she speaks with an anticipated accord or preconceived concurrence. This claim is 
further substantiated when Molly’s use of “you” is compared with Stephen’s thoughts 
in the earlier “Proteus” episode, which show Stephen’s use of “you”, by contrast, as a 
means of giving expression to his discordant deliberation. Rather than look toward a 
social audience, Stephen’s “you” is typically an “open slot” for his own critical and 
ironic self-reflection – his own personal condemnation. In the “Proteus” episode 
Stephen’s “you” is principally orientated toward his younger self; for example: “You 
told the Clongowes gentry you had an uncle a general in the army” (U 3:49; emphasis 
mine); “I was young. You bowed to yourself in the mirror … Hurray for the 
Goddamned idiot!” (U 3:50; emphasis mine); “Remember your epiphanies on green 
oval leaves … copies to be sent to all the great libraries in the world if you died” (U 
3:50; emphasis mine); “You were a student weren’t you? Of what in devil’s name?” 
(U 3:51; emphasis mine); “You were going to do wonders, what?” (U 3:53; emphasis 
mine). In contrast, Molly’s “you” aims away from herself towards a social audience, 
as demonstrated in the following examples: “so that you cant see the join for 2 
shillings wouldn’t even teem the potatoes for you of course shes right not ruin her 
hands” (U 18:910; emphasis mine); “but were to be chained up theyre not going to be 
chaining me up no damn fear once I start I tell you” (U 18:924; emphasis mine); “if 
his nose bleeds youd think it was O tragic” (U 18:872; emphasis mine); “proposing 
that she could eat at our table on Christmas if you please O no thank you not in my 
house” (U 18:873; emphasis mine); and finally, “you sometimes love wildly when 
you feel that way so nice all over you you cant help yourself” (U 18:875; emphasis 
mine).  
In a similar fashion, Molly also addresses her speech towards the collective 
pronouns “us” and “we,” indicating that she imagines her views are shared with 
others. For example: “let us have a bit of fun first” (U 18:871; emphasis mine); “what 
do they ask us to marry them for if were so bad” (U 18:880; emphasis mine); and “if I 
asked him hed say it was from the Greek leave us as wise as we were before (U 
18:880; emphasis mine). Molly’s tendency for inclusivity is again contrasted by 
Stephen’s thoughts in “Proteus.” In total Stephen uses “us” only twice: once 
ironically though borrowed discourse, “cling to us yet more” (U 3:61; emphasis 
mine), and once when he remembers Paris: “Noon slumbers. Kevin Egan rolls 
gunpowder cigarettes through fingers smeared with printer's ink, sipping his green 
fairy as Patrice his white. About us gobblers fork spiced beans down their gullets” (U 
	   30	  
3:53; emphasis mine). These examples indicate that Stephen’s time in Paris is the 
only time he orientates his thoughts toward a social audience and attains a social 
identity. In addition, Stephen uses “we” a mere six times throughout the entire 
“Proteus” episode, and five out of the six times Stephen’s “we” can be discounted 
since it refers to an imagined conversation belonging to another’s discourse. Stephen 
imagines his Uncle Walter’s response if he were to arrive at his house: “We thought 
you were someone else … We have nothing in the house but backache pills” (U 3:47–
48; emphasis mine). Likewise, Stephen imagines the words of those who recover a 
corpse from the sea, “We have him. Easy now” (U 3:63; emphasis mine). Finally, two 
further examples of “we” are found in the discourse of the men who will “give it a 
fair trial. We enjoyed ourselves immensely” (U 3:63; emphasis mine), and the words 
of “the courtiers who mocked Guido in Or San Michele … We don't want any of your 
medieval abstrusiosities” (U 3:57; emphasis mine). Notably, the one time Stephen 
uses “we” within his own discourse, the use is again ironic: “we simply must dress 
the character” (U 3:51; emphasis mine). 
Comparing Molly’s use of “you,” “us,” and “we” with Stephen’s shows how 
the same words are uniquely orientated and dependent upon the individual’s 
motivational values and what their cognitive processes aim at. The word is 
“determined equally by whose word it is and for whom it is meant.”52 To incorporate 
Voloshinov’s idea, we could think of Molly’s use of the word “you” as a bridge 
thrown between herself and another. If one end of the bridge depends on her, then the 
other end depends on her addressee.53 Where Stephen’s “you” enables self-criticism 
and self-reflection, Molly’s “you,” in contrast, reflects her need to collaborate and 
consequently corroborate her perspective. Molly’s reluctance to self-criticise also 
suggests that she takes little responsibility for her actions, hesitates to self-reflect, and 
is more likely to position herself as blameless. This idea is supported by her thoughts: 
“serve him right its all his own fault if I am an adulteress” (U 18:929); “I can’t help it 
if Im young still can I” (U 18:925); and “just enough to make her mouth water but 
that wasn’t my fault” (U 18:879). Unlike Stephen, Molly is more intent on 
influencing others than she is on influencing or improving herself. 
Molly’s distinctive “you” demonstrates that she orientates her interior dialogue 
towards the social and material world and that she aims towards conformity. Molly 
directs her thoughts beyond her bedroom walls towards a social imaginary. Molly’s 
imagined social audience becomes evident through examining the social groups her 
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“you,” “us,” or “we” represent more collectively. As previously discussed, Molly 
positions herself intrapersonally through imaginary dialogues and conversations in 
which her “I” takes up a multiplicity of positions in relation to multiple personae (her 
“Me”s). In a similar way, Molly positions herself interpersonally when her dialogue 
engages with a host of imaginary others (her “you”s). Molly’s “you” stands for a 
range of imagined audiences, which depend on her motivational values at the time. 
Just as Molly’s contradictory voices signify her varying levels of commitment to their 
concurrent values, Molly’s thoughts are determined by what she aims to achieve. 
Molly most commonly relates her thoughts to women in general, pitting 
females collectively against males more generally. Molly adopts this particular 
position to complain about the female condition. She thinks, “whats the idea making 
us like that with a big hole in the middle of us” (U 18:877; emphasis mine); thinks of 
how if anything goes wrong in a man’s “business we have to suffer” (U 18:922–23; 
emphasis mine); believes men are “not satisfied till they have us swollen out like 
elephants” (U 18:877; emphasis mine); and she wonders why men “ask us to marry 
them for if were so bad as all that” (U 18:880; emphasis mine). Take the following 
excerpt as yet another example: 
deceitful men all their 20 pockets arent enough for 
their lies then why should we tell them even if its the 
truth they dont believe you then tucked up in bed like 
those babies in the Aristocrats Masterpiece he brought 
me another time as if we hadnt enough of that in real 
life           (U 18:918; emphasis mine) 
In this example, Molly clearly assimilates her “you” with the “we” that refers to 
women more generally. Molly frequently either singularly pits herself against a man 
(most notably Boylan or Bloom) or collectively pits females against the collective 
male. This is hardly surprising, considering both her present personal circumstances 
and the conventional gender inequality present in Molly’s social life more generally. 
Although Molly voices her distaste at women’s politics or politics more generally (U 
18:871, 886, 905), her frequent use of “you,” “us,” and “we” groups her perspective 
with the collective woman and, relatedly, the feminist cause. Molly’s thoughts 
perpetually circulate a feminist discourse, which, as a social language, represents the 
social category of gender. Molly thinks the “cat itself is better off than us have we too 
much blood up in us or what” (U 18:914; emphasis mine). She reflects on “these 
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clothes we have to wear” (U 18:895; emphasis mine), moans that “theres always 
something wrong with us 5 days every 3 or 4 weeks usual monthly auction” (U 
18:913; emphasis mine), and complains that “were to be always chained up” (U 
18:924; emphasis mine). Molly surmises; “I suppose thats [sex is] what a woman is 
supposed to be there for or He wouldnt have made us the way He did so attractive to 
men” (U 18:929; emphasis mine). She expresses her “hope theyll have something 
better for us in the other world tying ourselves up God help us” (U 18:917; emphasis 
mine) and even appeals to Joyce, saying: “O Jamesy let me up out of this pooh sweets 
of sin whoever suggested that business for women what between clothes and cooking 
and children” (U 18:914). 
In addition to gender as a social category, literature – and more specifically, 
woman’s literature – has a significant bearing on Molly’s inner speech. The literary 
works that make up Molly’s literary repertoire, as alluded to in her inner speech, are 
“the works of Master Francois Somebody” (U 18:890), which is a reference to the 
author of Gargantua, Francois Rabelais;54 “Fair Tyrants” (U 18:925), a novel by 
James Lovebirch; “Freemans and Photo bits” (U 18:894), which are Bloom’s rather 
than Molly’s, but works she has access to nonetheless; “Lloyd’s Weekly News” (U 
18:909), a Sunday newspaper; “The Moonstone” (U 18:896), a novel by Wilkie 
Collins; “East Lynne” and “the Shadow of Ashlydyat” (U 18:896), both novels by 
Mrs Henry Wood; “Henry Dunbar” (U 18:896), a novel by Miss Mary Elizabeth 
Braddon; “Eugene Aram” (U 18:896), a novel by Edward Bulwer-Lytton; Molly 
Bawn (U 18:896), a novel by Mrs Hungerford; Moll Flanders (U 18:896), a novel by 
Defoe; and “Sweets of Sin” (U 18:909), attributed to the author Paul de Kock. 
Although Weldon Thornton is unable to confirm that de Kock wrote this particular 
title, he believes there is such a work and that he simply has been unable to locate it. 
Thornton also writes, “Probably the work is not pornography, but lower class erotica, 
which might make it even harder to find.”55  
Aside from the references to Paul de Kock and James Lovebirch – who 
published several books with “obvious semi-pornographic overtones”56 – the 
literature Molly remembers is less sexually orientated and more prominently romance 
or murder mystery novels.57 Molly does recall Molly Bawn, “A love-tale of a tender, 
frivolous, and petulant Irish girl, who flirts and arouses her lover’s jealousy and 
offends against the conventions of all innocence.”58 However, Molly’s comment that 
she does not “like books with a Molly in them” (U 18:896) suggests she did not enjoy 
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this particular tale. Joyceans are quick to note Molly’s more pornographic literary 
choices, due to Bloom’s statement in the “Wandering Rocks” episode that this type of 
book is “more in her line” (U 18:302). However, only two of all the novels Molly 
refers to are likely to be in this particular “line” and significantly, one of them is a 
book Bloom has chosen for her. In contrast, Molly’s thoughts are more often 
orientated by romances and mysteries. Molly more often remembers these categories 
of novels over sexually explicit works. It is unsurprising that this type of discourse 
resonates with Molly at this particular moment in her life. Molly’s present situation – 
her loneliness, boredom, dissatisfaction as a housewife, and undeviating desire for 
affection – contributes to her current preference for stories about romance and 
mystery. While a previous Molly may have enjoyed erotic literature, the character 
Joyce presents us with on June 16th 1904 is a woman progressively leaning toward the 
more popularly romantic values of love and intrigue.  
Molly’s reading choices suggest she values love in the romantic sense. 
However, they also reflect her inherent isolation, loneliness, and boredom. A final 
piece of literature thought of by Molly is The Gentlewoman, a journal aimed at bored 
housewives. As “an advertisement on page 229 of Willing’s says: ‘The 
Gentlewoman’ is bought by women, read by women, and as women spend nine-
tenths of what men earn, the moral is obvious.’”59 Molly is greatly influenced by 
fashion and succumbs to consumer fads. She wonders if that “antifat” is any good, 
wants “one of those kidfitting corsets … advertised cheap in the Gentlewoman with 
elastic gores on the hips” and remembers the marketed line, “what did they say they 
give a delightful figure line 11/6 obviating that unsightly broad appearance across the 
lower back” (U 18:888). Molly’s use of the words “delightful,” “obviating,” and 
“unsightly” further show illustrate how consumer discourse infiltrates her thoughts to 
create yet a another social language – this time of consumerism. Notably, this 
consumer discourse results in Molly’s remark that her “belly is a bit too big” (U 
18:888) – a rare instance of self-criticism – but Molly is also aware that “thin ones 
[women] are not so much the fashion now” (U 18:888). Molly resents that all the 
Blooms’ money goes on food and rent and believes, “you cant get on in this world 
without style all going in food and rent when I get it [money] Ill lash it around I tell 
you in fine style” (U 18:889). She “badly wants “a peachblossum dressing jacket like 
the one in Walpoles only 8/6 or 18/6” (U 18:928) and complains she has “no clothes” 
(U 18:889), not “even one decent nightdress” (U 18:896). Molly recalls she “felt 
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rotten” wearing one of her “old rubbishy” (U 18:891) dresses, but shifts to concede 
that “theyre coming into fashion again” (U 18:891).  
Like her husband Bloom, who “thinks he knows a great deal about a woman’s 
dress” (U 18:891), Molly is up to date on fashion and consumer trends. She worries 
about how all things get “dearer every day” (U 18:889), frets about her appearance, 
and values what other people think. Molly is, as Marilyn French writes, “a middle 
class woman with an eye to respectability.”60 Molly denounces the girls on bikes as 
“brazenfaced things on the bicycles with their skirts blowing up to their navels” (U 
18:882), and judges Bloom, who would “kiss anything unnatural” (U 18:925). Unlike 
Bloom, Molly cares about social perception. She condemns Bloom’s actions, 
“climbing over the railings” to get into the house, and is horrified by the thought “if 
anybody saw him that knew us” (U 18:913). Molly’s preoccupations with money, 
consumer goods, respectability, and materiality point to a middle-aged, middle-class 
woman who worries that without the right attire “the men wont look at you and the 
women try to walk on you” (U 18:889). Molly adopts a consumer-orientated social 
language that is highly gendered. Her thoughts recirculate the Irish advertising culture 
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which was “pervaded with 
discourses aimed at the female consumer.”61  
Reconciling	  Difference	  
The social nature of thoughts depends on complex cognitive processes. Consequently, 
the thought framework applied throughout this chapter is both extensive and 
convoluted. In mapping out some of these processes, this chapter provides an 
overview of many different theories – from Bakhtin’s dialogic, positioning theory, 
and reflexive self-positioning to reversal theory, motivational values, and social 
languages. This final section summarises the chapter’s main findings and seeks to 
evaluate what these findings might suggest in terms of Joyce’s characterisation 
strategies. 
To assist in a review of the chapter’s main theoretical terms and implications, I 
draw on a final excerpt from the text. Previous examples identified the motivational 
values of “power” and “achievement” as represented in Molly’s imagined scenarios 
with Bloom. This current example demonstrates how these same motivational values 
are also reconstituted through Molly’s memories of Bloom’s courtship. As with the 
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previous examples, the following excerpt suggests a power struggle occurring within 
the Blooms’ relationship. Molly explains to an imagined addressee that she liked 
Bloom because “[she] saw he understood or felt what a woman is” and because “[she] 
knew [she] could always get around him” (U 18:932). Molly remembers how she 
“gave him all the pleasure” and how she “led him on till he asked [her] to say yes” (U 
18:932). Finally, Molly recalls: 
how he kissed me under the Morrish wall and I 
thought well as well him as another and then I asked 
him with my eyes to ask again yes and then he asked 
me would I yes to say yes my mountain flower and 
first I put my arms around him yes and him down to 
me so he could feel my breasts all perfume yes and 
his heart was going like mad and yes I said yes I will 
Yes.      (U 18:933) 
Molly more frequently takes the leading role in her self-positionings. Just as 
Molly imagines seducing Bloom for material rewards, the above example shows 
Molly motivated by “achievement” since she seeks Bloom’s proposal. Molly’s I/Me 
exchange in the current example shows she positions herself as the more assertive of 
the two: “I put my arms around him yes and him down to me” (U 18:933; emphasis 
mine). Likewise, Molly thinks of how she initiated the proposal since she asks Bloom 
first with her eyes. Bloom acts more passively in response to Molly’s agency. As 
previously mentioned, the style of voice Molly adopts in this recollection is 
sympathetic, suggesting Molly’s motivational value is that of “love” since she adopts 
a style of affection and intimacy. However, again Molly’s style of voice combines 
across domains, since an autic style of voice is also evident in Molly’s self-orientated 
thought “well as well him as another” (U 18:933).  
As demonstrated through previous examples, Molly is motivated by “love,” 
“power,” and “achievement.” As the above excerpt (and this chapter more generally) 
demonstrates, Molly frequently appropriates a directorial position when imagining 
and remembering interactions with her husband. Molly remembers how she 
controlled Bloom with her body – she asks him with her eyes and gives him pleasure, 
leading him on. Likewise, she imagines she’ll “make him want [her]” (U 18:930) in 
the future. However, when Molly imagines or recalls sexual encounters with Boylan, 
Molly’s motivational values adapt accordingly. Molly’s contradictory articulations 
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suggest she is rediscovering her sexuality but is not yet fully committed to any of her 
expositions. Molly’s positions of sexual “freedom” and “enjoyment” never fully 
escape the underlying pull of conventionality.  
An assessment of Molly’s social languages has demonstrated how Molly’s 
inner speech responds not only to Bloom, but also to the social discourse of the book. 
Molly’s motivations and values, as evident through her discourse, socially situate her 
character in the storyworld of Ulysses. Although Molly aims at acceptance and 
conformity, she clearly lacks female friends and women in whom she can confide. 
Joyce accentuates Molly’s loneliness through the dialogic narrational form. Molly’s 
audience-directed interior dialogue represents a rope thrown between herself and 
another. She strives to connect with a social imaginary and to the world outside 7 
Eccles Street. Although Molly speaks to the female community, she does so primarily 
to rally their support. In this way, she attempts to shift the blame for her earlier 
indiscretions away from herself. Molly’s tendency for inclusivity is a way of 
ameliorating guilt by allowing the collective pronoun to speak for her.  
Arguably, then, Molly’s thoughts are directed at Bloom even more so than the 
female community, since her silent speech primarily aims to counter what could be 
perceived as Bloom’s silent accusation. Molly’s mental activity is primarily 
determined by Bloom – her social languages ultimately respond to her marital and 
financial situation, and her contradictions and reversals of voice show that she is 
motivated to regain control and achieve equilibrium within her tenuous marriage. So, 
while her thoughts might frequently aim at female camaraderie, Molly’s inner speech 
is essentially always already engaged in a dialogue with Bloom. In his book ‘Ulysses’ 
and the Poetics of Cognition, Hogan argues that like many intimately attached 
people, Molly and Bloom are “condemned forever to misunderstanding”62 because 
they are unable to experience one another’s thoughts. However, this chapter argues 
that despite each character’s physical and existential loneliness, Joyce does not 
portray Molly and Bloom as irremediably separate or isolated from one another 
mentally. Bloom’s wife Molly is an ever-present influence on his thoughts throughout 
the day.63 The same is true for Molly, whose thoughts are unavoidably orientated by 
her situation, which is in turn inevitably linked to her husband.  
Examining the social entities fundamentally shaping Molly’s mental activity 
inevitably generates some ideas about Bloom’s character and their marriage more 
generally. Molly’s imagined future scenarios with Bloom suggest she believes her 
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husband will continue to play an important role in her future. Her plans to manipulate 
Bloom suggest that she believes (or hopes) her husband is still vulnerable to her 
sexual charms. Likewise, Molly’s assertive self-positionings indicate Bloom tends to 
be the more passive of the two. Moreover, Molly’s agency and power over Bloom 
suggest that he is easily manipulable. Her opening thought, “Yes, because he never 
did a thing like that before as ask to get his breakfast in bed” (U 18:871), further 
substantiates these ideas. Molly is preoccupied with money and consumer goods; she 
resents her lack of financial independence, and places a high value on financial 
security. The fact that she is more inclined to scheme up underhanded ways to accrue 
money (rather than ask for it outright) suggests Bloom is stingy with his money. 
Again, this idea is further substantiated by Molly’s complaint that all their money 
goes on food and rent. Comparably, if it was her money she’d “lash it around I tell 
you in fine style” (U 18:889). Finally, Molly’s sympathetic style of voice and her 
literary choices indicate she is motivated to find companionship and love in the 
romantic sense. This is not to suggest Molly is motivated by “transcendence” or a 
spiritual unselfish love; rather, Molly seeks a physical selfish love to counter her 
loneliness, boredom, dissatisfaction as a housewife, and undeviating desire for 
affection. Molly’s dissatisfaction stands to indicate that presently, Bloom does not 
fulfil his wife’s romantic expectations physically.  
Just as any attempt to reconcile or affirm the Blooms’ marriage by way of 
Molly’s final “Yes” is problematic,64 what is most apparent from this chapter’s 
analysis is the irreconcilability of Molly’s character. In tangent with her fraught 
marital situation, Molly’s character is fraught with contradictions that cannot easily 
be reconciled. For example, while Molly’s autic stance toward companionship 
indicates Molly values love from a self-orientated perspective, Molly’s alloic stance – 
as evident when her dialogue engages with a host of imaginary others – suggests she 
is as the same time other-orientated. Although Molly hardly ever adopts another 
character’s perspective, she frequently seeks conformity and concurrence. Joyce’s 
paradoxical depiction of Molly – as egotistically self-centred yet romantically 
sentimental and other-orientated – generates a multileveled and complex yet 
psychologically convincing portrayal of her character. Moreover, the contradictions 
and differences implicit in Molly’s character work contribute to Joyce’s presentation 
of the Blooms’ marriage more generally. Joyce denies the reader any easy 
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reconciliation, by constructing husband and wife paradoxically through separateness 
and oneness, difference and sameness. 
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MAPPING	  BLOOM’S 	  MIND	   IN 	  “HADES”1	  
Rodin once called sculpture “le dessin de tous les cόtѐs.” 
Leopold Bloom is sculpture in the Rodin sense. He is made of an 
infinite number of contours drawn from every conceivable 
angle.2                                                  – Frank Budgen 
 
 
In “Penelope” Molly attests to Bloom’s multifaceted and complex character. 
However, since Molly’s comprehensive overview appears in the final episode of the 
book, the reader has likely already formulated his or her own idea of who Bloom’s 
character is. Despite this fact, Molly’s opinion closely resembles popular opinion. In 
her monologue, Molly suggests her husband is deceptive (U 18:919, 883), sly (U 
18:873, 879, 882), canny (U 18:910), persevering (U 18:883), pig-headed (U 18:885, 
891), sexually perverse (U 18:881), unmanly (U 18:890, 891), domestic (U 18:891), 
dutiful (U 18:920), knowledgeable (U 18:878, 883), inventive (U 18:909), foresighted 
(U 18:910), prudent (U 18:920), humble (U 18:872), mournful (U 18:921), and polite 
(U 18:872) – all characteristics traditionally attributed to Bloom in Joyce 
scholarship.3 Molly claims she knows Bloom well (U 18:873), yet knowledge based 
on familiarity does not necessarily correspond to objective and accurate observation 
of character traits. Familiarity breeds bias – be it positive or negative.4 For the most 
part, Bloom is Molly’s sole company and her primary source of entertainment – he is 
her lifeline to the world outside number 7 Eccles Street. Paradoxically, Molly 
determines Bloom’s homecoming and marks his journey’s end – she is the X on 
Bloom’s map. Just as Bloom’s thoughts continually return to memories or ideas about 
Molly, Bloom returns home to Molly’s sleeping form in the penultimate episode of 
the book. However, this close connectivity is often at the expense of the bigger 
picture and not without bias. While the previous chapter generated many ideas about 
Bloom’s character and his marriage to Molly more generally, the reader is wise to 
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consider how Molly’s attitude and current situation influences her thoughts about her 
husband.  
This thesis now moves from Molly to Bloom, using a cognitive framework to 
verify or falsify subjective accounts primarily substantiated by character or narrator 
suggestion. Unlike subsequent chapters, which focus on one specific cognitive theory, 
this chapter aims to cover many aspects of Bloom’s situated mind in one survey. This 
analysis of Bloom’s mind in the “Hades” episode is strategically placed as my second 
chapter, since it maps Bloom’s whole mind as it is situated in his entire environment 
– as it is embodied, socially distributed, and externally structured. In effect, this 
chapter provides a useful overview or introduction to the range of cognitive theory 
used throughout the rest of the thesis. This chapter provides evidence of an 
observable mind, locating Bloom’s mind in his body and behaviour (the embodied 
mind), in his social interactions (the socially distributed mind), and in the material 
world (the extended or external mind). Incorporated within this taxonomy of mind are 
some key cognitive concepts, most of which are introduced in this chapter but remain 
integral to this thesis more generally. For example, Andy Clark and David Chalmers’ 
active externalism, Varela et al.’s enaction, and discursive psychology’s discursive 
events continue to guide Bloom’s character analysis in many of the subsequent 
chapters.  
The	  Socially	  Distributed	  Mind 
The following reading takes a passage from the first half of Joyce’s “Hades” episode 
(marked specifically by the “carriage ride”) and critically examines it using theory 
from the interdisciplinary field of situated cognition. Throughout the course of this 
reading, questions directed at and guided by the above parameters of the embodied, 
socially distributed, and environmentally extended mind allow us to gain a greater 
depth of understanding about Bloom’s character than previously seen. In turn, this 
greater understanding can allow us to better verify or falsify Molly’s opinion and 
traditional accounts in Joyce scholarship more generally. Although we begin by 
looking at Bloom’s socially distributed mind, overlaps inevitably occur due to the 
synchronous nature of cognitive processes. There are many terms that correspond to 
my socially distributed mind category – other names being intermental thought and 
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intersubjectivity. A good description of what this chapter is	  interested in, however, is 
the sharing of minds facilitated by embodied interaction.  
Discursive	  Events 
To best examine social interaction within the fictional world, I borrow from 
guidelines derived from discursive psychology, best described by Shoshana Blum-
Kulka as discursive events. This real-world theory provides a useful method for an 
analysis of discourse as it is portrayed in the fictional social storyworld.  
The first of these events, the activity type, refers to “socially constituted, space- 
and time-bounded events”5 such as funerals, lectures, and meetings. Activity types set 
up constraints on participants and influence allowable “contributions, and preferred 
interpretations.”6 Discursive psychologists often use the term external framing to 
refer to the activity type. Likewise, the second discursive event, keying, is also 
sometimes referred to as “framing or rekeying.” Keying describes how people 
manipulate talk and how talk is subsequently interpreted. People can “key” talk as 
deceptive or earnest, contested or compliant. As Blum-Kulka explains, “Keying is 
dynamic: A verbal duel can start as play and become a real fight.”7 As we will see, 
keying can promote ambiguity. Consequently, it can be an effective method for 
approaching subversive or sensitive topics without giving offence. Next, generic 
resources are discursive events that refer principally to the discourse type. These are 
“culturally conventionalised discursive ways of achieving communicative ends, such 
as … describing objects, reporting an event, explaining a scientific process, or telling 
a story in conversation.”8 Generic resources are also effective tools for curbing 
conversation to meet personal agendas. Last, thematic frames differ from the previous 
discursive events since they have a more continual bearing on social interactions. A 
thematic frame has to do with “the participant’s perceptions of aboutness: the general 
theme of the conversation, the semantically congruent entities that together determine 
the conversational world of discourse.”9 As we will see, a thematic frame can exist as 
a semantic substratum – it may be hinted at but not made explicit to the participants. 
The interplay of all four of these discursive events directly influences each 
participant’s meaning-making processes. Just as Wittgenstein’s language-games10 
describe how meaning changes through use, these discursive events allow participants 
of talk to jointly manipulate and achieve meaning. 
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Indeed, the minds of Joyce’s characters in “Hades” become increasingly 
apparent through socially produced communicative acts. These discursive events are 
obviously linked to a situated mind approach, and more specifically the socially 
distributed mind, since they are interested in the situatedness of social acts. Similarly, 
just as the situated mind approach is orientated by the environment – or in literary 
terms, the social and material storyworld – a major focus for this piece is Bloom’s 
actions and interactions with objects and people. Inevitably, the minor characters 
Bloom interacts with are important, both in this scene and in Ulysses more generally. 
They contribute greatly to our character analysis since we are interested in jointly 
produced communicative acts, or in other words, the discursive. Minor characters do 
not reside within the storyworld simply to set the scene; rather, as Catherine Emmott 
explains, they should be considered as metaphors for physical and social space.11 The 
characters contributing to this particular social scene in Joyce’s “Hades” episode are 
characters specifically chosen and placed. Like chess pieces moved strategically 
across a board, Joyce sets up specific interactions between major and minor 
characters, be they pawns or knights, kings or queens.12 Through this interplay of 
social relations and social proximity, Joyce structures his major character Leopold 
Bloom – not through direct narration, but by deflecting and reflecting him off minor 
characters and the qualities or ideas those characters represent.  
It is often more revealing in terms of character to examine examples in the text 
that show the socially distributed mind failing for Bloom, rather than the rare 
examples of fully inclusive and successful intermental thinking. This is because Joyce 
mostly formulates occasions that create vacuity and social distance, developing his 
characters through what is unsaid and what is unachieved. The following quotation 
provides a clear example of Bloom’s blatant exclusion from the socially distributed or 
intermental thinking that occurs between the men in the carriage:  
Mr Bloom began to speak with sudden eagerness to 
his companion’s faces. 
—that’s an awfully good one that’s going the rounds 
about Reuben J. and the son. 
—About the boatman? Mr Power asked. 
—What is that? Mr Dedalus asked. I didn’t hear it. 
—There was a girl in the case, Mr Bloom began, and 
he determined to send him to the isle of Man out of 
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harm’s way but when they were both…  
—What? Mr Dedalus asked. That confirmed bloody 
hobbledehoy is it?  
—Yes, Mr Bloom said. They were both on the way to 
the boat and he tried to drown…  
—Drown Barabbas! Mr Dedalus cried. I wish to 
Christ he did!  
Mr Power sent a long laugh down his shaded nostrils.  
—No, Mr Bloom said, the son himself…  
Martin Cunningham thwarted his speech rudely. 
   (U 6:118) 
 Bloom’s sudden eagerness to talk is a result of his unease at the direction the 
conversation has suddenly taken. As the thematic frame shifts slightly to incorporate 
an anti-Semitic tone, Bloom attempts to cover his discomfort by participating in the 
group’s derision with a joke. This particular discursive event is an example of Bloom 
utilising a generic resource in an attempt to take control of the conversation. He fails 
in his attempt, for as Patrick Colm Hogan explains, “Esoteric jokes produce a feeling 
of intimacy with those who get the joke. Estrangement intrudes when we need to spell 
out the humour”13 – something Bloom has to do and fails at. Interestingly, the 
anecdote that Bloom chooses to retell surfaces a father–son or paternal theme that is 
discussed further throughout this chapter. The anecdote tells the story of Reuben 
senior’s attempt to break up his son’s relationship with a girl by sending him to the 
Isle of Man. The distraught son jumps from the boat and has to be saved by the 
boatman. The joke is that Reuben senior pays the boatman a mere florin for saving 
his son from drowning. Simon Dedalus’ vacillating relationship with his son is made 
more apparent when he announces drily in response that the father paid “One and 
eightpence too much” (U 6:118). 
Bloom’s failure adequately to express himself can be attributed to his own 
awareness of social difference and his consequent self-placement as an outcast. It can 
also be attributed to the men’s corresponding feelings that he is an outsider due to his 
ethnicity and his different opinions. Unlike Simon Dedalus he dignifies the bonds of 
sonship; unlike Jack Power he honours the union of marriage; and unlike Martin 
Cunningham he is not respected or influential within this social circle (D 157), 
preferring instead a position on the periphery. Such variance in social values marks a 
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clear contrast in the situational identities or the “shared presuppositions” of the 
men.14 What is occurring between Bloom and the other men in the carriage is not a 
sharing of minds, intimacy, or empathy, but instead alienation for Bloom, who is 
misunderstood regularly and who clearly does not fit in. This inability to fit in is 
intrinsically due to Bloom’s situational identity. However, throughout this passage 
Bloom’s position on the periphery is portrayed as more purposeful than it is 
imperative. Bloom does not actively seek approval and he rarely makes 
communicative moves to lessen social distance. Helping to inform my socially 
distributed mind category is discursive psychology’s communication accommodation 
theory or CAT. CAT examines how “speakers are motivated either to seek approval 
and indicate liking by bringing themselves and their interlocutors closer through their 
communicative moves, or alternatively, to create more social distance.”15 The above 
example clearly displays a barrier and consequent social distance between Bloom and 
the other men. Joyce uses these reoccurring gaps and spaces, disparities and 
distances, to manipulate social proximity and indirectly incorporate clues about 
character through contrast. 
Mr Power’s character is most obviously employed to develop disparity and 
distance. A revealing interaction occurs between Bloom and Power directly after 
Blazes Boylan is observed and greeted by the men. Bloom immediately averts his 
eyes from the other men; casting them downwards he reviews “the nails of his left 
hand, then those of his right hand. The nails, yes … He clasped his hands between his 
knees and, satisfied, sent his vacant glance over their faces” (U 6:115). I have 
emphasised the word vacant because I believe it highlights both the technique Joyce 
uses in this extract to establish Bloom’s social status as an outsider, and also the way 
Bloom freely conforms to this outsider position. Although, at the beginning of this 
extract he is directed by Martin Cunningham to take the “vacant space” (U 6:115), it 
is clear through this example that he is now freely adopting vacuity through his 
carefully composed “vacant glance” (U 6:115). That Bloom “sent” his vacant glance 
“out over their faces” portrays an action that is active and assertive. I suggest that the 
intent of Bloom’s glance is strategic – he attempts to reassert his position as an 
outcast and to stretch the social fabric even further in an effort to avoid any personal 
remarks or questions about his domestic life. Bloom’s vacant glance from his vacant 
space is an example of a particular social performance from a particular social 
position, and it is part of his overall social game-play. In addition, this example also 
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demonstrates how the embodied mind, or gestural cues, can be used to shut down 
social interaction and inhibit rather than support intersubjectivity.  
Unfortunately for Bloom, Power is not easily deterred from his conversational 
path, despite Bloom’s attempts at distance. Power persists in asking about Boylan’s 
upcoming concert tour with a series of questions directed at getting to the topic of 
Bloom’s wife and her activities: 
—How is the concert tour getting on, Bloom? … 
—Are you going yourself? … 
—Have you good artists? … 
—And Madame, Mr Power said, smiling. Last but not 
least.       (U 6:116) 
In reaction to this last comment Bloom “unclasped his hands in a gesture of soft 
politeness and clasped them” (U 6:116). Bloom’s indecisive gesturing exhibits his 
uncertainty about how he should respond to Power. Reexamining Power’s 
“goodlooking face” (U 6:115) for clues on how to react to this last comment, Bloom 
questions specifically the use of the title “Madame” in conjunction with Power’s 
smile. He reviews the interaction, reflecting that “I smiled back. A smile goes a long 
way. Only politeness perhaps” (U 6:116). Bloom’s inability to decipher Power’s 
meaning and interpret his smile marks an overall inability to achieve joint meaning 
and intersubjectivity. In effect, Joyce highlights the enlarging social divide that 
demarcates these two men.  
Mr Power’s ambiguous use of the term “Madame” is a good example of keying. 
Is Power being polite or playful, subversive or forthright? As suggested by Brian 
Phillips, a more detailed description of the embodied mind would aid the reader in 
deciphering Power’s comment.16 However, in spite of the absence of detail, Phillips 
proceeds to make the call that Power is mocking and ridiculing Bloom for the 
amusement of the other men in the carriage. Because Phillips’ theory is purely 
speculative, I hesitate to agree. He admits the shortage of sensory detail necessitates 
such things “must simply be puzzled out”17 but he does not draw on any observable 
evidence to show how he “puzzled” out his findings. All that can be said for certain 
about this interaction is that Joyce, true to form, uses an absence of overt information 
to compound our reliance upon an accretion of other subtle clues. Utilising the 
information we’ve gained so far on Joyce’s character places us in a better position to 
assess this question. Bloom guesses and hopes the intent is only “politeness perhaps.” 
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However, if we take into account Jack Power’s roguish disposition (as substantiated 
throughout the rest of this chapter), I suggest that it is unlikely that the intent of this 
discursive event is politeness, but rather, it is a speech act aimed at being playfully 
provocative. What could be a polite title is used impolitely and suggestively. And 
what Bloom hopes is perhaps a polite smile is intended instead to provoke. I do not 
want to claim that Bloom is wrong in his subsequent thought that Mr Power is a “nice 
fellow” (U 6:116); instead, I wish to underscore how social difference combined with 
this strategic language play can result in confusion and misunderstanding through the 
negotiation of potential meanings. 
There are many more examples of misunderstanding and Bloom being 
misunderstood in this scene. When Bloom surmises that a sudden death is “The best 
death” (U 6:119), the other men appear shocked and say nothing: “Their wide open 
eyes looked at him” (U 6:119). Bloom attempts to explain, saying that there was “–
No suffering … A moment and all is over.” (U 6:119). However, Bloom’s 
explanation does not reduce the men’s reserve and still “no-one spoke” (U 6:119). 
The only exception to Bloom’s inert intersubjectivity in this situation is his 
sympathetic awareness of Martin Cunningham. Cunningham and Bloom share what 
might be described as empathy. In their chapter “The Functional Architecture of 
Human Empathy,” Jean Decety and Philip L. Jackson describe empathy as a “natural 
ability to understand the emotions and feelings of others.”18 When Power rebukes the 
disgrace of suicide, unaware that Bloom’s father poisoned himself, Cunningham 
interrupts to conclude, “It is not for us to judge” (U 6:120), effectively saving Bloom 
from further discomfort. Bloom studies the face of his saviour, noting Cunningham’s 
“large eyes … Sympathetic human man he is. Intelligent. Like Shakespeare’s face” 
(U 6:120). This reference to Shakespeare’s face, also used to describe Cunningham in 
Dubliners (D 157), is repeated again in a moment of intersubjectivity in “Circe,” 
when Bloom and Stephen share a mutually inspired vision, seeing their combined 
reflection in the mirror as the face of Shakespeare (U 15:671). If we implement 
Colwyn Trevarthen’s definition of intersubjectivity here, as “an immediate 
sympathetic awareness of feeling and thought – of purposeful intelligence in others, 
as manifested through cultural learning,”19 Bloom’s observation and awareness of 
Cunningham’s intelligence and sympathy provide the reader with a rare example of 
intersubjectivity. This claim for socially distributed cognition is confirmed – or at 
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least supported – by Bloom’s thought: “He looked away from me. He knows” (U 
6:121). 
The	  Embodied	  Mind	  
As this chapter has so far shown, it is impossible to talk about the socially distributed 
dimensions of mind without also discussing the embodied mind – or the mind as 
evident through physical behaviours, such as facial expressions, body posture, 
gesture, eye movement, touch, and the use of space. As we have seen, body language 
plays a vital role in achieving intersubjectivity, manipulating meaning, and reading 
social situations more generally. This chapter now moves to look more specifically at 
Bloom’s embodied mind, demonstrating how Joyce’s representation of Bloom’s 
physical behaviours can assist in an analysis of character. An example of Bloom’s 
embodied mind occurs within the first few lines of my chosen episode when “Mr 
Bloom entered and sat in the vacant place. He pulled the door to after him and 
slammed it tight till it shut tight” (U 6:108).20 This example demonstrates how the 
narrator’s voice can become coloured by the idiom of the character. Bloom’s thoughts 
colour the narration, which in turn gives us clues about his mental state. We can 
expand this idea, borrowed from traditional narrative theory’s concept of free indirect 
discourse, by augmenting it with research from the cognitive sciences. The repetition 
of “slammed it tight till it shut tight” is traditionally viewed as indicative of Bloom’s 
social edginess and nervousness.21 I do not refute this view, but a claim can also be 
made that this particular thought and action sequence is an example of the phenomena 
known to cognitive science as “action loops.”22 Action loops explain a person’s initial 
rough mental estimation of an action or their pure thought, a state that is typically 
followed by the physical trying out of that pure thought. In his chapter “Narrative 
Theory after the Second Cognitive Revolution,” David Herman describes this process 
as “feedback loops.”23 Herman uses this idea to support his argument that, instead of 
seeing the mind as underlying behaviour, the mind should be placed “on the same 
footing as the world in which we think, act, and communicate” as part of a “mind-
body-language nexus.”24 Therefore, action loops (or feedback loops) show the mind 
as inalienably embodied.  
The claim that this particular instance is an example of an action loop depends 
on whether Bloom’s repetition “slammed it tight till it shut tight” is representative of 
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his actual ensuing actions (he needs two attempts to shut the door firmly), or if it is 
simply that he thinks on this action twice as a consequence of his social unease. In 
either case, the act of slamming the door and making doubly sure it is closed tight 
shows how the mind is embodied within the action. Either Bloom’s thoughts about 
his actions are an example of an action loop, and Bloom’s process of appraisal results 
in a botched attempt at closing the door, or they are simply representative of Bloom’s 
apprehension to get the task right the first time. Either way, the resulting argument 
remains the same – that this is an example of Bloom experiencing feelings of 
apprehension and unease. 
Joyce’s Ulysses resonates with recent cognitive theory since it blurs the 
boundaries between inner and outer by persistently breaching the divide between 
public and private. In the “Hades” episode Joyce stages mourning as a public 
spectacle.25 When Bloom “looked seriously from the open carriage window” (U 
6:108), his serious expression could be interpreted as an example of the embodied 
mind and, in consequence, his demeanour and personality. However, Bloom’s 
expression could also be attributed to his role of “mourner” as played on the public 
stage. The funeral cortege is a social event which works like a public stage, setting up 
constraints on participants and their permissible contributions.26 The reader needs to 
consider the more specific constraints on participants, such as seating arrangements, 
potential for eye contact, and the size of the social group. Does Bloom’s serious 
expression act as a socially performative or socially inhibited and inhibiting mask 
(taking on an expected role and position due to the activity type)? Or is it reflective of 
his overall state of mind and possible temperament – feeling serious and/or being a 
serious type of person? Or is it a combination of both personality and positioning? As 
the narrator observes this aspect of mind it is not presented to us as immediate and 
unmediated. However, if we take it in conjunction with our previous observation (that 
being Bloom’s caution to ensure the carriage door is tightly shut and/or his 
misapplication of this task), and remember that this earlier observation is unmediated 
(coloured by Bloom’s characteristic idiom), we can formulate that this seriousness 
represents Bloom’s state of mind and is not a social mask – since he already 
demonstrates a similar display of such deliberation. Bloom’s seriousness is 
substantiated by observable patterns. Therefore, it is less likely to be a mask put on 
purely to appease social expectation. Quite early, then, we witness a certain level of 
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solemnity, caution, and apprehension within Bloom’s actions and consequent 
disposition.  
For those who still argue Bloom’s seriousness is more necessary than natural 
and is due to an activity type that sets up sombre and serious behaviour as a social 
expectation, let me point out that not all characters in this scene conform to this 
expectation. Mr Power’s behaviour, or embodied mind, often contradicts the activity 
type. Although aware of the inappropriateness of his behaviour, Power is constantly 
portrayed throughout this passage as shading his amusement or choking his laughter 
(U 6:118). His overall demeanour indicates a more cheerful and less serious 
disposition. In direct contrast to Power’s concealed joyfulness or even outright 
laughter (U 6:113), Joyce depicts Bloom as “smil[ing] joyously” (U 6:109). So while 
Power is frequently presented as showing real joy and amusement, Bloom’s 
infrequent smiles are shown to be fake and/or forced.27 Bloom’s solemnity in this 
scene recalls Molly’s observation that Bloom would “go into mourning for the cat” 
(U 18:921). Notably, Bloom’s joyless smile follows his sighting of Simon’s son 
Stephen. Simon is quick to criticise his son’s activities and company and in response 
Bloom fakes a smile. Bloom is particularly sensitive to Simon’s lack of respect for 
his son. Even though Bloom currently plays the “mourner” within a funeral 
procession, he is also more characteristically a “mourner” since the death of his only 
son.  
When we examine the embodied mind within this passage using Herman’s 
mind-body-language nexus, it becomes apparent that Bloom rarely initiates talk in 
this scene. This is another clue that he feels socially uneasy. An example of Bloom’s 
reticence is found through his repetition of the thought “All waited” three times: “All 
waited. Nothing was said … All waited. Then the wheels were heard from in front 
turning … They waited still, their knees jogging” (U 6:108). And although the reader 
may initially question what this “waiting” is for (to talk or to move?),28 the answer is 
made apparent when Bloom thinks, “They waited still” even after “their carriage 
began to move” (U 6:108). This last point suggests that the waiting is not an 
impatience to get going, but is instead socially based. Bloom is waiting for someone 
to dispel the awkward silence and initiate conversation. His high awareness of this 
waiting reflects his discomfort; he does not, however, relieve this awkward waiting 
by making the first move to talk. It is instead Power who initiates conversation with 
his question, “What way is he taking us?” (U 6:109).  
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Even with no previous knowledge of Bloom before this particular episode, the 
reader’s awareness of his embodied mind and of the activity type helps to discern 
Bloom’s thoughtful, socially apprehensive, and respectful demeanour. These 
observations so far are in accord with Molly’s description of her husband as polite, 
dutiful, humble, and devoted to obsequies. Moreover, these observations are also in 
line with traditional views on Bloom as kind, level-tempered, submissive, and 
isolated.29 As previously hinted, what we also pick up very early in this episode is 
that there are some subtle and yet definite contrasts between Leopold Bloom and Jack 
Power and how they each negotiate this social scene. The social space Joyce creates 
between these two characters quickly amasses tension through disparity. This contrast 
is a tactical trend. Joyce plays these two characters against one another to gradually 
expose an underlying theme of conjugality. Bloom wonders if Power is an adulterer – 
“Who knows is that true about the woman he keeps? Not pleasant for the wife” (U 
6:116) – whereas Power potentially hints at being aware of Bloom’s wife’s imminent 
indiscretion(s) through his ambiguous use of the term “Madame” (U 6:116). What 
both men have in common is ironically what marks each as distinct. Both men are 
concerned about adultery. However, while Power is speculatively an adulterer, Bloom 
is concerned that his wife is possibly about to commit adultery, and possibly not for 
the first time. The other men in the carriage each have more certain roles within their 
marriages. We know for certain that Simon Dedalus is a widower and Martin 
Cunningham’s marriage, although not a particularly happy one – his wife “Leading 
him the life of the damned” (U 6:120) – is at least portrayed as monogamous.30 The 
uncertainty that surrounds both Bloom’s and Power’s domestic lives is reflected in 
their sensitivity to the topic of conjugality. This sensitivity creates for the characters 
what could be termed a thematic frame (to recall our discursive events), which, in 
turn, influences and directs a large proportion of the discursive practices in the scene. 
Conjugality is a substratum that directs almost all of the characters’ minds in 
this passage but never reaches the surface of the text. The characters in the scene 
make no direct mention of what is underlying and potentially deemed subversive. The 
men in the carriage belong to a society that enforces monogamous relationships 
within the institution of a Catholic marriage.31 The current situation sets up a dynamic 
where accepted practice and unaccepted behaviour collide. Like pieces on a 
chessboard, Bloom and Power, the two key players within this social interaction, 
come into this dynamic from opposing sides. Each has an ambiguous marital 
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situation, and each has his own reason for wanting to curb or control the 
conversation. Likewise, character disposition, social proximity, and physical setting 
are all factors contributing to this language game.32 As esteemed by Wittgenstein, 
such inner and hidden processes stand “in need of outward criteria,”33 and what is 
especially interesting for the reader is how Bloom outwardly participates in this 
interactive duel.  
As I have shown, the strategic game-play between these two men first becomes 
evident through an analysis of the embodied mind. As previously mentioned, Power, 
while aware of his social responsibilities – evident in his attempts to “shade” his 
behaviour and his consequent “rueful[-ness]” (U 6:119) – frequently neglects to 
adhere to conventional expectations. His mind, as embodied in his actions, shows him 
as often sheepishly amused and in high spirits. In accordance with his adulterous 
activities, Power is portrayed as aware of social convention but also as someone who 
does not conform. He attempts to cloak his actions. Bloom, in contrast, makes 
conscious attempts to smile and appease social expectations.34 In addition, there are 
also many examples where Power takes the lead in talk while Bloom chooses to 
remain taciturn. Is this yet another marker indicating that Power prefers to act while 
Bloom tends to be acted upon? Or does it instead point to an underhanded cunning in 
“slyboots” Bloom’s ultimate game plan?35 
The	  Environmentally	  Extended	  Mind	  	  
Using the concept of the environmentally extended or external mind to examine 
how “minds are spread out among participants in discourse, their speech acts, and the 
objects in their material environment”36 further highlights the sense of tension 
between Bloom and Power. How the mind extends throughout the material 
environment is a dual process. The mind interprets a reality or worldview, but it also 
creates or accomplishes its own reality. How characters’ minds map their 
environment, what they choose to consciously note, and how they interpret these 
things reveal much about them. Within this particular passage Power and Bloom are 
contrasted by what they choose to note and how they navigate their immediate 
environment. Where one (Bloom) observes the rain, the other (Power) remarks upon 
the return of the sun (U 6:112). This comparison is not surprising as it builds on what 
we have already gleaned about character disposition. Power tends towards 
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cheerfulness and is quick to note the bright side, whereas Bloom is more often silent 
and solemn. 
This passage also provides many instances of Bloom informing himself through 
this mapping process. An obvious example of this process is when he notes the 
“Dog’s home over there. Poor old Athos! Be good to Athos!” (U 6:112). Bloom’s 
location sets in motion a particular progression of thoughts that remind him of his 
suicidal father. These thoughts are individual to him – no one else would have the 
exact same chain of thoughts as prompted by the same environment. The way 
Bloom’s mind interacts with the storyworld provides clues to his character. Like a 
jigsaw puzzle, the more pieces begin to fall into place, the more we find evidence of 
Bloom’s mind as it is externally extended.  
Enaction	  
A cognitive approach very closely connected with that of situated cognition is the 
enactive approach.37 Integral to this approach is the idea that “a cognitive being’s 
world is not a prespecified, external realm, represented internally by its brain, but a 
relational domain enacted or brought forth by that being’s autonomous agency and 
mode of coupling with the environment.”38 Joyce’s text dramatises this process of 
enaction in the following:  
Martin Cunningham began to brush away crustcrumbs 
from under his thighs. 
—What is this, he said, in the name of God? Crumbs? 
—Someone seems to have been making a picnic party 
here lately, Mr Power said.    (U 6:111) 
The meaning of the crustcrumbs is not immediately obvious. Instead their 
significance is revealed by a number of situational factors. Extramarital sex as a 
thematic frame helps to determine a sexual connotation. The men in the carriage have 
become sensitive to this thematic frame, as it has gradually gained power through the 
prevailing collective. In consequence, sensitivity to this theme has established the 
significance of the crustcrumbs for the men – demonstrating how the mind 
codetermines the environment. The crumbs, which may otherwise have been ignored, 
not even warranting a mention, are immediately viewed as suspicious and “eyed [by 
the men] with disfavour” (U 6:111). The meaning and value of the crumbs are 
conjointly achieved. Kiverstein and Clark align this type of “close coupling” with 
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enaction, describing enaction as the “process by which meaning and value are said to 
be brought forth through the viable coupling of an autonomous system and its 
environment.”39 Subsequently, the characters in this passage grow into or arise from 
their interactions both with and within their environment. Significantly, it is Power 
who jests about a “picnic party” in the carriage, a comment not unlike today’s 
witticism about “campervans rocking” (in fact, the expression of the day was “once 
around the green”).40 This slightly comical situation also echoes Madame Bovary, a 
novel much admired by Joyce, in which Emma commits adultery “in a carriage with 
its blinds shut, coming into view like this over and over again, as secret as the grave 
and shuddering along like a ship at sea” (MB 228).41 
In his chapter on “Hades,” R. M. Adams astutely picks up on this idea of a 
picnic party and crustcrumbs but does not make the connection explicit. He interprets 
the crumbs as “the remnants of a sacramental feast”42 but fails to develop this idea. 
Instead, his intuitive remark that “Bloom will encounter ‘some crumbs, some flakes of 
potted meat’” later in his own bed is left open-ended. He loosely suggests that “the 
earlier passage must be read in light of the later one”43 without developing an 
argument for what the parallel implies. Here we see the advantages of implementing a 
cognitive framework directed by the distribution of the mind across the brain, body 
and the external world. Because the item is now viewed as part of a feedback loop 
extended between the external environment and the mind, and not merely as an item 
disjointed from the mind, we can anticipate and discern further connections.44 In 
typical Joycean style, the idea of the crustcrumbs gains weight through incremental 
accretion. The significance of Plumtree’s Potted Meat as a sexual marker45 is 
combined with that of the crumbs when Bloom later encounters on the clean bedlinen 
“additional odours, the presence of a human form, female, hers, the imprint of a 
human form, male, not his, some crumbs, some flakes of potted meat, recooked, 
which he removed” (U 17:862–63).  
In this passage Bloom’s mind navigates his local environment to interpret the 
significance of the crumbs many hours before he encounters them in his bed. Joyce 
frequently sets up such “metamotifs” throughout Ulysses that, as a technique, serve to 
anticipate, or at least resonate with later theories developed in the cognitive sciences. 
Here we see how Bloom’s interactions with objects, or in this instance his coupling 
with crumbs, anticipate this more recent cognitive term enaction and the idea that 
“every living organism enacts, or … brings forth the world in which it exists.”46 
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Whether Joyce consciously developed such techniques as representative of cognitive 
processes or whether he simply had a fondness for recycling symbols is debatable. 
However, if we consider Joyce’s uncanny accuracy in predicting cognitive processes 
and his effective representation of these processes through narrative techniques more 
generally, the former notion increasingly gains credence.  
Carriage rides with crustcrumbs support the thematic frame, but they also reveal 
much about character through discourse. How each man reacts to and interprets the 
crumbs reveals much about his positioning in terms of this topic. That all men eyed 
with “disfavour” the “mildewed buttonless leather seats” (U 6:111), where the crumbs 
are first observed, indicates the men act as one “intermental unit.”47 Palmer’s term 
encapsulates ideas about the distributed mind, showing how an idea can be shared but 
unspoken. However, if each man is showing displeasure, the displeasure is not shared 
equally. Simon Dedalus’s disdain is most evident as he “twist[s] his nose” and 
“frowned downward” (U 6:111). What is surprising is that he is portrayed as 
embodying the greatest distaste for the situation, yet his concurrent speech act 
contradicts these gestures. He remarks, “it’s the most natural thing in the world” (U 
6:111; emphasis mine), albeit with a sigh of resignation. Power’s reaction to the 
crustcrumbs is to brush off or trivialise the affair. He seems amused and jokes about it 
– a tactical move considering his alleged adultery. What is interesting, however, is 
that Bloom also shows little concern. For a man worried that his wife is involved in 
extramarital sex, he seems emotionally removed and untouched by the presence of the 
crumbs. As he sets his thigh down on the crumb-littered seat he casually thinks: “Glad 
I took that bath. Feel my feet quite clean” (U 6:111).  
The repetition of Bloom’s feeling of cleanliness in spite of the crumbs, first 
relating to Bloom’s feet and socks and later to his bedlinen, emphasises Bloom’s 
separation from the act. He reacts to the idea of the crustcrumbs and what they 
represent with no shame or culpability. Just as he simply removes the crumbs from his 
bed later in the “Ithaca” episode, he calmly sits himself back down amongst the 
supposed remnants of an illicit sexual act and feels himself “quite clean.” His 
subsequent indifferent thoughts about the poor darning of his socks reaffirm this sense 
of displacement – he removes himself from the situation through his conviction that at 
least his own paternal role is pure. That Bloom takes his role as a father seriously is an 
important aspect of his character. This is evident in his cognitive mappings. When his 
distributed mind maps his environment in this scene, he consciously notes, for 
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example, the “Gasworks” (U 6:112), which leads his mind through a chain of thoughts 
that progress from “Whooping cough” (U 6:112) to his daughter Milly. Or, in another 
example, he notes Simon Dedalus’ “angry moustache” (U 6:110), and thinks of him as 
a “Noisy selfwilled man” (U 6:110), but then concludes that he is right to be “Full of 
his son” (U 6:110) and ponders how it would be if his own son Rudy had lived (U 
6:110). Bloom’s mind turns seemingly unrelated cues from his environment into 
precursors for thoughts regarding his paternity. This shows the reader where Bloom’s 
primary concerns lie. Thus, although Bloom is often criticised as unassuming and 
passive, my reading of Bloom is that he does assume astuteness and agency, 
especially when it comes to family matters. Bloom’s actions are not spontaneous or 
obvious – they are calculated, crafty, and contrived. He plots and plans and positions 
himself primarily by his paternal concerns – concerns that originate independent of his 
perceived ethnic identity.48 
Active	  Externalism 
Theorists of active externalism and extended cognition see the mind as extended into 
the environment through “external props,”49 tools or artefacts (language included) in a 
way that, if taken in extreme measure, point towards a “seepage of the mind into the 
world.” This seepage broadens “our view of persons to include, at times, aspects of 
the local environment.”50 User–artefact dynamics are an important aspect for 
examining this episode. As demonstrated by the crustcrumbs, a focus on the 
relationship between Bloom and the objects within his immediate environment can 
reveal new patterns in addition to strengthening claims made previously, both about 
his character and about the underlying thematic frame. The following example reveals 
yet another object of interest: 
Mr Bloom at gaze saw a lithe young man, clad in 
mourning, a wide hat. 
—There’s a friend of yours gone by, Dedalus, he 
said. 
—Who is that?  
—Your son and heir. 
—Where is he? Mr Dedalus said, stretching across.  
  (U 6:109) 
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Bloom sees Stephen and notes specifically his “wide hat.” The relationship 
between Stephen and his father highlights for Bloom Simon’s right to be “full of his 
son,” but it also highlights for the reader the disparity between Simon’s notions of 
paternity and Bloom’s. Simon sees a son as a possession and attempts to establish his 
son’s identity by discovering where he is, placing him in “a physical frame of 
reference. It is Bloom who answers the question of who Stephen is, a ‘friend,’ a ‘son 
and heir.’ Bloom dignifies the bond of sonship that Simon facetiously degrades.”51 
Bloom acknowledges Simon’s paternal shortcomings through his subsequent thoughts 
of “the wise child that knows her own father” – a reference to Shakespeare’s Gobbo, 
another father who fails to recognise his own son (MV, II.ii.72). Thoughts of familial 
estrangement lead Bloom to think next of Simon’s estranged brother-in-law Richie 
Goulding, whom Bloom later meets for dinner in the “Sirens” episode. Significantly, 
Bloom recalls Goulding “on a Sunday morning, the landlady’s two hats pinned on his 
head” (U 6:110). Once again the “hats” are pointedly noted and remembered by 
Bloom.  
Like the crumbs, hats are an important marker both within this particular 
passage and in Ulysses as a whole. But, as Clark argues, it is the relationship52 
between the user and the object that demonstrates the mind as integrated in a process 
of off-loading onto external props. Bloom has a good relationship with his hat – that is 
to say, his mind often contemplates how it feels, how it fits, its placement, where it is, 
and how it appears. Why is Bloom so taken with his own hat and why does he note 
first the hats of other men? The following hat reference taken from within this passage 
may provide an answer: “Same house as Molly’s namesake. Tweedy, crown solicitor 
for Waterford. Has that silk hat ever since. Relics of old decency” (U 6:116). It is 
noteworthy that Bloom remembers the solicitor’s name, Tweedy, because it is the 
same as Molly’s maiden name. He also specifically remembers the solicitor’s silk hat, 
which recalls for Bloom the song “The Hat Me Father Wore” by Fergus McCarthy. In 
it, the chorus goes:  
It’s old, but its beautiful 
The best was ever seen,  
T’was worn for more than ninety years,  
In that little isle so green. 
From my father’s great ancestors 
It’s descended with galore, 
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’Tis the relic of old decency, 
The hat my father wore.53  
This song, which invokes themes of paternity and ancestry, provides an answer 
for why Bloom is so preoccupied with hats. Bloom takes special notice of hats 
because he interprets them as markers of paternity. Not only does he see men’s hats as 
paternal markers, he associates them with paternal purity and with the ancestral link 
provided through the son. Just as the crumbs constitute the world as being a certain 
way, hats too are viewed as “having the features they do, because of how they are 
disclosed and brought to awareness by the intentional activities of our minds.” 54 Mark 
Osteen discusses hats in Ulysses in his chapter “A High Grade Ha: The 
‘Politicoecomedy’ of Headwear in Ulysses,” but his interpretation differs somewhat 
from mine. Although he argues that Bloom’s fixation on hats supports Freud’s theory 
that “hats symbolise the male genitals,” he develops this idea to explain how in 
“Hades” hats function more as “symbols of social rank.”55 Reading this episode using 
a social and historical approach does indeed support this statement. However, 
borrowing from cognitive science allows us to advance on this perspective. Diverging 
from the notion of symbolism – which stands to oppose an anti-dualistic model of 
mind – we can further claims made through psychoanalytic theory regarding hats as 
phallic symbols56 and propose instead that hats are brought to awareness for Bloom 
through his sensorimotor coupling with the world.57 As Evan Thompson explains, a 
“sensorimotor coupling with the world is expressed in perception, emotion and 
action.”58  
Bloom’s perceptions, emotions, and intentional actions show his mind 
reconfiguring and refining what was a symbol of both social status and the phallus 
and reconstituting meaning. Evidence for this is found firstly within Bloom’s 
perceptions, as evident through his mental mappings. The previous example of 
Stephen’s hat (a map which leads Bloom to think of Stephen’s relationship with his 
father) and this last example (that shows Bloom’s thoughts circulating from Molly’s 
father’s surname, to an image of solicitor Tweedy’s silk hat, to the song “The Hat me 
Father Wore”) show Bloom linking hats with paternity. It is also demonstrated when 
Simon Dedalus later describes the deceased Paddy Dignam “—As decent a little man 
as ever wore a hat” (U 6:119); Simon’s comment unintentionally adds to Bloom’s 
“hat semiology.”59 Dignam leaves behind his wife and five children, the eldest of 
whom Bloom speaks of later in the episode: “poor boy! Was he there when the 
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father?” (U 6:129). However, the most relevant and revealing scene that supports this 
claim is the one where Bloom sights Blazes Boylan. It is, of course, the hat which is 
exclusively acknowledged: “From the door of the Red Bank the white disc of a straw 
hat flashed reply: passed” (U 6:115). There is no mention of Boylan’s additional attire 
and no comment regarding anything else about his physical appearance. Significantly, 
it is only the hat that Bloom sees.60 Bloom views Boylan’s hat as a white flash, 
effectively granting it a radiant appearance. In a later encounter, Bloom again 
recognises primarily Boylan’s “Straw hat in sunlight” (U 8:234). Bloom seems 
dazzled by this hat and displays a sort of reverence for it. This is reflected in his 
subsequent thought about Boylan: “Is there anything more in him that they she sees? 
Fascination. Worst man in Dublin. That keeps him alive” (U 6:115).  
If Bloom’s mind associates hats with paternity, then Boylan’s hat signifies for 
Bloom the concern that Boylan will impregnate his wife. Whether he is consciously 
aware of it or not, Bloom’s focus on Boylan’s hat and its inescapable visibility points 
towards an underlying apprehension that, where Bloom has failed to father a surviving 
son, Boylan might succeed. The hat represents for Bloom the virility and potency of 
Boylan’s seed, a seed “that keeps him alive” through an ancestral line. It also 
sensitises Bloom to the possibility that the ancestral “passing on of the hat” could 
occur as a result of Boylan’s adulterous union with Molly. Ironically, Bloom’s fear of 
Boylan’s potency is later revealed to be unfounded when Molly laments in postcoital 
reflection that “he [Boylan] hasn’t such a tremendous amount of spunk … Poldy has 
more spunk in him” (U 18:877). Immediately preceding Bloom’s glimpse of Boylan 
in this passage, Bloom was already thinking of him – “He’s coming in the afternoon. 
Her songs” (U 6:114) – and looking, whilst thinking this, at the inside of his own hat, 
his mind making a note of the label “Plasto’s” (U 6:114). This suggests that Bloom’s 
mind is already connecting his hat and its shortcomings (his hat, although “high 
grade,” is now old and worn – the label is missing a “t” [U 4:67]) to Molly’s sexual 
and consequent reproductive potential. He makes this link even before Boylan appears 
“airing his quiff” (U 6:115) and gallantly flashing his vibrant and virile hat. Both 
Bloom and Boylan are therefore “hatless” when they encounter each other. Not only 
does this mean that Bloom gets a welcome reprieve from having to salute Boylan as 
the other men in the carriage do; it also hints at a situation which Freud would 
interpret as Bloom’s castration (if the hat were seen purely as a phallic symbol), but 
	   62	  
that I otherwise interpret as Bloom enacting through his material world his ever-
present sense of failure to produce another son. 
Not only does this idea of hats as markers for paternity, decency, and ancestry 
relate directly to Bloom’s character; it also contributes to the thematic frame of 
conjugal purgation. As mentioned before, Bloom is intrinsically orientated by his role 
as a father and a husband. Rather than fulfil his needs through extramarital sex and 
run the risk of fathering a child out of wedlock, he finds an outlet for his desires both 
through his epistolary affair with Martha Clifford and through his later voyeuristic 
masturbation in the “Nausicaa” episode. What is noteworthy is that Bloom chooses to 
hide the evidence of his correspondence with Martha within the leather headband of 
his hat: “The sweated legend in the crown of his hat told him mutely: Plasto’s high 
grade ha. He peeped quickly inside the leather headband. White slip of paper. Quite 
safe” (U 4:67). The hat, for Bloom, is not only associated with paternity. It acts as a 
protector. It covers the evidence of Bloom’s epistolary fantasies, indirectly protecting 
his paternal purity and decency through the concealment of his less virile ventures. 
In keeping with Joyce’s fondness for recycling images and circulating signs, 
what seems to be an unremarkable act concluding the “Hades” episode furthers the 
theme of paternity through the hat as a cognitive marker. Bloom, in an apparent act of 
kindness, points out a “dinge” (U 6:146) in John Henry Menton’s hat: “—Your hat is 
a little crushed, Mr Bloom said, pointing” (U 6:146). Menton, who is still bitter about 
losing to Bloom in a game of bowls, and ultimately losing the contest for Molly’s 
affections, does not receive Bloom’s kindness agreeably. Instead, his “short” thank-
you suggests he considers this an act of contention. Bloom’s speech act is a good 
example of the discursive event introduced earlier as keying but also known as 
“internal framing.”61 The social dynamics of the interaction promote ambiguity and 
call into question Bloom’s intent. Does this act demonstrate Bloom’s considerate 
tendencies? Or is it rather an example of his underhandedness, showing him jockeying 
for position? Although the word “crushed” refers materially to the hat, it can be 
rekeyed and personified to suggest the familiar concept of being emotionally crushed. 
The parallel here is implicit and it calls into question the popular view that this act 
attests to Bloom’s “kindness.”62 And if “hats” represent paternity for Bloom, all other 
occasions where he fixes, saves, and returns hats to men throughout Ulysses are 
inevitably cast in new light. Although Menton’s present paternal situation is not 
explicitly stated, his prospects for reproducing with Molly are prematurely crushed. In 
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“Eumaeus” Bloom brushes off and returns Stephen’s hat to him as he leaves the 
brothel, and then later in the episode recalls how he saved and returned Parnell’s hat 
when it was dropped in the crowd – Parnell’s thoughts were “miles away from his hat 
at the time” (U 16:761). Both Stephen, who has a history of sexual encounters with 
prostitutes, and Parnell, who fathered three children out of wedlock, are as careless 
with their hats as they are with their paternal seed – they are certainly not figureheads 
of paternal purity. Bloom’s hat interventions may be more self-serving than 
customarily perceived, since his local environment represents more for him than 
accounted for by most previous scholarship. These “considerate” acts are determined 
more by Bloom’s own preoccupation with posterity due to the way his mind 
manipulates his material surroundings than by a genuine concern for the hat owner or 
the hat itself. 
Joyce orchestrates his characters through the storyworld and his storyworld 
through his characters. His transactions between character perception, action, and 
storyworld can be fruitfully interpreted using research from situated cognition, which 
suggests the mind is embodied, distributed, and extended, and therefore always 
embedded and enacted within the world. Bloom’s embeddedness is most apparent in 
the following example: 
They went past…the Queen’s theatre: in silence. 
Hoardings. Eugene Stratton. Mrs Bandman Palmer. 
Could I go to see Leah tonight, I wonder. I said I. Or 
the Lily of Killarney? Elster Grimes Opera Company. 
Big powerful change. Wet bright bills for next week. 
Fun on the Bristol … 
He’s coming in the afternoon. Her songs. 
Plastos. Sir Philip Crampton’s memorial fountain 
bust. Who was he?     (U 6:114)  
This extract shows how meaning-making is intrinsically tied to sociohistorical 
setting. Both character and reader are, at the same time, vulnerable to the influence of 
their unique place in space and time. On the one hand, a reader with no background 
knowledge of popular culture in 1904 Dublin is potentially presented with a 
superficial text, since meaning comes from context. On the other hand, the character 
is unavoidably embedded in the social storyworld and is coloured by the latent social 
and historical presence of the contemporary media. How different is this scene if we 
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read it with an embedded understanding (knowing what the character knows) and 
with awareness, in turn, of this character’s cognitive embeddedness? Firstly, we 
discover that the actors and the plays Bloom makes note of add to the substrata or 
thematic frame of this passage. There is no way of knowing how many other theatre 
hoardings are on display; all we know is that Bloom notes only those that can be 
linked either directly or indirectly to the theme of marriage and adultery. As Zack R. 
Bowen writes: 
…the Lily of Killarney [is] an opera which involved 
the ruin of the innocent “Colleen Bawn” by a Don 
Giovanni-Leporello combination with whom, in turn, 
Bloom associates Blazes Boylan. The operatic 
association combines with the title of the forthcoming 
musical Fun on the Bristol to produce the subsequent 
Boylan reference (“He’s coming in the afternoon. Her 
songs”) as Bloom thinks of Boylan’s prospective fun 
on the jingling bedstead.63   
This particular opera clearly touches on some sensitive topics for Bloom. In 
addition, Eugene Stratton, who was a blackface stage performer of the time, is later 
thought of by Bloom as “Othello black brute” (U 15:573) in “Circe.” Bloom 
remembers that Molly “longs to encounter men of colour,”64 like Desdemona in 
Othello. Further, this scene contributes to the paternity theme through Bloom’s 
interest in Leah – an adaptation of S. H. Mosenthal’s Deborah65 – which is a play 
Bloom’s father was always talking about. A scene from this play that is of particular 
interest for Bloom is “where the old blind Abraham recognises the voice…—
Nathan’s voice! His son’s voice!” (U 5:93). Bloom’s specific sociohistorical setting is 
structuring, supporting, and contributing to his mind. Bloom collects and collates 
isolated signs from his environment to make his own unique mind montage. 
Discourse is restructured and reassembled in a manner depending on how it is made 
relevant to him and him alone. Ultimately we see an image emerging, a picture of 
Bloom’s mind which always returns home, customarily coloured by his familial 
concerns. The passage ends with the men exiting the carriage upon arrival at the 
cemetery. I look last at the following passage that depicts Bloom’s thoughts 
immediately before Martin Cunningham shoves open the door to let them out: 
	   65	  
Cramped in this carriage. She mightn’t like me to 
come that way without letting her know. Must be 
careful about women. Catch them once with their 
pants down. Never forgive you after. Fifteen.  
                             (U 6:126)  
I pinpoint this quotation for two reasons. Not only does it mark the end of our 
passage, but it also pinpoints a moment of realisation that greatly influences Bloom’s 
subsequent activities. Throughout this entire episode it is clear that Bloom’s concerns 
lie within the domestic realm. His joyless smiles are merely a mask for these 
concerns. His reaction to the crustcrumbs, his awareness of hats, and his attempts at 
social distance all contribute to the overarching theme of conjugality, and more 
specifically, paternity and paternal purity. Bloom’s acknowledgement that it would be 
foolish to catch Milly with her “pants down” can be equated with a decision about 
Molly’s impending affair. Bloom lumps his concerns about the sexual activities of 
both Milly and Molly into one problem, just as he earlier thinks, “Molly. Milly. Same 
thing watered down” (U 6:111). For a man so orientated by the domestic and the 
familial, it would be unsettling to think that his only family, the two women in his life, 
would “never forgive him” should he bear witness to their indiscretions.  
Bloom becomes increasingly aware of the negative consequences of 
confrontation. However, he is yet to make any final decisions regarding his marital 
situation. The social storyworld has incrementally contributed to Bloom’s processing 
of this problem. As we have seen, from the first lines of the selected passage through 
to the last scene, Bloom’s mind seeps out into his environment, off-loading onto his 
material setting. He reflects on his dilemma using different cognitive markers 
throughout his environment. As representational cues, they allow him to process his 
insecurities about his paternal and conjugal roles. Bloom’s deliberation on this matter 
is consistent with my reading of Bloom’s character as calculated and foresighted. The 
lens cognitive science provides magnifies and enlarges the more common 
conceptions66 about Bloom to reveal how intricate threads of meaning criss-cross the 
character in a continuum of the mind as distributed through the social storyworld. And 
since the storyworld incorporates not just objects but also the social, an account of 
discursive events further develops these new insights.  
This chapter has demonstrated how Bloom accepts and sometimes even 
facilitates his own alienation to protect his domestic privacy. Likewise, Bloom’s 
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apparent politeness is often used as a tool to maintain social distance through 
decorum. Moreover, Bloom’s “abundant good-will,”67 compassion and sympathy68 
are shown as more self-interested than previously thought. Contra to Steinberg, 
Bloom does bathe in self-concern,69 albeit in a private and unobtrusive manner. 
Bloom is often serious, solemn, and sorrowful. These characteristics are not solely 
attributable to his attendance at a funeral; rather, as Molly suggests, Bloom is more 
characteristically “mournful.” Although Bloom’s sympathetic acts remain considerate 
at a surface level, they are nonetheless imbricated by his underlying personal 
motivations. A cognitive frame reveals how Bloom’s kind acts often originate from 
his personal and familial preoccupations rather than what have been previously 
represented as genuine human sympathies. I have shown Bloom as even more 
purposefully strategic than the Homeric parallels identified by most critics have 
traditionally conceived – he is not only “wily and cunning”70 but also sly and socially 
self-situating. Like a chess player, he moves strategically – his positioning is 
premeditated and purposeful. Molly’s description of Bloom as looking “slyboots as 
usual” (U 18:882) is therefore an accurate assessment. And even though what we have 
learned about Bloom so far is largely in line with Molly’s final overview, the 
advantages of this cognitive framework remain clear. Not only does this framework 
counterbalance any character bias, it also provides for us a much greater depth of 
understanding about Bloom’s character. We’ve shown thematic threads unfolding 
through objects and characters in ways previous scholarship has not seen. These 
thematic threads constitute substrata that further disclose the complexity and depth of 
not only Bloom’s character but also Ulysses as a whole. 
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‘Plumtrees Potted Meat’ are definitely of a sexual nature” (9). Joyce scholarship typically argues that 
the newspaper ad, “What is home without Plumtree’s Potted Meat? Incomplete. With it and abode of 
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of Criticism (New York: Vanguard Press, 1963). Contra to this perspective I show Bloom’s familial 
concerns originating independent of his perceived ethnic identity. 
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SEE ING	  AND	  SAYING	   IN 	  “LESTRYGONIANS” 	  
As demonstrated in the preceding chapters, a better understanding of how identity is 
achieved in real people enables a better understanding of Joyce’s fictional characters 
as model persons.1 In the first chapter I discussed how identity is achieved through 
discourse – through Molly’s reflexive positioning and discursive choices. The second 
chapter developed this basic conception of identity, as it is expressed predominantly 
through discourse, to examine how identity is likewise a process firmly grounded “in 
social interaction and within social practice.”2 Similarly, this current chapter 
examines how Joyce stages Bloom’s identity through his character’s discursive and 
socially communicative acts, focusing on what David Herman calls “scenes of talk,” 
which “are also scenes of identity-construction, social positioning, and the 
negotiation of gender roles.”3 However, while the preceding chapter maps Bloom’s 
whole mind and introduces a diverse range of cognitive theory borrowed from the 
field of situated cognition, this chapter looks more specifically at how Bloom’s gaze 
behaviour relates to his discursive choices.  
“Lestrygonians” is an episode about the reading of surfaces. Joyce is concerned 
with the relationship between what is revealed and what is suppressed or concealed. It 
is an episode about knowledge versus blindness – about what can and cannot be 
known. Relationships between the external and internal, between appearance and 
thought, complement a cognitive framework based on the premise that cognitive 
processes criss-cross the brain, body, and environment. Even when the narrative 
focuses on the representation of a character’s innermost thoughts (which are 
traditionally viewed as internally located and organism-centred), Joyce anticipates 
recent research in situated cognition to treat such thoughts more meaningfully as 
externally orientated and distributed. Alan Friedman recognises Bloom’s character as 
emphatically outwardly orientated, writing “Bloom is a man … for whom the exterior 
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world most emphatically exists.”4 Bloom’s external orientations emerge as embodied 
actions, which in turn work to reveal the concealed and disclose the undisclosed. In 
my first chapter I discussed the nature of thoughts and questioned the absolute 
privacy of thoughts. The intentional aspects of so-called private thoughts are often 
made apparent through embodied actions such as eye contact, facial expression, and 
other body language cues. Through Bloom’s character, Joyce accurately represents 
this process, showing how the intentional aspects of Bloom’s thoughts relate to an 
extensional orientation – as evident through social behaviour and action. Moreover, it 
is precisely within the space between Bloom’s intent and action that the nuances of 
his character begin to appear. 
Discursive psychologists argue that personal identity is situated and negotiated 
in this middle ground between social action and communicative intent. Studies 
examining the way identity is “situated and negotiated through discourse in 
intergroup interactions”5 reveal how important discourse practice is in shaping 
identity. Both language use and non-verbal behaviour equally affect how people 
negotiate intent, meaning, and action in social interaction. Detailed studies of these 
social behaviours suggest that communicative intent and bodily behaviour are highly 
coordinated synchronous processes.6 Research on cognition in interpersonal 
communication describes how “people communicate what they truly believe or intend 
by their body postures, facial expressions, gestures, and so on, in contrast to what 
their words often express.”7 Correspondingly, this chapter compares Bloom’s speech 
acts (his words) with his (not so private) thoughts. Bloom’s speech acts can be 
reinterpreted, authenticated, or refuted, through a close examination of synchronous 
body language, which in turn helps readers to substantiate and/or contest traditional 
ideas about Bloom’s character. 
Seeing	  in	  Lestrygonians	  
Previously unremarked aspects of Bloom’s character reveal themselves through his 
social and communicative behaviour. However, what is most notable about Bloom’s 
social encounters in “Lestrygonians” is Joyce’s special focus on Bloom’s eyes. Not 
only are Bloom’s eyes of special interest, but so too are the eyes of all the characters 
in this episode. This chapter notes the extent to which this theme permeates the 
narrative, and examines what Joyce achieves by its use. My survey begins with 
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Bloom’s use of eye directives, such as “See that” (U 8:192), “See?” (U 8:194), 
“Watch him … Watch!” (U 8:201, 202), and “Look at that woebegone walk of him” 
(U 8:209). By my count Bloom directs either himself or another character to “look” a 
total of fourteen times in this episode. Both Bloom and Mrs Breen will offer to show 
something: for example, “Show this gentleman the door” (U 8:211) or “Wait till I 
show you” (U 8:198), a total of four times. However, as this chapter discusses in 
greater depth, for all Bloom’s insistence on looking, seeing, showing, and watching, 
he ultimately chooses not to see: for example, “Can’t see it. If you imagine it’s there 
you can almost see it. Can’t see it” (U 8:211), and finally Bloom’s ultimate conflict to 
“Look for something I … Won’t look … Not see. Not see” (U 8:234).  
Throughout this episode there are also a large number of eye descriptions. 
However, Joyce acknowledges that unlike one’s hair, nose, ears, or teeth, eyes can 
relay more about a character than appearance alone. Throughout Ulysses Joyce gives 
infrequent details about character appearance, choosing to focus instead on character 
behaviour. In accordance, in “Lestrygonians” Joyce rarely depicts his characters’ eyes 
as static objects, such as “two large eyes” (U 8:198). Rather, Joyce recognises eyes as 
embodied and expressive. Joyce’s eye descriptions are therefore more often 
descriptions of eye behaviour, such as “His heavy pitying gaze” (U 8:201), “a rapt 
gaze” (U 8:201), “Their eyes bulging” (U 8:215), “sad booser’s eyes” (U 8:215), 
“glasseyed sheep” (U 8:217), “Flowers her eyes were … willing eyes” (U 8:224), 
“tearwashed eyes” (U 8:226), “Light in his eyes” (U 8:234), and “His eyes beating” 
(U 8:234). These descriptions of eye behaviour tell us much about the character’s 
present condition and emotion. The reader can pinpoint, for example, from these 
descriptions alone, Joyce’s characters’ pity, rapture, sadness, oblivion, enthusiasm, 
fervour, and panic.  
This episode is rich in examples of modes of looking or instances where the 
eyes are active – showing expression, emotion, and intent. These different modes of 
looking show how Joyce uses either the eyes of his characters or an eye metaphor to 
communicate character emotion and intention. For example, the phrase Bloom’s 
“gaze passed over” (U 8:192) Mrs Breen demonstrates his intended sly surveillance. 
Similarly, when Bloom “looked still at her holding back behind his look his 
discontent” (U 8:200), he deliberately attempts to conceal his emotion. Joyce 
frequently describes modes of looking using relative direction. Bloom often looks 
forward, backwards, round, and upon: for example, he gazes “after the last broad 
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tunic” (U 8:206), he gazes “round the stooled and tabled eaters” (U 8:215), he looks 
“upon his [Nosey’s] sigh” (U 8:221), “His downcast eyes follow … the silent veining 
of the oaken slab” (U 8:224), and he both “foresee[s]” (U 8:198) and sees “ahead of 
him” (U 8:202). The coordinates of Bloom’s directional sight can be read either 
literally or metaphorically, to indicate Bloom’s present intent, past reflection, and/or 
future speculation. Finally, Joyce ascribes eyes an unlimited range of other uses, 
senses, and functions. Bloom’s eyes seek “answer” (U 8:193), take “note” (U 8:212), 
speak (U 8:216), and “Almost taste … by looking” (U 8:218). Bloom worries that 
“the eyes of that cow will pursue … [him] through all eternity” (U 8:210) if he eats 
beefsteak. Similarly, another character falls “in love by her eyes” (U 8:195). 
Correspondingly, eye behaviour is also used analogously to further Joyce’s 
description of other body parts. Consider Bloom’s “limp seeing hand” (U 8:231) and 
the blind stripling’s “eyeless feet” (U 8:231), for example.  
Many Joyce scholars have picked up on the use of eye imagery in this episode 
and discussed the concept of the gaze in Ulysses more generally.8 This chapter 
augments this previous criticism with a framework substantiated by the most recent 
advances in situated cognition to show how the modality of vision – as a component 
of the embodied mind – can generate new insight on character identity.9 However, the 
implications surfacing from the use of the term gaze cannot be ignored. The gaze 
comes in many forms: the psychoanalytic or Lacanian gaze, the feminist theorists’ 
male gaze, the postcolonialists’ imperial gaze, the Foucauldian power, knowledge, 
and surveillance gaze, the philosopher’s phenomenological gaze, and so on. There is 
no need for these previous theories on gaze to be dismissed, discounted, or 
discredited for my current cognitive literary use of gaze to take precedence. It is 
narrow-sighted to insist that, for example, the Lacanian gaze must be sorted into its 
own box while these more recent advances from cognitive sciences are placed in 
another. There is no reason to restrict our reading to one or the other. Just as this 
thesis argues that there is no fixed thesis on mind nor fixed type of evidence that 
trumps all, this current theoretical analysis does not pioneer one approach and use 
only that approach as it was originally founded. Often in the time since one particular 
theory was popular, advances in other areas are able to disprove or advance upon the 
relative ideas – ideas that are not frozen in time but adaptable, flowing, and 
regenerative. 
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The term gaze as I use it in this reading is a cognitive term. However, due to the 
multidisciplinary nature of cognitive studies, this term unavoidably emerges as a 
conflux influenced by previous branches of research. As a cognitive term it is more 
accurate to talk of gaze behaviour. Gaze behaviour is used as an umbrella term to 
encapsulate ideas about eye language (communication) and eye contact 
(reversibility). Applying ideas about gaze behaviour to the fictional world of Ulysses 
enables a comprehensive analysis of Bloom’s different modes of looking, which in 
turn can be tied to the differences between his reciprocity and disengagement, 
assertion and passivity, subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and objectification.  
The	  Mind’s	  Eye	  	  
Just as the progression from thought to speech act demonstrates the inner-outer flow 
of mind through discursive practice, eye language also demonstrates a 
multidirectional flow of mind through embodied cognition. Eye language moves 
fluidly within the space between outer appearance and inner intent. The proverb “the 
eyes are the windows to the soul” conveniently depicts this dynamic. Eyes can project 
inner intent (whether wittingly or not) while also absorbing external information. 
They assist in negotiating a public persona and in regulating discourse in interactional 
situations. The proverb “the eyes are the windows to the soul,” even in its oldest 
variant forms, aligns seamlessly with a modern approach interested in the embodied 
mind. This proverb in its oldest form, dating back to Marcus Tullius Cicero (106 BC–
43 BC), “ut imago est animi voltus sic indices oculi, the face is a picture of the mind 
as the eyes are its interpreter,”10 highlights how eyes read appearances – in this 
instance facial expressions. A more recent variation, dated 1545 AD, “The eyes are 
the wyndowes of the mynde, for both ioye & ange are seen through them,”11 
emphasises instead how eyes can likewise project information to be read. Variant 
forms of this proverb demonstrate how past philosophical writings both 
acknowledged and examined the inextricable link between eye and mind.  
Many more recent technological advances within the field of developmental 
cognitive neuroscience have enabled researchers to revisit this age-old question of 
how eye language works in human communication.12 Of special interest are the 
dynamics of mutual gaze and how these can successfully encourage socially 
distributed cognition. The importance of mutual gaze in social relationships is 
assessed in Beata Stawarska’s article “Mutual Touch and Social Cognition.” 
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Stawarska develops on the foundational theories of both Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s 
dynamics of embodiment and Martin Buber’s I/thou relation to distinguish between 
social observations and social relationships. Stawarska argues that without the 
reciprocity of mutual gaze people tend to regard each other not as subjects but as 
objects. According to Stawarska, where people look can tell us a great deal about the 
relationships people construct: “looking at the eyes, when reciprocated by the other, 
enables an I/Thou relation where the self and other regard each other as subjects, 
while looking at the body produces an I/It relation where the other is regarded as an 
element of the visual field.”13 There is no ground for intersubjectivity if there is no 
mutuality, or what Stawarska terms “reversibility.” The other becomes deprived of 
personhood and consequently objectified.  
Advancing from Starwarska’s article, Rauthmann et al. examine the connection 
between eye contact, communication (eye language), and personality in their article 
“Eyes as Windows to the Soul: Gazing Behaviour is Related to Personality.” Using 
highly specialised and sophisticated eye-tracing technology, Rauthmann et al. present 
evidence that personality traits, specifically neuroticism, extraversion, and openness, 
are manifest in gazing behaviour.14 Their research advances on previous studies to 
show gazing behaviour is linked not only to personality but also to regulatory 
behaviour, intent and motivations, wishes and preferences, communication, and 
mood.15 This large range of connections between gaze, personality, and behaviour 
works to further substantiate my use of gaze behaviour as a parameter for 
investigating fictional character in “Lestrygonians.”  
“Lestrygonians” offers a rich sampling of character interactions as well as a 
narrative highly focused on eye contact and gaze behaviour more generally. This 
chapter looks in particular at four different extracts, as marked by four separate social 
interactions: Bloom and Mrs Breen’s encounter; Bloom’s interactions in Davey 
Byrne’s pub; Bloom’s interaction with the Blind Stripling; and last, Bloom’s chance 
encounter with Blazes Boylan.  
Bloom	  and	  Mrs	  Breen	  	  
The first extract is marked by Bloom’s encounter with Josie Breen on Westmoreland 
Street. If eye contact is indeed an important marker for both personality16 and social 
relations,17 examining how Joyce represents both Bloom’s and Mrs Breen’s eye 
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movements during this exchange promises to add meaning to each character’s 
discursive constructions, which will consequently reveal more about each character. 
The first mention of sight in this particular extract is Bloom’s observation that Mrs 
Breen has “no other [children] in sight” (U 6:198), indicating he shifts his gaze to her 
belly to gauge if she is pregnant. Bloom’s immediate gaze on Mrs Breen’s body is 
echoed by her reciprocal gaze on him – Mrs Breen’s following comment that Bloom 
is “in black I see” (U 8:198) indicates she likewise immediately employs an 
objectifying gaze.  
Although both characters initially employ an objectifying gaze, this gaze is only 
momentary. Bloom and Mrs Breen are socially familiar and share a past. Their 
existing familiarity makes an immediate denial of personhood difficult. As such, it 
makes better sense to read their initial objectifying gaze as less superficial and more 
socially strategic, since each character looks to the other for clues regarding their 
present physical condition – clues which are then usefully deployed as talking points 
to promote conversation and further sociability. In support of this argument, the 
reader need only look a further ten lines ahead (excluding the embedded narrative) to 
find the first mention of eye contact. This occurs when the comment that it is “Sad to 
lose the old friends” is said “melancholily” by “Mrs Breen’s womaneyes” (U 8:198). 
Mrs Breen effectively communicates her mood through her eye language. However, 
some readers might argue the narrator reports on and describes Mrs Breen’s 
“womaneyes” and therefore it is the narrator and not Bloom observing her eyes. This 
argument clearly complicates my claim for an early establishment of eye contact 
between these two characters.  
In response, a more careful account of this passage reveals this segment of 
narrative as another example where the narrator’s voice is coloured by the figural 
idiolect of the character. David Lodge suggests this technique of condensing two 
words – otherwise known as “agglutinations”18 or “nonce words”19 – effectively 
allows authors to better represent a character’s thoughts. Since “the word actually 
mimes what it signifies,”20 these “nonce words” effectively represent a mental image, 
or what cognitive science calls “qualia.”21 Joyce frequently uses this narrative 
technique to blur the boundaries between the character’s inner thought and the 
narrator’s outer omnipresent perspective. In Ulysses Joyce frequently treats both 
Stephen’s and Bloom’s thoughts as externally orientated, which allows character 
idiolect to be more readily adopted by the third-person narrator.22 Accordingly, if 
	   78	  
Joyce uses this technique to simulate the fast and fragmentary quality of thoughts, it 
follows that these “nonce” words belong to a character’s thoughts rather than the 
narrator’s perspective. The mention of Mrs Breen’s “womaneyes” is therefore the 
first evidence in this extract of eye contact – of Bloom looking at Mrs Breen’s eyes.  
This instance describes the impression Mrs Breen’s eyes have on Bloom and 
demonstrates how the eyes can actively infer emotion. Although Mrs Breen does not 
verbally express her feeling of melancholy, Bloom needs only to observe her eye 
language to perceive her emotion. This example also demonstrates Bloom instigating 
intimacy very early on in this exchange. In “Circe” the reader learns through Bloom’s 
unconscious events (or hallucinations, as they are often called) the extent to which 
Bloom and Mrs Breen share a past. In this episode, Bloom talks of “For old sake’sake 
… you know I had a soft corner for you” (U 15:574), and in response Mrs Breen 
muses about “Love’s old sweet song” (U 15:574). The reader learns that Bloom 
courted Josie persistently, sending her a Valentine, claiming that the Josie Powell that 
was “was, the prettiest Deb in Dublin” (U 15:574). This comment mirrors Bloom’s 
thought in “Lestrygonians” of the “Josie Powell that was” (U 8:200), recalling for the 
reader their shared past. Furthermore, this comment helps to explain Bloom’s initial 
high levels of gaze and his establishment of eye contact. Bloom’s past romance with 
Mrs Breen makes it impossible for him to immediately disregard her as a mere 
element within his visual field. 
A second interpretation of Bloom’s high levels of gaze suggests that Bloom’s 
visual assertiveness is not purposefully driven, but rather, that it is a reflexive 
reaction. Although I believe it to be a less convincing explanation, it is an avenue 
worth considering. In his research review on gazing behaviours, Chris Kleinke 
discusses a study by Griffit, May, and Vetch, which found that participants “gazed 
more at opposite-sex peers when they had previously been exposed to sexually 
arousing slides.”23 While Bloom has not been viewing sexually arousing slides prior 
to his encounter with Mrs Breen, he was having sexually orientated thoughts and 
mentally picturing Molly: “Swish and soft flop her stay made on the bed. Always 
warm for her. Always liked to let herself out … Happy. Happy. That was the 
night…” (U 8:197). These sexual memories – Bloom’s visual slides of the past – are 
presented to him in full succession but then prematurely obstructed by Mrs Breen’s 
interruption “—O, Mr Bloom, how do you do?” (U 8:197). Griffit, May, and Vetch’s 
findings could help to explain Bloom’s initial high levels of gaze and his more 
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immediate review of Mrs Breen’s body. However, these findings do not extend to 
fully explain Bloom’s more specialised use of eye contact, which is purposefully 
deployed to promote openness and intimacy. 
Both interpretations are valid in that one does not discount the other. Both 
purposeful and reflexive cognitive processes work synchronously, in what Antonio 
Damasio describes as a symphony24 – a performance from multiple sections 
unfolding in perpetual harmony, continuously responding to and negotiating with 
multifarious sounds. We can maybe attribute some of Bloom’s gazing behaviour to 
reflexive or primordial responses. However, we can certainly attribute Bloom’s more 
specific use of eye contact to his purposeful and calculated attempts at establishing 
effective communication, reversibility, and intimacy. Just as Bloom later directs 
himself to “Look straight in her [Mrs Breen’s] eyes” (U 8:199) when he wishes to 
convey his belief in her and to encourage her trust, Bloom’s attempt at eye contact in 
this particular instance is well timed. Bloom asks after Mrs Breen’s husband, 
knowing Denis Breen has a history of mental illness. Bloom carefully approaches this 
sensitive topic looking simultaneously into Mrs Breen’s “womaneyes.” In this 
example Bloom instigates a particular mode of looking that works to establish trust. 
In response, Mrs Breen turns “up her two large eyes” (U 8:198) to meet Bloom’s 
when she replies to his question. Although Bloom assertively plays the eye contact 
card first, this countermove is required for the pair to achieve reversibility and 
intimacy. Reversibility stands for the “double experience of seeing and being seen”;25 
therefore, a mutual awareness between self and other, or a mutual gaze, is imperative 
for interpersonal relations and intersubjectivity to succeed.  
Mrs Breen’s response indicates that she interprets Bloom’s question favourably 
and as kindness. Rather than interpret Bloom’s question as nosiness and dismiss it by 
avoiding eye contact and/or changing the subject, Mrs Breen responds with trust and 
relief, eager to have someone to confide in. When Mrs Breen produces from her bag 
the postcard her husband received and discloses the related story, her eyes fix 
“themselves on him [Bloom] wide in alarm yet smiling” (U 8:199). Not only does 
this example demonstrate Mrs Breen’s continued embodied openness, but it also 
expresses her complex mix of emotion. Mrs Breen’s eye language suggests she is 
trying to make light of the situation. She attempts to diminish the concern that her 
eyes cannot conceal. Mrs Breen’s “smiling” eyes help to mask the awkwardness 
implicit in relaying information that is both personal and embarrassing. Despite her 
	   80	  
discomfort, Mrs Breen’s eye language in this exchange embodies openness and 
indicates a significant level of trust. This easy reversibility points to Bloom’s and Mrs 
Breen’s shared past. It also suggests that Mrs Breen values Bloom’s opinion and 
discretion. 
Mrs Breen’s openness marks that she is receptive to him, seeking from him 
information, support, or advice. However, does Mrs Breen interpret Bloom’s question 
correctly and is her trust in his kindness warranted? Just as Bloom thinks as he runs 
into Mrs Breen that he “May as well get her sympathy” (U 8:198), this chapter 
reveals how not all of Bloom’s actions stem from the best of intentions. Bloom’s 
immediate focus on Mrs Breen’s smiling eyes (as evidenced by these two mentions in 
quick succession) demonstrates his openness to the immediate experience of 
interacting with her. As Rauthmann et al. explain, individuals exhibiting openness 
“increase eye fixation points when watching gestures of other people, possibly to 
obtain more information.”26 However, Bloom’s desire to encourage Mrs Breen’s 
response and to obtain information about her current domestic life is not necessarily a 
sympathetic gesture. This chapter now moves to incorporate into its analysis theory 
from discursive psychology that can help substantiate an argument against Bloom’s 
sympathetic or kind intentions in this scene. Bloom’s speech acts point toward his 
character traits. However, this chapter suggests that many of Bloom’s discursive 
constructions, as evident through both talk and thought, can be reinterpreted, 
authenticated, or refuted when analysed in close relation to his synchronous gaze 
behaviour. 
Saying	  in	  Lestrygonians	  
Theories borrowed from discursive psychology, or more specifically, from 
conversation analysis, help to support the argument for Mrs Breen’s familiarity and 
openness. What is most remarkable about her discursive acts is the high use of 
proverbs – for example, “Getting on like a house on fire” (U 8:198); “He’s a caution 
to rattlesnakes” (U 8:198); and “All on the baker’s list” (U 8:198). Proverbs work on 
the premise that both participants share a collective consciousness. As Harvey Sacks 
argues, “proverbs are not critically examined or revised when applied to 
contemporary situations. Far from being nebulous or inadequate they are among the 
most robust of cultural objects.”27 However, it is only Mrs Breen who uses a high 
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number of colloquial sayings. Although Bloom’s personal thoughts contain proverbs 
– for example, “Turn up like a bad penny” (U 8:198) – he refrains from using 
proverbs in his speech acts in this scene. Bloom’s discursive acts therefore suggest 
that he does not feel as closely connected to Mrs Breen as his earlier gaze behaviour 
would indicate. This argument can be substantiated by a review of Bloom’s 
subsequent gazing behaviour as it progressively unfolds in this scene. 
Bloom initially responds to Mrs Breen’s disclosure by “letting her speak” (U 
8:199) and encouraging her trust. However, once Mrs Breen has revealed the gossip 
on her husband and returned the controversial card back into “her untidy bag” (U 
8:200), both Bloom’s gazing behaviour and discursive constructions begin to take an 
increasingly negative path. The change in Bloom’s gaze behaviour and discourse 
suggests that his social and communicative goals are likewise changing. This is 
however a chicken-and-egg situation. Has Bloom been looking for reasons to justify 
incorporating social distance all along? Or does his increasing negativity suggest that 
with his social objectives achieved, Bloom is no longer motivated to promote 
intersubjectivity?  
Mrs Breen’s evident “alarm” whilst discussing her husband coincides with 
Bloom’s increasing discomfort. Although Bloom asks after her husband, knowing it 
is a sensitive subject, he does not respond kindly to Mrs Breen’s emotional appeal. 
This discomfort, though later verified by Bloom’s self-directive to “change the 
subject” (U 8:200), is more easily apparent in Bloom’s immediate gaze behaviour. 
Superficially, Bloom reverts to observing Mrs Breen’s clothing and untidy 
appearance, using condescending adjectives: “same shabby dress she had two years 
ago, the nap bleaching … Wispish hair over her ears. And that dowdy toque … 
Shabby genteel. She used to be a tasty dresser. Lines around her mouth” (U 8:200; 
emphasis mine). As N. M. Angus, J. W. Osborne and P. W. Koziey explain, “When 
one looks away, or breaks off gaze frequently, it may indicate a desire to maintain 
psychological distance and to avoid receiving or sending messages that are emotional 
or threatening.”28 It is likely, then, that before Bloom thinks to change the subject and 
before he can formulate a verbal response to shut down the current conversation, he 
reacts more immediately at an embodied level, shutting down reversibility and 
increasing psychological distance by reverting to an objectifying gaze. Bloom’s 
discursive choices likewise indicate he aims at psychological distance. Bloom notes, 
“the eye that woman gave her, passing, Cruel. The unfair sex” (U 8:200), which is 
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arguably less what the passing woman projects, and more a projection of his own 
judgments as informed by his former appraisal or “eye” on Mrs Breen’s body. Bloom 
uses the female stranger as a form of mental scapegoating – removing self-reproach 
by transferring the blame for his negativity on to the “unfair sex.”  
In this example, Bloom’s discursive choices match his simultaneous gazing 
behaviour. He reverts to negative thoughts while also reverting to an objective gaze. 
Bloom’s gazing behaviour in this scene is deployed as a socially strategic measure. 
Bloom employs an objective gaze to distance himself from Mrs Breen’s emotional 
appeal. Shifting his gaze to Mrs Breen’s static appearance allows Bloom to shut down 
any previously established intersubjectivity. Furthermore, Bloom uses Mrs Breen’s 
appearance as a measure for social categorisation. In effect, he creates a social divide 
that enables him to justify his reticence. Bloom’s social behaviour in this scene is 
representative of what Semin and Smith call an “action-orientated representation,”29 
in that Bloom’s mind’s eye relies on discourse models such as “traits, social 
categories, stereotypes, and other components of person impressions”30 to guide 
appropriate social action. Bloom’s objective gaze furthers his awareness of Mrs 
Breen’s unkempt appearance, which in turn furthers discord. Accordingly, Bloom 
realises he and Mrs Breen are now different people and social distance invariably 
ensues. Just as positive actions espouse positivity, Bloom’s negativity (his 
objectifying gaze) in response to Mrs Breen’s emotional appeal generates further 
negativity and the breakdown of sociability.  
Bloom’s early attempt to establish both positive familiarity and openness is also 
a strategic manoeuvre, ultimately aimed at meeting social objectives. Bloom knows 
exactly how to use eye contact and gazing behaviour to achieve social regulation. As 
discussed previously, Bloom shifts his gaze from one of mutuality and openness 
(when attempting to promote communication and gather information) to one of 
separation, distance, and evasion (when it is his turn to offer information or when the 
conversation makes him uncomfortable). A second example supporting this claim is 
the line “He looked still at her. Holding back behind his look his discontent” (U 
8:200). Bloom is strategically concealing his true feelings by inhibiting the 
transference of emotion through eye language. Although the immediately obvious 
cause of Bloom’s discontent is hunger – “I’m hungry too” (U 8:200) – 
contextualising this example through both the discursive and nondiscursive elements 
in this scene reveals an additional reason for his discontent. In this scene the reader 
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observes Bloom switching from positive familiarity and intimacy to negative 
familiarity and contempt. Bloom now focuses on Mrs Breen’s “same shabby dress … 
that dowdy toque,” and complains “she used to be a tasty dresser” (U 8:200; 
emphasis mine). This brings us back to Bloom’s preoccupation with the Josie Powell 
“that was” (U 8:200, 15:574), a preoccupation which recolours his earlier comment, 
“she hasn’t lost them (her eyes) anyhow” as less kind, and more dismissive in intent. 
Mrs Breen’s failure to meet Bloom’s unrealised ideal contributes to Bloom’s 
discomfort and discontent. This idea is amplified by the fact that Bloom’s relationship 
with Molly similarly borders on disrepair. Bloom’s discontent is not solely due to his 
hunger, but also it stems from his present disillusionment that both women, who in 
his younger years represented the ideal, appear now as increasingly flawed. 
The scene with Mrs Breen demonstrates that Bloom understands the importance 
of eye contact in establishing interpersonal experiences and furthering 
communication. Accordingly, it is reasonable to assume Bloom retains this awareness 
in all subsequent social scenes throughout the rest of this episode and throughout 
Ulysses as a whole. There are many instances in this episode where Bloom’s 
purposeful lack of eye contact indicates he deliberately stifles the possibility of 
effective social interaction. The avoidance of eye contact also demonstrates Bloom 
playing the role of a social actor, using the embodied mind to manipulate scenes of 
talk to best suit his social agenda. 
Bloom	  in	  Davey	  Byrne’s	  Pub	  	  
Bloom’s interaction with Nosey Flynn in Davey Byrne’s pub further substantiates the 
idea that Bloom uses gaze behaviour to manipulate his social agenda. This pub scene, 
when compared with Bloom and Mrs Breen’s encounter, is markedly deprived of eye 
contact. When conversing with Nosey, Bloom instructs himself to “look at his 
mouth” (U 8:219) and he “looks upon his sigh” (U 8:221); the only time Bloom does 
engage in eye contact is when he raises his eyes and meets the “stare of a bilious 
clock” (U 8:219). Bloom’s lack of eye contact reframes how we might read his first 
utterance upon entering the bar, which is a request to “let me see … let me see” (U 
8:218). The disparity between Bloom’s discursive request to “see” and his subsequent 
gaze behaviour further underscores a degree of purposeful deliberation determining 
what Bloom does choose to observe. He decisively looks at the shelves of food and 
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the tins of sardines, which he can “almost taste … by looking” (U 8:218). Bloom 
looks everywhere and at everything besides the person he is conversing with. He 
spots a tin of “Plumtree’s Potted Meat” (U 8:218) and is reminded of the advertising 
campaign surrounding the product. What captures Bloom’s attention in this scene is 
not the social but the superficial – the surface layers of advertisements, food products, 
shelves, wooden fittings (U 8:218, 8:222), and the appearance and clothing of the 
other bar patrons. Bloom focuses on aesthetics; he notes the superficial planes of the 
wood, and “the way it curves there” (U 8:221). He is quick to see Nosey’s runny nose 
and flappy ears, but all the while purposefully evades mutual eye contact and in 
consequence any platform for mutuality or reversibility. The discursive elements in 
this scene help to explain Bloom’s avoidance of eye contact and his gaze behaviour 
more generally. After the standard cursory greetings the conversation immediately 
proceeds to Nosey Flynn’s question, “—Wife well?” (U 8:210), which is clearly a 
subject Bloom wishes to avoid. When Nosey asks next if she is “—Doing any singing 
those times?” (U 8:210), Bloom’s initial response is to direct himself to “look at his 
[Nosey’s] mouth. Could whistle in his own ear. Flap ears to match” (U 8:210). These 
shallow and disparaging observations are reminiscent of Bloom’s earlier 
objectification of Mrs Breen, following his discomfort at her emotional appeal.  
Social situations are grounded by both discursive and embodied acts. As 
Herman writes: “interlocutors as well as analysts can take the true measure of 
discourse only in situ – by considering utterances as part of more global environments 
for sense-making.”31 To examine discursive displays within a situated mind approach 
I recall the guidelines discussed in the previous chapter, described by Shoshana 
Blum-Kulka as discursive events. The “socially constituted, space- and time-bounded 
events”32 within this scene generate Bloom’s feelings of obligation. He feels obliged 
to partake in conversation: he is after all restricted to the bar area (a customary social 
space) and, since he has expressed an interest in lunch, he is forced to remain for the 
time taken to eat it. Both time and space contribute to the social pressure. This is 
evident in Bloom’s frequent glances at both the clock on the wall and his watch (U 
8:227). Nosey notices Bloom’s frequent timekeeping gestures and asks Davey Byrne, 
“didn’t you see him look at his watch … if you ask him to have a drink first thing he 
does he outs with the watch to see what he ought to imbibe” (U 8:227). Nosey also 
remarks that Bloom is known for cunningly slipping “off when the fun gets too hot” 
(U 8:227). Bloom’s insistence on looking at his watch is important for two reasons. 
	   85	  
First, it suggests Bloom is anxious about the time – Bloom knows Boylan is due to 
call on Molly at four. And second, it suggests Bloom is socially uneasy. Bloom uses 
his watch as a social prop – it provides a form of social escapism by allowing him to 
act disinterested with his present surroundings or to indicate he has somewhere else to 
be. Bloom uses his watch much as people today use their cell phones. And just as 
using cell phones in some social situations is increasingly regarded as a form of bad 
manners, Bloom’s constant time checking likewise conveys a lack of social decorum. 
Despite his sense of social obligation, Bloom often chooses to disregard social 
decorum when it best suits his own agenda. Although Bloom is demonstrably 
respectful of the activity type (the funeral procession) in the previous chapter, 
Bloom’s serious and “mournful” characteristics enable him to better conform to that 
particular situation. In contrast, this current activity type calls for social interaction. 
Bloom’s attempts at avoiding sociability and his inability to conform to this activity 
type arguably call his politeness further into question. Where possible Bloom makes 
the required contributions. For example, when Bloom is cornered by Nosey at the bar 
he begrudgingly participates in socialising, thinking even though Nosey “Knows as 
much about it as my coachman,” it is “Still better tell him” (U 8: 219). However, the 
bar scene works both for and against Bloom’s desire to escape social interaction and 
if an opportunity for social avoidance arises, Bloom is quick to take advantage. For 
example, Bloom uses the transaction of ordering a meal and the consumption of food 
as excuses to avoid actively contributing to the conversation. Bloom sidesteps 
Nosey’s question about his wife’s concert tour and “Who’s getting it up?” (U 8:219) 
with the convenient arrival of and payment for his food. The arrival of Bloom’s food 
is a fortunate distraction, granting him time to better formulate an appropriate 
response to Nosey’s intrusive question. Bloom’s response is consequently cleverly 
keyed to restrict further questioning – he replies, “Getting it up? Well, it’s like a 
company idea, you see” (U 8:219). Bloom’s use of the expression “you see” is 
strategic since it is self-referential and uses the concept against itself. This allows 
Bloom to answer without providing new information. Unfortunately for Bloom, 
Nosey plays his bluff, suddenly remembering the details on his own accord. No 
longer requiring Bloom’s empty information, Nosey recalls “—Ay, I remember now 
… Isn’t Blazes Boylan mixed up in it?” (U 8:219) – an underhanded and contesting 
remark that causes Bloom “a warm shock of air heat” (U 8:219). Characteristically, 
Bloom blames this emotional response on the mustard and avoids confronting the 
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actual cause of his emotion. Just as Bloom avoids all personal conversations that 
might transpire with other patrons in the bar, he likewise avoids a confronting 
conversation with himself in his refusal to acknowledge the real cause of his 
emotional reactions. 
While Nosey continues to talk about Blazes Boylan, Bloom distances himself 
from the conversation, concentrating instead on the dewdrop precariously hanging 
from the tip of Nosey’s nose. Bloom then uses Davey Byrne’s entrance as a 
distraction and an opportunity to return his attention to his food, his wine, and the rest 
of the bar: “Not logwood that. Tastes fuller this weather with the chill off. Nice quiet 
bar. Nice piece of wood in that counter. Nicely planed. Like the way it curves there” 
(U 8:219). Bloom begins with an objective description of the bar, saying it is “good” 
or “nice” but then progresses to a subjective account, saying he likes the way the 
wood curves.33 Bloom’s easy transition from an objective to a subjective account of 
the bar further highlights, through disparity, the lack of subjectivity or personal 
descriptions Bloom allocates to his concurrent social interaction. Bloom is quick to 
react personally and subjectively to objects in the bar and to the bar’s aesthetics, but 
he resists forming this same type of relationship with characters in the bar. He 
establishes personal distance, not by removing himself to the other end of the bar, but 
by employing the pragmatics of social interaction in tactical ways. Bloom’s gaze 
behaviour represents the synchronous embodiment of his antisocial intent. This is 
most evident in Bloom’s categorical observations and descriptions of the objects in 
the bar, Nosey’s body included. Bloom allows his vacant gaze to pass over the 
superficial objects in the bar, “letting on to be awfully deeply interested in nothing” 
(U 12:420).  
To	  See	  or	  not	  to	  See?	  
The image of Bloom’s “downcast eyes” following the “silent veining of the oaken 
slab” (U 8:224) signifies his overall attraction of the visual over the verbal in this 
scene. His downcast eyes also recall the recurrent image of Bloom’s heavy, large-
lidded or half-closed eyes, not only in this episode but also throughout the entire text. 
Wilheim Fuger argues that this is a symptom of Bloom’s “continual attempts to settle 
the conflict between the Vorrei e non vorrei by compromise,”34 or to walk the middle 
line. Joyce often describes Bloom physically in terms of his eyes – he has “dark eyes” 
(U 11:334), “greasy eyes” (U 11:334), a “cod’s eye” (U 12:391), and a “backward 
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eye” (U 4:74). However, Joyce’s insistence on Bloom’s “dropped lids” (U 5:86) and 
his frequent “half closedeyes” (U 3:74) is especially significant because it exemplifies 
a major theme underpinning this episode, that being Bloom’s inner conflict of 
whether to see or not to see. This theme parallels Bloom’s existential dilemma 
regarding whether to know or not to know. Throughout the entire day Bloom debates 
whether to confront Molly’s affair or to remain, superficially at least, in the dark.  
Eye contact and eye language are crucial for communication, social relations, 
and for conveying personality traits. Bloom’s half-closed eyes embody his tendency 
to avoid social interaction and to remain withdrawn. They are also symbolic of his 
reluctance fully to see what is going on around him. Recalling the proverb “The eyes 
are the windows to the soul,” which describes how eyes both read external 
information and project internal intent, Bloom’s heavy lids suggest he is both obscure 
to read – “A bloody dark horse” (U 12:435) – and hesitant to acknowledge the reality 
of his current predicament. As in “Calypso,” he chooses to keep the blinds half shut 
(U 4:74). He keeps the reality of Molly’s imminent affair out of focus. Bloom’s inner 
conflict about how to address this problem – how to reframe the picture rather than 
shut it out in denial – resembles Bloom’s visual experiments at the beginning of 
“Lestrygonians,” when he attempts first to see with his eyes half closed – “His lids 
came down over the lower rims of his irides. Can’t see it. If you imagine it’s there 
you can almost see it. Can’t see it” (U 8:211) – and secondly, to blot out the sun: 
“The tip of his little finger blotted out the sun’s disk. Must be the focus where the 
rays cross. If I had black glasses” (U 8:211). Bloom’s remark “If I had black glasses” 
further suggests his desire to semi-obscure his sight and to shut out the reality of the 
day.  
Bloom	  and	  the	  Blind	  Stripling	  
Bloom’s encounter with the blind stripling works as a testing ground for his 
experiments with visual acuity. The preponderance of sight images in this scene 
marks this particular interaction as a culmination of Joyce’s sight metaphor. Not only 
does Joyce underscore ideas about sight by introducing a character who cannot see; 
he elaborates this theme by endowing his blind character with “eyeless feet” (U 
8:231) and a “limp seeing hand” (U 8:231) to effectively suggest that a lack of vision 
is all-encompassing – that it is embodied, affecting not only the eyes but the whole 
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bodily experience. Moreover, Joyce allows Bloom to demonstrate he is aware of the 
extent to which blindness affects all aspects of life and body. When Bloom ponders 
how it must be to be “with a woman, for instance. More shameless not seeing” (U 
8:232) or, when he questions the effect of blindness on the “sense of smell” and 
“tastes” (U 8:232), Bloom reformulates blindness as an all-encompassing embodied 
experience.  
In contrast to the pub scene, Bloom’s attempts at (not) seeing through another’s 
eyes and at walking in another’s shoes in this scene demonstrate he is actively aiming 
at intersubjectivity and seeking an interpersonal connection. As already discussed, 
successful interpersonal relations rely upon mutual gaze or reversibility. Bloom 
attempts to counteract the physical impossibility of achieving this type of reversibility 
with the blind stripling by using a combination of touch and imitation. Bloom 
“touched the thin elbow gently: then took the limp seeing hand to guide it forward” 
(U 8:231). Stawarska describes how “mutual touch and mutual gaze produce an 
analogous effect of directly connecting with the other person”;35 however, although 
Bloom is actively touching, the stripling remains passive and makes no attempt to 
reciprocate touch or accept Bloom’s hand or guidance. Mutual touch therefore does 
not occur. Bloom’s attempts at imitation are more successful. Imitation both increases 
“our ability to represent the goals and intentions of others”36 and at the same time 
encourages empathy.37 The claim for empathy is disputed, however, by Luke 
Gibbons, who argues “sympathy is possible with strangers but empathy, which 
essentially involves bringing the other into the self, takes place only between 
intimates.”38 I believe that the very act of imitation is just that – a bringing of the 
other into the self. Although the stripling remains a stranger, Bloom’s use of imitation 
and his attempt to put himself “in another’s shoes” allow him to transcend this 
boundary and to connect with the stripling at an empathetic level. 
Bloom successfully interprets the blind stripling’s intention to cross the road 
whilst ironically attributing to him the sense of sight: “No tram in sight. Wants to 
cross” (U 8:230). This successful interpretation of the stripling’s intent suggests 
Bloom achieves a level of intersubjectivity. The blind stripling is demonstrating what 
Harré and Gillett describe as intentionality. Bloom reads the stripling’s intent through 
an account of “the extensional specifications of the objects and features of the 
environment,”39 which in this instance are manifest in the stripling’s “tapping” of the 
curbstone with his “slender cane” (U 8:230). The stripling’s tapping demonstrates 
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how intent is displayed externally – how the invisible becomes visible through 
embodied action. Bloom does not wait for the stripling to answer his question “—Do 
you want to cross?” (U 8:230). Rather, Bloom’s “eye followed” the line of the 
“trembling cane”; he deduces from the stripling’s action the direction the stripling 
wishes to take. Bloom recognises that aspects of behaviour are predominantly 
structured by situations and perceives that the stripling is not tapping his cane out of 
boredom or because he likes the sound. Rather, Bloom uses environmental cues to 
attribute the stripling’s behaviour to situational over dispositional factors. The 
stripling taps his cane in an attempt to navigate a path to travel.  
This scene demonstrates a level of intersubjectivity not typically associated 
with Bloom. As this thesis argues more globally, other characters often misread 
Bloom’s intentions just as Bloom often misreads the intentions of others. 
Surprisingly, in this scene, Bloom does not fall victim to what cognitive science 
labels the fundamental attribution error – a common error in person perception which 
describes how individuals typically attribute behaviour to dispositional (individual) 
rather than situational factors, even though the situation is more often the cause. 
While the fifth chapter, on “Cyclops,” discusses attribution theory in greater depth, 
for now it is sufficient to note the extent to which this extract deviates from Bloom’s 
common social behaviour. Bloom’s keen insight and confidence in this scene 
demonstrate that while he may hesitate to see most of the time, he displays 
remarkable social acumen and is skilful at reading people when he does choose to 
engage. The question must be asked, however: why does Bloom make such effort to 
establish a connection and to engage with the blind stripling, who is a stranger, when 
previous interactions with old friends and familiar acquaintances are marked more 
negatively with evasive behaviour, shallowness, and contempt?  
In contrast to the previous encounters, Bloom makes no attempt to establish and 
maintain social distance in this current scene. This may be because Bloom conceives 
of a preexistent social divide. Likewise, Bloom does not view the empathy he 
establishes with the stripling as a threat to his personal privacy. Bloom’s use of the 
collective pronoun “they” and “them” when referring to blind people marks his belief 
that the blind stripling belongs to a separate social category. Bloom imagines the 
blind population exists in an alternate social space. It is also possible that Bloom 
engages with the blind stripling without reservation since the stripling is a stranger 
who has no social connection to Bloom and his family. Bloom increasingly 
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withdraws from conversations with characters who are likely to mention his wife 
Molly, her suspected lover Blazes Boylan, or Bloom’s familial situation more 
generally. Correspondingly, there is no risk that a conversation with the blind 
stripling will incorporate the topics that Bloom most fervently wants to avoid. 
Moreover, Bloom maintains a degree of anonymity when interacting with a blind 
character. Bloom’s social manoeuvrings are markedly different in this scene, when 
compared with his social interactions with other Dubliners who are more familiar to 
him. Unlike many secondary characters in Ulysses, the stripling is “blind” to Bloom’s 
situation, just as Bloom himself battles to be.  
Bloom’s experiments with vision in this scene reflect his belief that he can learn 
something from the blind stripling – this being how to remain blind to his situation 
and yet stay functional. Although the citizen in the “Cyclops” episode states “There’s 
no-one as blind as the fellow that won’t see” (U 12:423), Bloom’s attempts to “not 
see” are rarely successful. Bloom is unable to escape objects in his immediate 
environment that often invoke memories of Molly or thoughts of Boylan. Bloom 
would have to remove himself from the familiarity of his material surroundings to 
successfully “not see” these mental images, which are routinely evoked by 
associative environmental cues. For example, as Bloom helps the stripling across the 
road, he “saw again the dye-works van drawn up before Drago’s. Where I saw his 
brilliantined hair just when I was” (U 8:230). This cryptic thought only becomes clear 
once we introduce a second piece to the puzzle – that being Bloom’s chain of 
thoughts in “Calypso” that refer to a previous sighting of Boylan outside the 
hairdressers: “Drago’s shopbell ringing. Queer I was just thinking that moment. 
Brown brilliantined hair over his collar. Just had a wash and a brushup” (U 4:83). As 
Bloom walks the streets of Dublin he passes many places that trigger memories of his 
past. Without sight, Bloom could better avoid this incessant stream of memories and 
reminders. Limiting physical sight would effectively limit both foresight and 
retrospective sight, since Bloom’s reflections are often the result of a causal 
associative chain, initiated in the first place by environmental stimuli.  
Bloom	  and	  Boylan	  
At the end of this episode Bloom catches a glimpse of Blazes Boylan on Kildare 
Street. Although this encounter occurs over just one page, there are a large number of 
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sight- and eye-related images in this small segment of narrative. Joyce repeats the 
words “look,” “looking,” “eyes,” and “see” a total of eleven times in just thirty-one 
(short) lines (U 8:234). Likewise, the repeated reference to Bloom’s watch can also 
be tied to Joyce’s pervasive eye imagery. According to Kendall F. Haven, the pocket 
clock picked up its name “watch” from sailors who used these devices to time the 
length of their watches.40 The idea that this timekeeping device is linked most 
fundamentally to the act of watching furthers Joyce’s imagery – rethreading yet 
another silken line through the web of his narrative. 
Bloom’s physical response to seeing Boylan in this final scene suggests this 
encounter is a traumatic experience for Bloom. He notes the beating of his heart 
“quopp[ing] softly” (U 8:234) and swerves to the right in an effort to hide – to find a 
place that is “safe” (U 8:234). Bloom performs a pantomime – pretending to look for 
something in his pockets as he walks quickly to the refuge of the museum gate. Tony 
Thwaites similarly describes Bloom’s actions in this scene as a pantomime. Like the 
stripling’s previous “limp seeing hand,” Bloom’s hand in his pocket is blind in its 
searching. Bloom’s blind hand is a distraction, enabling in turn further avoidance. 
However, as Thwaites suggests, Bloom’s performance is not directed at Boylan, who 
is the only other person perceived as present on the scene. Thwaites confirms 
“Boylan is the last person Bloom wants to have to address.”41 This makes sense, 
considering throughout this entire episode Bloom regularly attempts to avoid the 
mere subject of Boylan. Bloom’s actions are therefore, as Thwaites explains, “for the 
‘big Other,’ the symbolic Other: the empty position of judgment itself, that 
impossible place from which one can be seen and judged.”42 Bloom does not aim to 
fool Boylan or some other spectator with his actions; rather he is intent on fooling 
only himself. Bloom attempts to dodge his own judgment and to avoid confronting 
his own feelings, using the mysterious lost object as a means of escape. 
Boylan’s character does not embody an individual identity, since the narrator 
neglects to describe Boylan’s body using the physical anatomy of a person. 
Throughout Ulysses, Boylan is reduced to the symbolic motifs of his hat, his 
brilliantined hair, and his tan shoes. This suggests that Bloom denies Boylan’s 
personhood and reduces him to a mere object within the visual field. Similarly, in this 
scene Bloom notes only Boylan’s “Straw hat in sunlight. Tan shoes. Turnedup 
trousers” (U 8:234). Bloom’s description of Boylan in this scene is reminiscent of his 
earlier objective descriptions of both Nosey Flynn and Mrs Breen. Like the previous 
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examples, this particular example demonstrates Bloom’s attempt to maintain social 
distance through an objectifying gaze. Not only does Bloom objectify Boylan using 
erratic, passive, impersonal glimpses; he also reverts to the same gaze behaviour he 
exhibits in both Davey Byrne’s bar and later Barney Kiernan’s bar, letting on to be 
“awfully deeply interested in nothing” (U 12:420). Bloom focuses on the quiet 
aesthetics of his surroundings. He notes the “Handsome building. Sir Thomas Deane 
designed,” the “cream curves of stone,” and the “cold statues: quiet there” (U 8:234). 
Just as Bloom earlier blames the sensation of a “warm shock of air heat” (U 
8:219) on his consumption of mustard, he similarly attributes his current erratic and 
anxious behaviour to the “Wine in my face. Why did I? Too heady” (U 8:234). 
Bloom fails to correctly attribute his own behaviour and emotional response to the 
situation. Rather, he attempts to attribute his actions to less upsetting and 
confrontational factors. However, the reader is not so easily fooled. Bloom’s lack of 
confidence and supposed “headiness” are not present just previously when Bloom 
assuredly aids the blind stripling across the street – even though this event occurs 
directly after Bloom consumes the wine. Nor is this headiness mentioned again once 
Bloom reaches the refuge of the museum gate and thinks he is “safe.” Again, Bloom 
avoids facing up to the real reasons for his emotive behaviour. Likewise, Bloom’s 
final elaborate pantomime to locate a mysterious object in his pocket further 
substantiates this argument; he shies away from the truth and from seeing the 
situation at hand. Bloom’s desperate searching of his pockets is arguably another 
example of him using his watch as a form of social escapism since, as Margaret 
McBride explains, “this timepiece … is the inanimate object for which Bloom 
desperately searches at the close of ‘Lestrygonians’.”43 McBride argues that Bloom 
cannot “articulate the word ‘watch’ [so] the soap provides a much-needed 
surrogate.”44 Bloom has already found the soap “nine words earlier,”45 therefore it is 
the watch for which he continues to search, even though he refuses to admit this to 
himself. The idea that Bloom looks for his watch makes further sense if the reader 
considers that a sighting of Boylan will make Bloom immediately anxious about the 
time. Bloom wonders if it is close to the time of Boylan and Molly’s intended liaison. 
Bloom’s subsequent thought, “Afternoon she said” (U 8:234) and this reference to 
time further suggests it is the watch for which Bloom seeks.  
This chapter advances from traditional gaze analysis and close reading to show 
how a contemporary cognitive angle provides a greater depth of understanding about 
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Joyce’s characters. While traditional gaze analysis treats gaze as a static state, 
attributable to one particular person at one particular time, a cognitive vocabulary 
derived from more recent cognitive research effectively relocates gaze within the 
overall orchestration of cognitive processes. Recent research demonstrates how 
“vision is not simply related to behaviour, but is itself behavioural.”46 Studies on eye 
language as a form of human communication further accentuate gaze as a highly 
coordinated communicative process, “essential to the active disclosure of our 
consciousness to others.”47 A cognitive framework that connects gaze behaviour to 
discursive events, social roles, and the construction of a social identity allows the 
reader a better understanding of how Joyce encodes his characters as social 
constructs. 
Examining the intersection between gaze behaviour and discourse, intent and 
action, has helped to decode Bloom’s character in insightful ways. While traditional 
criticism is quick to point to Bloom’s humanity and kindness, especially in the blind 
stripling scene, this analysis has shown that Bloom’s actions more often stem from 
his own social agenda. Bloom uses his gaze behaviour to manipulate social situations 
and to establish social distance. Bloom’s encounters with both Mrs Breen and Nosey 
Flynn further substantiate his strategic skill in avoiding unwanted interactions and 
redirecting conversations through gaze behaviour. Bloom successfully shuts down 
intersubjectivity and empathy in both these instances, using an objectifying gaze and 
tactical discursive constructions. The only time Bloom achieves intersubjectivity in 
“Lestrygonians” is when he interacts with the blind stripling. He uses imitation and 
touch to establish empathy with the blind stripling when helping him across the road. 
Bloom makes a rare display of openness in this scene, but for reasons that are again, 
purely self motivated. First, Bloom does not feel threatened by the stripling, as he 
does when interacting with the many other characters in Ulysses, who are more 
familiar with Bloom. The blind stripling, unlike these other characters, is highly 
unlikely to bring up the topics Bloom most wants to avoid. Therefore, the stripling 
does not threaten Bloom’s current desire for anonymity and privacy. Second, 
Bloom’s apparent act of kindness, in helping the stripling across the street, is more 
correctly attributable to his curiosity. Bloom is curious about blindness and maintains 
an underhanded desire to embody blindness so he might better avoid confronting 
situations. Bloom’s avoidance and his refusal to see, acknowledge, discuss, or accept 
his current predicament direct all his social behaviour, both in this chapter and in 
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Ulysses as a whole. Bloom wants to be able to negotiate the streets of Dublin without 
seeing – without the visual stimuli that constantly unlock memories and thoughts of 
Molly and Boylan. The empathy and subsequent intersubjectivity evident between 
Bloom and the blind stripling are the direct result of Bloom’s research endeavours 
rather than from genuine human sympathies. Bloom’s behaviour in this scene is self-
begetting rather than selfless. In this chapter we’ve seen how Bloom’s actions are 
first and foremost tactical and formulaic. They are less the product of humanistic 
concern or care for fellow characters, and more the result of his underlying concern 
for personal privacy and social avoidance.
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THEATRES 	  OF 	  EMOTION	   IN 	  “S IRENS” 1	  
By emotion I understand the modifications of the body, by 
which the power of acting of the body itself is increased, 
diminished, helped, or hindered, together with the ideas of 
these modifications.2   – Spinoza 
 
 
The terms “emotion” and “feeling” are often used synonymously within literary 
studies. This assumed equivalence is traceable back through a popular lexicon, taking 
root in definitions that simply transpose meaning. “Feeling” is defined as “An 
emotional appreciation” or “emotional attitude”3; “Emotion” is defined as “Any 
strong mental or instinctive feeling.”4 A perpetual loop unfurls, circulating from 
feeling as emotion back to emotion as feeling. Literary critics tackle these terms using 
a vocabulary that endlessly entangles itself through interdependent definitions. Those 
committed to disentangling these terms may learn through etymology that the early 
use of the term “emotion” aligns more accurately with the word “movement,” since 
emotion comes from the Latin verb emovere, which literally means “outward 
movement.”5 This etymological distinction constitutes a step in the right direction. 
However, as this chapter will demonstrate, to accurately redefine and redemonstrate 
how character, emotion, and feeling are treated in literary works, we need to extend 
our investigatory strategies still further. 	  
	   A cognitive approach allows us to redefine character emotion as a 
distinguishable process. Other existing approaches to Joyce’s Ulysses are confounded 
by a flawed vocabulary that treats emotion and feeling as one state of being – limiting 
the investigatory view to one particular state, for one particular character, at one 
particular time. A cognitive framework distinguishes emotion and feeling as different 
segments within a continuous cycle, thereby recalibrating the investigatory view to 
encompass the actions and interactions of multiple characters, in multiple situations, 
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as mediated over time. A cognitive vocabulary effectively demonstrates how 
emotions and feelings “play out” at different stages within this cycle as 
distinguishable (albeit intertwining) processes.6 As Antonio Damasio explains, 
“Emotions play out in the theatre of the body. Feelings play out in the theatre of the 
mind.”7 	  
	   The intersection of “bodily emotion” and “mindful feeling” raises awareness of 
the mind-body problem – a problem Joyce both acknowledges and interrogates 
through narrative technique. Joyce’s treatment of emotion and feeling in “Sirens” 
recalls Baruch Spinoza’s anti-Cartesian conception of body and mind. Joyce 
realistically encodes experience, representing through narrative the mind as a 
continuum, fluidly transcending the boundaries of the body, and constantly 
negotiating and enacting a social and material storyworld. Joyce’s fluidity when 
moving from inner feeling to active emotion mirrors his interpretation and subsequent 
representation of the minds he observed in his day-to-day interactions. As this chapter 
will demonstrate, Joyce’s “Sirens” episode gives “literary expression”8 to Spinoza’s 
revolutionary ideas on emotion. And since Spinoza’s theories closely align with 
contemporary emotion science and its call for “emotion to be conceptualised as a 
faculty of the whole embodied and situated mind,”9 we will see how Joyce’s narrative 
similarly anticipates modern cognitive theory and the idea that emotions, like 
thoughts, are not in the mind but are, instead, the activity and essence of an embodied 
mind.10 They are both causal and intentional, both corporeal and cognitive.11	  
 Emotional appraisal is a process we commonly misconstrue as all in the head. 
A situated approach to emotion highlights that emotional appraisal is instead a form 
of “skilful engagement with the world which need not be mediated by conceptual 
thought.”12 Emotions are “scaffolded by the environment, both synchronically in the 
unfolding of a particular emotional performance, and diachronically in the acquisition 
of an emotional repertoire.”13 Emotion both influences and is influenced by the 
context of its development. A situated perspective views emotions as effective goal-
orientated responses. For example, sulking, as a manifestation of emotion, is a 
behavioural strategy, an emotional “game of chicken” that seeks a “better deal” 
through relationship reconfiguration.14 Griffiths and Scarantino further illustrate how 
emotions are produced strategically, describing how male Golden Sebright chickens 
only make a fuss when they find food if there are female chickens around,15 and 
similarly, how an antelope, when pursued by a lion, will selectively transform 
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environmental inputs into opportunities for life-saving output. The environment is 
suddenly transformed in terms of what it affords the antelope for self-preservation.16 
Examples like these suggest how the environment might contribute to a strategic 
aspect of emotion. These examples also demonstrate how emotional appraisal is 
conceived as socially situated, goal orientated, “experientially corporeal and … 
structurally embodied.”17 Giovanna Colombetti writes that: 
bodily arousal is not merely a response to the 
subject’s valuation of the situation in which he or she 
is embedded. It is, rather, the whole situated organism 
that subsumes the capacity to make sense of his or her 
world.18  
As this theory suggests, a narrator’s diegesis of character thoughts in the head will 
not suffice in a reading of character emotion. Rather, to fully comprehend character 
emotion the reader must extend his or her investigatory view even further to examine 
how emotions unfold upon a social and material storyworld as situated, goal-
orientated responses. From this new vantage point we can better appreciate Joyce’s 
presentation of his character Leopold Bloom as experientially corporeal and 
structurally embodied. 
Emotion	  Episodes	  
Joyce’s “Sirens” episode represents emotive processes as affective events and 
strategic actions. To discern how Bloom’s emotions constitute character, I borrow 
from Evan Thompson’s “emotion episodes” – a method for interpreting emotion that 
uses a five-component breakdown or “micro-development.”19 Thompson’s emotion 
episodes combine perspectives from emotion theory, affective neuroscience, and 
phenomenology. Applying these emotion episodes to a scene from “Sirens” allows us 
to better understand Bloom’s emotions, motivations, and consequently, his character. 
The	  Precipitating	  Event	  or	  Trigger	  	  
This analysis begins with the scene from “Sirens” where Bloom spots from afar 
Blazes Boylan’s “gay hat riding on a jaunting car” (U 11:339). This event 
corresponds to the first of Thompson’s five emotion episodes, which is 
(unsurprisingly) identified as the “precipitating event or trigger.”20 Thompson’s 
precipitating event aligns with Spinoza’s “adequate cause.”21 Just as Spinoza’s 
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“adequate cause” determines between emotional passivity and activity by 
distinguishing whether something is done either “within us or without us,”22 
Thompson’s “precipitating event” reminds the reader that a trigger is not necessarily 
a physical event occurring outside bodily boundaries. Both Spinoza and Thompson 
recognise that the capacity for control can vary. A trigger or cause can be external or 
internal: “perceptual or imaginary (a memory, fantasy), or both.”23 For example, in 
“Wandering Rocks” Bloom’s interpretation of a passage from Sweets of Sin leaves 
him showered in warmth and cowers his flesh (U 10:303); or in “Calypso” the 
combination of the grey cloud (a physical trigger) and Bloom’s “bad images” (a 
conceptual trigger) causes him to hurry homeward as “grey horror sears his flesh” and 
“Cold oils” chill his blood (U 4:73). Whether passive or active, a precipitating event 
or trigger is what sets emotion in motion.  
Affective	  Salience	  
Following the initial trigger of emotion there emerges a sense of the precipitating 
event’s meaning. This appraisal corresponds with the second element in Thompson’s 
model, termed “affective salience.”24 As Thompson explains, affective salience “can 
take form before the experience of affect (as part of the precipitating process), [or] 
just after (post hoc appraisal), and can interact continually and reciprocally with 
affect, through processes of self-amplification and self-stabilization.”25 Affective 
salience is symbiotic and transitional – adjusting according to sense-making or 
meaning-making processes. While we can later rationalise, reason, accept, 
acknowledge, or otherwise continually readjust affective salience, the initial 
significance, or awareness of emotion, is typically established pre-reflectively.  
 Returning to the scene from “Sirens,” Bloom’s post hoc appraisal of sighting 
Boylan and his emergent affective salience align with his thought: “It is. Third time. 
Coincidence” (U 11.339). Bloom’s immediate thought appears to promptly dismiss 
this event as a “coincidence” – as “a notable concurrence of events or circumstances 
without apparent causal connection.”26 However, it is problematic to suggest that 
Bloom’s affective salience can be read alongside his use of the word “Coincidence.” 
Even if Bloom’s “Coincidence” is taken to mean “pure chance,” we must also 
consider that Bloom may be intentionally deceiving himself by “telling himself” this 
encounter is a mere chance or coincidence. Previous scholarship is undecided as to 
whether Bloom unequivocally accepts this third encounter with Boylan as mere 
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chance. This confusion is due to the fact that until now, the reader has been unable to 
pinpoint the intention behind Bloom’s use of this word. Hilary P. Dannenberg notes 
this ambiguity and suggests that Bloom “tries to evaluate the significance of 
coincidence;”27 Peter Francis Mackay takes a more decisive stand, conventionally 
aligning Bloom’s “Coincidence” with “chance;”28 while Chris Ackerley suggests that 
Bloom “notes only the affinity which he calls ‘coincidence’” but that he does not 
understand the underlying causality.29  
 This chapter suggests a further possibility: that as Bloom’s affective salience 
continues to shift and reciprocally interact with his emotion, Bloom does begin to 
understand the significance and underlying causality attached to this event. Extending 
our analysis to encompass the whole of Ulysses, it is apparent that Bloom frequently 
ponders the term “coincidence.” In “Lestrygonians” Bloom contemplates 
coincidences both when he recalls the phrase “Coming events cast their shadows 
before” (U 8:210) 30 and when he intuits that significant events are often preceded by 
signs. In “Calypso” Bloom dwells on “destiny. Ripening now … Will happen, yes. 
Prevent. Useless: can’t move” (U 4:81). Similarly, in “Nausicaa” Bloom ponders the 
magnetic influence between people and things, predicting that at the back of 
everything there is a “magnetism” which causes movement (U 13:487). Although 
Bloom never explicitly suggests there is a magnetic force drawing him towards 
Boylan, he does assume that this type of affinity occurs between Boylan and Molly: 
“Molly, he” (U 13:487). Bloom’s conception of causality and fate is also easily 
recognisable in “Sirens.” Bloom clearly believes in fate. He believes it was fate the 
night he met Molly: “First night when first I saw her at Mat Dillon’s in Terenure. 
Yellow, black lace she wore. Musical chairs. We two the last. Fate. After her. Fate … 
First I saw. She thanked me. Why did she me? Fate” (U 11:355). Similarly, Bloom 
accepts the idea of a predetermined course of events when he considers how the 
“chap that wallops the big drum” came to his vocation. Bloom calls the sequence of 
events that led to the drum player’s present circumstance “what you call yashmark or 
I mean kismet. Fate” (U 11:373). Bloom’s “fatalism”31 complies with his rational and 
calculated tendencies. Fate allows him to rationalise the sadness of death. Bloom 
believes it is inevitable that the Croppy Boy should die: “The chords consented. Very 
sad thing. But had to be” (U 11:370). Bloom’s ideology, most especially his fatalism, 
increasingly modulates his affective appraisals to influence what he means by 
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“coincidence” in this scene. This ideological contextualisation of emotion contributes 
towards an increasing level of complexity in Bloom’s appraisal.  
 Bloom notes that this encounter with Boylan in “Sirens” is the “third time” (U 
11:339) – the third “coincidence.” A critical reappraisal of Bloom’s use of the word 
“coincidence” shows how, at a universal level, coincidence in Ulysses is less a matter 
of character subjectivity (as Hillary P. Dannenberg suggests) 32 and more a matter of 
character intersubjectivity and character action – of a socially distributed, 
environmentally extended, embodied mind. This reformulation of “coincidence” 
further highlights how Joyce’s fictional minds are portrayed as seeping out into the 
social storyworld as mutually influential forces – or, as Bloom describes it, as 
magnetic influences between people and things, as a “magnetism” which causes 
movement and becomes manifest through action. As this scene progresses it becomes 
increasingly clear to Bloom that his encounter with Boylan is not a mere coincidence 
of chance. Bloom’s understanding of magnetism means he can appreciate that his 
mind is, to a certain degree, responsible for the manifestation of this event; so 
accordingly, Bloom attributes greater significance to it. Bloom’s awareness of 
Boylan, and his high sensitivity to all the places and objects associated with Boylan, 
create this higher level of perception.  
 Examining Bloom’s emotions as goal-orientated actions allows us to review 
what Bloom means by this word “coincidence.” As Bloom’s ability to rationalise 
through processes of self-amplification and self-stabilisation progresses, it becomes 
increasingly clear that the affective salience attached to this event increases in 
significance. Bloom’s sense-making process – his “bodily cognitive-emotional form 
of understanding”33 – allows him to rewrite or reascribe meaning to this word. As 
time progresses, Bloom’s “coincidence” gains meaning in such a way that the concept 
of coincidence-as-chance is itself negated. We can better understand the intention 
behind Bloom’s use of this word by focusing on his active emotion. While Bloom’s 
thought (“coincidence”) is a mental commitment, which is at best a signpost or 
indicator of what might manifest as reality, Bloom’s emotional acts are observable 
reactions to precipitating triggers. They are therefore more easily verifiable. As 
demonstrated in the following section’s analysis on Bloom’s motor embodiment and 
visceral-interoceptive embodiment, Bloom’s physical actions suggest that he 
reappraises this situation to make sense of it as causal, meaningful, even fateful, 
rather than accepting it as only affinity, simple serendipity, or random chance. 
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Although Bloom does not immediately perceive this encounter as fateful (being 
immersed in the drama of it),34 a review of Bloom’s actions further demonstrates that 
he grows sceptical of the idea that this encounter is a coincidence of chance.  
Feeling-­‐Tone,	  Motor	  Embodiment	  and	  Visceral-­‐Interoceptive	  Embodiment	  	  
A more easily verifiable and accurate interpretation of Bloom’s appraisal requires a 
more bodily focus. Post-reflective appraisals are evident through embodied acts: 
expressions, postures, movements, and behaviours. To further develop my argument I 
turn to the final three steps of Thompson’s emotion episode model. The first of these 
is “feeling-tone,” the second is described as “motor embodiment,” and the third as 
“visceral-interoceptive embodiment.”35 Feeling-tone, or “feeling-tendencies,” is 
described in terms of a pleasant/unpleasant polarity. Fluctuations in feeling-tone are 
displayed through affective valences such as attraction/repulsion, positive/negative, 
and dominance/submission. Similarly, “motor embodiment” refers to “facial and 
posture changes and different action tendencies.”36 Fluctuations in motor embodiment 
are displayed through movement tendencies such as toward/away, 
approach/withdrawal, and engage/avoid.  
 Motor embodiment is also closely related to a visceral-interoceptive 
embodiment. Clearly both occur within the physical domain of the body through 
embodiment. However, while motor embodiment involves movement tendencies, 
visceral-interoceptive embodiment refers more specifically to physiological 
tendencies. They take the form of autonomic-physiological changes such as 
“cardiopulmonary parameters, skin conductance, muscle tone, and endocrine and 
immune system activities.”37 These final three steps of Thompson’s model both 
determine and are determined by the event’s affective salience. In our current 
example, Bloom’s initial appraisal is to reduce the affective salience to that of mere 
coincidence. However, his continual and reciprocal appraisal in concert with his 
concurrent emotion episodes – feeling-tone, motor embodiment, and visceral-
interoceptive embodiment – determines that this event’s meaning becomes 
increasingly embellished.  
 To advance the idea that Bloom grounds meaning through emotion to find 
greater salience in this third encounter, I am going to compare Bloom’s previous two 
encounters with Boylan with this final one. Using the emotion episode model to 
identify Bloom’s feeling-tone, motor embodiment and visceral-interoceptive 
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embodiment, the reader can compare and contrast the affective salience Bloom 
detects in each encounter accordingly. The current affective event involves Bloom’s 
sighting of Blazes Boylan’s “gay hat riding on a jaunting car” (U 11:339). Boylan is 
on his way to the Ormond Bar, which is also en route to number 7 Eccles Street. 
Bloom recalls that Boylan is scheduled to visit his wife Molly “At four,” he notices 
that four is “Near now” (U 11:339), and given the direction Boylan travels, Bloom’s 
observations generate an increasingly emotional response – he decides to “Follow. 
Risk it. Go quick” (U 11:339). Bloom’s decision to follow Boylan is especially 
pertinent when we compare his emotional response in this scene with that of earlier 
encounters with Boylan. For example, the first time Bloom spots Boylan is in the 
“Hades” episode: “From the door of the Red Bank the white disc of a straw hat 
flashed reply: … passed” (U 6:115). Bloom responds by immediately pretending to 
review his fingernails whilst attempting to compose a vacant expression. Bloom’s 
second encounter with Boylan occurs in “Lestrygonians” when he spots “Straw hat in 
sunlight. Tan shoes. Turnedup trousers. It is. It is” (U 8:234). Bloom notes the beating 
of his heart “quopp[ing] softly” (U 8:234) as he swerves to the right in an effort to 
hide – to find a place that is “safe” (U 8:234). Bloom (again) performs a pantomime, 
pretending to look for something in his pockets as he walks quickly and quietly to the 
refuge of the museum gate. In each of the first two encounters the outcome of 
Bloom’s emotion leads him to appraise the situation in such a way that he decides to 
disengage. The valence of his feeling-tone is markedly defensive and negative. In the 
first encounter Bloom thinks that Boylan is “the worst man in Dublin” (U 6:115), and 
in “Lestrygonians,” Bloom is worried Boylan might follow him (U 8:234). 
Correspondingly, his movement tendency is to avoid and withdraw. His global 
intention is to get away. This intention is most evident in the second encounter, which 
occurs around 2 p.m. In this example Bloom is more anxious, his motor embodiment 
even more “hasty” (U 8:234). Bloom’s visceral-interoceptive embodiment makes 
explicit his anxiety. His cardiopulmonary rate increases (or at least becomes more 
noticeable to Bloom since he remarks upon his heart three times), he suddenly feels 
“heady” and his “flutter of breath” comes “forth in short sighs” (U 8:234).  
 Similarly, this third sighting of Boylan causes Bloom apparent anxiety. He 
forgets to pay the shopgirl, apologising distractedly “—Aha … I was forgetting … 
Excuse” (U 11:339). Bloom’s truncated and sporadic thoughts may reflect not just a 
speeding up of movement, but also the speeding up of his heart rate and a subsequent 
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shortness of breath: “Bloo smi qui go. Ternoon” (U 11:339). However, in contrast to 
the previous two examples, Bloom’s feeling-tone and motor embodiment in this 
scene are valenced as “approach” and “engage.”38 Bloom still hurries, but he hurries 
towards Boylan. Bloom sees Boylan crossing the Essex Bridge and takes the same 
direction along the Quay. Once Bloom reaches the Ormond and spots Boylan’s car 
outside, he begins to “warily [walk]” (U 11:340). Again, in contrast to the previous 
two examples, although Bloom warily walks, he walks not in the manner of a timid 
mouse, but rather, of a “[b]lack wary hecat” (U 11:341). Bloom’s input or 
representation of his environment is suddenly transformed in terms of the 
opportunities it can afford him for goal-orientated action. Bloom spots both Richie 
Goulding’s legal bag raised in greeting and Cowley’s ears, his “red lugs” (U 11:341). 
Both are opportunities affording different possible outputs. Significantly, Bloom 
chooses to give “Goulding a chance” (U 11:341). Bloom’s goal is to discover what 
Boylan is “doing in the Ormond” (U 11: 341), and the storyworld affords Bloom, in 
the form of Richie’s bag, a goal-orientated output. Although “Richie led on” (U 
11:341), it is notably Richie’s bag that Bloom follows upon entering the Ormond. 
 Bloom enters the Ormond fully aware that Boylan is somewhere inside. 
However, his “agitated aim” (U 11:342) upon entering the establishment is not 
confrontational. Rather, Bloom intends on watching from the shadows. He wishes to 
“see” Boylan, but not to be seen by him, as indicated by his thoughts: “Be near” (U 
11:342); “See me he might” (U 11:340); “See not be seen” (U 11:341). However, as 
previously mentioned, these thoughts in the head do not sufficiently verify Bloom’s 
intent. Rather, Bloom’s mental commitments represent an indeterminate reality. They 
should be treated as signposts, or at best, indicators of what might be around the 
corner. It is only through emotional expression that Bloom’s intention becomes 
manifest as a truly committed, goal-orientated movement. Accordingly, once he is 
inside the Ormond, we see Bloom skilfully engage with his environment in ways that 
substantiate his intent. His emotion shows him as notably interested, yet restrained. 
Bloom’s thought “Order” (U 11:351) is made manifest when he corrects the fringe of 
a “doyley” down under a vase. He regularly implores himself to “wait” (U 11:341, 
342) during his reconnaissance of Boylan, and he later enacts this intent to “sit 
tight”39 (U 11:341) by restraining his own fingers with the elastic band of his packet, 
winding it “round his troubled double” (U 11:353). Bloom’s emotive actions signal 
an enduring need for restraint, order, and control.  
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 Bloom’s desire to “see” in this scene is an emotional response to situational 
uncertainty. Traditional criticism tends to discuss Bloom’s voyeurism as a symptom 
of his masochism, most especially in the “Circe” episode.40 Incorporating this 
commonly held critical conception about Bloom’s character into our current 
discussion generates the idea that, like the crowd at a crime scene, Bloom feels 
morbidly compelled to watch Boylan and oversee the degree of his own devastation. 
However, Bloom’s voyeurism in “Sirens” is less morbid and more assertive. Bloom 
does not follow Boylan to the Ormond to confront him, nor does he follow him in 
masochistic complicity; rather, Bloom shadows Boylan and attempts to survey the 
situation so he might better understand his current predicament and further alleviate 
uncertainty. In this way Bloom embodies his later sentiment of “Wisdom while you 
wait” (U 11:361). This idea directly contrasts Declan Kiberd’s claim that “Bloom 
may seem at this moment to have shown excessive tolerance with his head-in-the-
sand policy.”41 A continued review of Bloom’s emotion shows he is, instead, notably 
interested and assertive. Bloom’s actions are not representative of a head-in-the-sand 
policy; rather, they represent a strategy of careful surveillance. Bloom’s emotions 
demonstrate that he is alert and responsive. His heart rate is raised. He is perceptive to 
his surroundings, and most especially to the presence of Boylan. He demonstrates 
courage by attempting to be near his antagonist at the crux point of time. He notes the 
time, “Four now,” and despite his emotion, “warm…nerves a bit” (U 11:344) 
(characteristically blamed on the alcohol),42 Bloom remains seated and makes no 
irreconcilable actions. Again, when Boylan leaves the bar, the emotional cost of 
Bloom’s reconnaissance is made apparent through his: “Light sob of breath Bloom 
sighed on the silent bluehued flowers. Jingling. He’s gone” (U 11:345).  
 The claim for Bloom’s responsiveness directly challenges the common 
misconception that “Sirens” “displays Bloom at his most passive.”43 Kiberd 
tentatively supports this sentiment, arguing that Boylan’s statement, “I plunged a bit 
… Not on my own you know. Fancy of a friend of mine” (U 11:342), “could refer to 
Bloom’s connivance in his own cuckolding” and that “Bloom’s near impatience” at 
the proximity of time “might be read as this.”44 Kiberd’s use of “could” and “might” 
indicates his uncertainty in making these claims. Kiberd’s hesitancy is even more 
evident when he later pinpoints this third encounter as “the very moment when 
Bloom decided to accost Boylan.”45 The contradiction is clear – either Bloom is 
helping facilitate his own cuckoldry or he is challenging it. He cannot be both 
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complicit and confrontational. As we have seen, Bloom’s emotions depict him as 
neither complicit nor confrontational; rather, he is strategically responding to his 
situation in a highly receptive way. Spinoza similarly describes this tendency not as a 
type of passivity but as an active receptivity, requiring that the individual “follow[s] 
the common order of Nature, and obeys it, and accommodates himself to it as far as 
the nature of things demands (Ethics 157).”46 Bloom’s decision to follow Boylan in 
this scene is orientated not only by uncertainty, but also by an active receptivity. 
Bloom accommodates himself to the demands of the situation in an endeavour to 
persist in his own identity. 
Conatus	  
Emotion plays a significant role in self-stabilisation. Spinoza defines this process 
using the term conatus to describe “the relentless endeavour of each being to 
preserve itself.”47 Modern cognitive science substantiates this idea. A situated 
standpoint describes a living system’s desire to regenerate its conditions and to 
maintain its identity: “to be a living system is to be, necessarily, a system concerned 
with its own continuation.”48 As Thompson and Stapleton explain, “motivated action, 
especially when it involves affect, is a mode of self-regulation.”49 Emotion is a self-
regulation process by which “the brain and the rest of the body jointly sustain 
homeostasis throughout the organism’s dealings with its environment.”50 The 
emotional body thus uses the environment to self-regulate. Where many critics are 
quick to point out Bloom’s despondency and his lack of intentional action in 
“Sirens,”51 Stanley Sultan highlights instead Bloom’s renewed hope that “something 
may yet be done to change his situation.”52 Sultan’s claim that Bloom avoids “self 
destruction” by rejecting all other “kinds of inducement for reconciling himself to the 
loss of Molly and a prospective son”53 unintentionally recalls not only Bloom’s 
active receptivity but also Bloom’s conatus, his ability to self-regulate and to 
persevere through intentional action. Bloom strives for self-continuation, 
strategically keeping all options available. Had Bloom confronted either Boylan in 
“Sirens” or Molly in “Calypso,” he would have effectively curtailed his options and 
subsequently relinquished his scope for self-governance and self-regulation. While 
Bloom has not confronted Boylan in this scene, or Molly earlier that morning, he 
remains actively receptive to his situation and sensitive to preserving future stability. 
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M. D. Lewis further illustrates this tactic, explaining how inaction or ineffective 
action can allow emotional engagement with a goal to continue as a need or wish 
extending over time.54 As we will see, this tactic allows Bloom to maintain stability 
within his identity.  
 Rather than act directly, Bloom acts indirectly and affectively, emotionally 
engaging with objects in the storyworld through embodied acts. For example, by 
drumming his fingers on the writing pad, Bloom’s performs boredom through his “I 
am just reflecting fingers” (U 11:360). This affective action also enables Bloom to 
better reflect on his letter writing, similar to the way that one might stick out their 
tongue when concentrating. Bloom’s manifestation of emotion is a behavioural 
strategy, a goal-orientated response to both boredom55 and difficulty. A second 
example of Bloom performing emotion, as previously discussed, is where Bloom 
unwinds “slowly the elastic band of his packet … Bloom wound a skein round four 
forkfingers, stretched it, relaxed, and wound it around his double” (U 11:353). Here 
we see Bloom grounding meaning through his body. His restrained fingers embody 
the restraint he forces upon himself (to take no irreconcilable actions). However, 
“parallel processing”56 – or more simply, the ability to cognitively multitask – means 
movements such as this one can produce multiple meanings. Bloom’s circular 
looping of the string, slowly winding round and round his fingers, recalls through 
“kinetic analogy”57 the precious and, paradoxically now, painful memory of the first 
time he met Molly during a game of musical chairs: “Musical chairs. We two the last. 
Fate. After her. Fate. Round and round slow. Quick round. We two” (U 11:355). 
Bloom’s affective action with the string, his winding it around, stretching it, looping 
it, unlooping it, then noding and disnoding it (U 11:354), brings forth his memory of 
running round and round, chasing Molly. By actively mimicking this type of slow 
encirclement, this entanglement of fate, Bloom’s movement with the string 
effectively recalls Damasio’s “tightly bound cycle” of emotion and feeling. Bloom’s 
expressive action in this scene represents the cycle of emotion (as elicited through 
memory) and Bloom’s subsequent mapping of feeling (his sense of fatefulness). 
Bloom’s plucking and buzzing, his testing of the strength of the catgut, reinforces the 
meaningfulness of his movements. Bloom begins kinetically to assess the integrity of 
his relationship with Molly. As Bloom stretches the string he thinks how “[c]ruel it 
seems. To let people get fond of each other: lure them on. Then tear them asunder” 
(U 11:357). Bloom matches this thought on cruelty by taking the string which was 
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looped loosely around and stretching it thin – taut: “it twanged” (U 11:357). Finally, 
when Bloom remembers Martha’s earlier question, “Are you not happy in your 
[home]?” (U 11:358), he finds his breaking point: he stretches the string until 
“Twang. It snapped. / Jingle into Dorset street” (U 11:358).  
 Bloom’s actions with the string demonstrate how material props in one’s 
environment can contribute to a strategic and dynamic negotiation of emotion. The 
string is a mental mechanism for Bloom. It provides a form of feedback when no 
other can be had. This example also supports the claim for Bloom’s conatus, since the 
reader sees him endeavouring to reclaim his identity through memory, reenacting it 
through an emotional engagement with his environment. Bloom’s conscious product, 
his reflections, feelings, and motivations, arise in harmony with his emotion and 
movement. As previously mentioned, Damasio likens this process to the performance 
of a “symphonic piece,”58 a performance not from a single musician or even from a 
whole section of an orchestra. Through movement, this performance unfolds, and for 
all intents and purposes the performance creates the conductor (the conscious 
thought), not the other way around. As we have seen, Joyce’s “Sirens” intuits this 
idea since Bloom is shown to be cognitively multitasking, grounding meaning 
through movement, and mapping feeling through the performance of emotion.  
 Bloom emotionally engages with his environment, off-loading memory and 
processing future possibility in an attempt to make sense of his current situation. 
Although much of this process is painful for Bloom, he remains positive. Elizabeth 
Anker claims “Bloom’s theoretical rationalizations of his emotions seem to give him 
a means of disassociating from the delicate or the painful.”59 While I agree with 
Anker about Bloom’s rationality, Bloom’s emotion, as evident through his embodied 
acts, counters the idea that he dissociates himself from the painful or that he is 
removed or unconcerned. Rather than distance himself from pain through reason, 
Bloom processes his painful feelings corporeally through his environment. Moreover, 
processing emotion through the environment contributes to self-regulation. The 
environment is transformed for Bloom in terms of what it affords him by way of self-
preservation. While Bloom’s rationality may help him persevere, crucially it is his 
ability synchronically to unfold or perform emotion through materiality that enables 
him to better process his thoughts and to diachronically acquire a more positive 
repertoire. It allows Bloom to retain hope. 
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 Bloom’s perseverance, his renewals, and reaffirmations, are reflected in the 
episode’s prelude with its cyclic sequence: “Then, not till then. My eppripfftaph. Be 
pfrwritt. / Done. / Begin!” (U 11:330). Bloom’s decision to follow Boylan’s jaunting 
car also demonstrates Bloom’s hopefulness. He follows hoping against hope that 
Boylan may take another route, or even that Boylan might stay at the Ormond: “At 
four … Perhaps a trick” (U 11:342). Similarly, Bloom’s thought, “No son. Rudy. Too 
late, now. Or if not? If still? / He bore no hate. / Hate. Love.” (U 11:367-68),. 
encapsulates this recurring sense of renewed hope. After Bloom questions time and 
whether it is “too late” he suddenly becomes anxious to leave the bar: “Time to be 
shoving. Looked enough” (U 11:368). Bloom astutely recognises that a possible 
cuckoldry is not all that threatens his conatus, but time is also a serious contender, 
that it is a second, silent saboteur to self-preservation. Bloom recognises “Soon I am 
old” (U 11:368), and old-age will lessen fertility and the likelihood he will father a 
healthy son: “I too. Last of my race … No son. Rudy” (U 11:367). Bloom’s sudden 
awareness of the threat of time is, to use a term from emotion science, an “eliciting 
condition” which sets his emotion in motion. Bloom hastily withdraws and this is 
reflected in the narrator’s transcription of Bloom’s hurried speech and subsequent 
action: “Well I must be. Are you off? Yrfmstbyes. Blmstup” (U: 11:370), interpreted 
as Bloom saying goodbye and Bloom standing up. Bloom rushes to “Get out before 
the end” (U 11:370)60 – to make a move, any move, even if it is just to “Walk, walk, 
walk … Waaaaaaalk” (U 11:370). This sudden action reflects Bloom’s belief that 
something may yet be done to reclaim his role as both husband and father. Bloom 
does not leave the bar set on confrontation. He continues to make no irreconcilable 
actions, just as he sticks to his earlier decision to refrain from interfering. However, 
Bloom’s impatience to get moving in this scene reflects his eternal optimism that 
hope remains regardless.  
Music,	  Meaning,	  and	  Emotional-­‐Feelings	  
As previously discussed, Bloom’s third sighting of Boylan differs from the previous 
two encounters. An emotional interpretation of this last encounter marks it as not only 
valenced contrary to the previous encounters, but also as having an affective salience 
that is stronger or more important than Bloom’s initial experience of emotion. At first 
glance, Bloom’s feelings in “Sirens” match his earlier melancholy, as they are 
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seemingly marked by sadness and loneliness (U 11:361). This sentiment is reflected 
in Cope’s claim that Bloom experiences a “psychic low”61 in “Sirens,” as well as 
Kiberd’s view of Bloom “sadly” pondering his own cuckolding.62 However, Bloom’s 
sad mood is the easy answer, since it supports what the reader is culturally 
conditioned to see. The reader anticipates Bloom’s pain and despondency because 
this is how we expect victims of adultery typically to feel. A cognitive-emotive lens 
allows us to see past this cultural conditioning and to focus instead on how Bloom’s 
emotions, feelings, and relative mood contribute to how he constitutes meaning 
through his environment, and ultimately to how he makes sense of his situation. The 
ability to distinguish between emotions, moods, and emotional-feelings (see below) 
enables us to more accurately scrutinise and dissect Bloom’s state of mind and 
consequently, his character.  
 Elaborating on previous definitions for “emotion” and “feeling,” Damasio 
defines emotional-feelings as “composite perceptions,”63 images, or the mental 
mappings of the body’s emoting process. They are therefore private and internalised. 
Emotions, in contrast, precede feelings as embodied “automated programs of 
actions.”64 Furthermore, moods (or their close relations, background emotions) are 
background feelings or primary emotions that “become fairly frequent or even 
continuous over long periods of time.”65 Correspondingly, Thompson’s breakdown of 
an emotional interpretation recognises that feelings, while distinct from emotion, are 
tightly bound to the emoting process. Feelings are incorporated within his emotion 
episode model as “feeling-tones” which contribute to affective salience. A review of 
Bloom’s emotion as distinct from his emotional-feelings and mood in this episode has 
demonstrated that Bloom is less passive than traditionally assumed, and instead, is 
more actively receptive. It has revealed that Bloom is not masochistic, complicit, or 
combative as previously claimed, and that he is, instead, restrained and strategic. And 
finally, Bloom’s enactive emotion in this scene shows him as less morose, sad, and 
despondent, and more hopeful in his perseverance. I want to now advance on this last 
claim by looking more specifically at Bloom’s feelings, his feeling tendencies and 
subsequent long term mood, and compare these to what we have already ascertained 
about his character through a broader emotional interpretation.  
 The majority of criticism tends to focus on Bloom’s sadness in this episode, and 
the background music, most especially the repetition of Bellini’s lyrics “All is lost 
now,” exacerbates this sentiment. A search of “Sirens” reveals that the key word 
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“sad” appears fifteen times in this episode. When we examine how the word “sad” is 
used, however, it is related to or thought by Bloom only nine times. Moreover, 
Bloom’s use of the word “sad” is never independent of the background music – “sad” 
is never used by Bloom to describe his own “sad feelings” but instead, it is used to 
describe the music. For example, when the background music plays a sad song in a 
minor key Bloom incorporates his own imagined “sad lyrics” into the melody: “Trails 
off there sad in minor. Why minor sad? Sign H. They like sad tail at end. P. P. S. La 
la la ree. I feel so sad today. La ree. So lonely. Dee” (U 11:361). Similarly, the sad 
music of Dollard’s rendition of “The Croppy Boy” motivates Bloom to reflect on 
sadness: “The chords consented. Very sad thing” (U 11:370). Bloom’s thoughts of 
sadness in both these examples do not directly refer to Bloom’s own sad feelings. 
They are his contributions to and reflections on sad music. David Carr substantiates 
the idea that sadness in music does not equate to sad feeling: “the emotional 
properties we are inclined to take this or that piece of music to express are 
nevertheless properties of the music rather than our own mental states.”66 Admittedly, 
Bloom is more convincingly depicted as lonely in “Sirens.” Having left the music of 
Ormond Bar to walk along the quay, Bloom thinks “I feel so lonely” (U 11:374). The 
narrator depicts Bloom accordingly, comparing him to the “one lonely, last sardine of 
summer. Bloom alone” (U 11:373), and describing him as “Bloom, soft Bloom, I feel 
so lonely Bloom” (U 11:370).  
 Joyce paradoxically presents Bloom as both lonely and joyful in “Sirens.” 
When Cowley plays the “light bright tinkling minuet” from Don Giovanni, Bloom 
thinks, “That’s joyful I can feel … Yes, joy it must be” (U 11:364; emphasis mine). 
In contrast to the previous examples, this example shows Bloom matching the joyful 
music with awareness of his own joyful feeling. Again, when Bloom listens to Simon 
Dedalus sing “M’appari” from Flotow’s opera Martha, Bloom emotes a “Flood of 
warm” and consequently feels “The joy the feel the warm the … joygush” (U 
11:354). Music motivates Bloom to reflect on sadness, but by contrast, it inspires him 
to feel and perceive joy. However, while it is clear that Bloom’s feelings are more 
accurately presented as joyful, these feelings are arguably superficial, since the 
background music encourages him to feel them. This necessarily raises the question 
of whether an emotional-feeling in response to music qualifies as an authentic feeling. 
Are feelings evoked by music genuine indicators of perceptions of emotion, genuine 
enough to enable us to diagnose Bloom’s longer-term and idiosyncratic mood?  
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 One answer to this question is found in John Sloboda’s book, Exploring the 
Musical Mind: Cognition, Emotion, Ability, Function. Sloboda claims that music 
cannot create emotional-feelings; rather, music generates access to emotional-feelings 
that are “somehow already ‘on agenda’ for that person, but not fully apprehended or 
dealt with.”67 Similarly, philosopher of music Peter Kivy argues that music simply 
cannot make us happy or sad. Nevertheless, Kivy acknowledges that music does 
arouse people emotionally. He explains this by imputing it to emotions such as 
“enthusiasm, or excitement, or ecstasy” which are “directed at the music as its 
intentional object.”68 Music triggers emotion, but it does not create feelings. Although 
music often triggers immediate emotional responses, such as bringing tears to the 
eyes, or raising goose bumps on the skin, these emotions typically taper off in 
harmony with the final chord. Feelings, as distinct from emotions, internalise 
emotion. They are reflected upon, rationalised against, or justified. Or, as Michael 
Washburn explains, “Feelings evolve in tandem with cognition. The achievement of 
object permanence … usher[s] in feelings that are no longer just momentary 
responses to stimuli, but are now ongoing affective engagements with enduring 
objects.”69 These ideas suggest that Bloom’s joyful feelings in response to musical 
stimuli are “genuine” in that they are “already on the agenda” for Bloom. Therefore, 
while a song may trigger Bloom’s emotion and instantly cause a warm sensation, any 
enduring joyfulness he justifies is preexistent. The music allows Bloom access to 
joyfulness independent of the music and attributable to his personal reflections, to his 
present state of mind and/or positive reflections.  
 Happiness and sadness are not features of music. However, most people intuit 
that music does somehow enable feeling as an offshoot of emotion. Music is emotive 
and while it cannot cause a person to feel happy if they have nothing happy to reflect 
on (no memories or current happiness to relate it to), it can, over a prolonged period 
of time, help to determine a person’s mood. The tension between these two basic 
intuitions – that music determines feelings on one hand, and that music can only ever 
co-determine or allow access to meaningful feeling on the other – can be explained 
by distinguishing between what could be termed “musical meaning” and “affective 
meaning.” In his book Emotion and Meaning in Music, Leonard B. Meyer picks up 
on the tension between those who 
insist that musical meaning lies exclusively within the 
context of the work itself … and those who contend 
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that, in addition to these abstract, intellectual 
meanings, music also communicates meanings which 
in some way refer to the extramusical world of 
concepts, actions, emotional states and character.70  
Meyers calls the first group, those who insist meaning is determined by music, 
“absolutists” and the second group, those who contend meaning is co-determined, 
“referentialists.”71 Correspondingly, I believe it helps if we can distinguish between 
Bloom’s musical feelings (musical meanings) in “Sirens,” as compared with his 
emotional-feelings (affective meanings). Bloom recognises a sad song – “Trails off 
there sad in minor” (U 11:361) – as a musical feeling, but this is not his sadness. It is 
not his own emotional-feeling. Similarly, Bloom perceptively recognises the 
difference between a sad musical feeling and a sad emotional-feeling when he thinks: 
“Too poetical that about the sad. Music did that. Music hath charms” (U 11:361). 
Here Bloom criticises the sad poetics of lyrical music and attributes any sad feeling 
purely to the charm of music. It is a musical feeling rather than his own emotional-
feeling of sadness. In contrast, when Simon sings “Ma’appari” Bloom recognises a 
solemn “tenderness it welled: slow, swelling” and identifies it as a musical feeling. 
Bloom then paradoxically situates his own emotional-feeling as “The joy the feel the 
warm the … joygush, tupthrop. Now!” (U 11:354).  
 Joyce perceptively understands and distinguishes between musical feeling and 
emotional-feeling. In “Sirens” Joyce allows Bloom to demonstrate awareness of this 
relationship between music and feeling with the thought “Words? Music? No: it’s 
what’s behind” (U 11:354). Bloom questions the source of emotional-feeling and 
keenly discerns that it is not music (melody) nor words (lyrics), but “what’s behind” 
that co-determines meaning. Emotional-feeling is what lies beneath or “behind” 
music, effectively being pulled to the surface through the absolutist swell of the 
musical tide. Joyce underscores the difference between musical feeling and 
emotional-feeling by having Bloom further ponder the difference, noting the feeling 
in the “air” once the music finishes: “Calmer now. It’s in the silence after you feel 
you hear. Vibrations. Now silent air” (U 11:357). Bloom also distinguishes between 
his musical joy and affective joy, acknowledging his two “joys” and concluding that 
emotional-feeling is the “other joy,” a second and more enduring joy, distinguishable 
from the emotive pull of musical feeling. Bloom understands that both are joys and 
that music is a catalyst uncovering or prompting each feeling: “That’s joyful I can 
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feel. Never have written it. Why? My joy is other joy. But both are joys. Yes, joy it 
must be. Mere fact of music shows you are. Often thought she was in the dumps till 
she began to lilt. Then know” (U 11:364; emphasis mine). Bloom’s thought 
highlights the idea that music opens the door to “what’s behind,” that music “shows” 
how “you are” underneath. Bloom acknowledges that music gives Molly access to her 
joyfulness. Even when she thinks she is feeling sad, the music of her singing shows 
her how she really feels.  
 Music, like all stimuli, is individually meaningful and co-determined. 
Colombetti further explains, “meaning is always relational in the sense that it depends 
on the specific mode of co-determination, or coupling, that each system realizes with 
its environment; different couplings produce different meanings.”72 Applying this 
theory to the text of “Sirens” suggests that each character will interpret music 
differently and derive meaning individually, according to what each character brings 
to the coupling: their agendas, relative dispositions, and moods. The notion that each 
character will note different lyrics, detect different tones, and “hear what they are 
conditioned to hear” enables us to further settle our previous concern that music 
cannot be a true or objective measure for mood or feeling. Bloom’s interpretations of 
music in “Sirens” are distinctly his own. As Kiberd astutely observes, the song “The 
Croppy Boy” compels Bloom to think of his son Rudy, and ponder if he will have 
another.73 Given that “The Croppy Boy” is a song about nationalist rebellion in 
Ireland, this is a very individual and characteristic response to the song. Another 
character (take the Citizen from “Cyclops,” for example) would almost certainly find 
this song meaningful in a distinctly different way. This song holds a different 
affective meaning for Bloom than for others. It is interpreted in a way indicative of 
where his thoughts primarily lie, at home, with the familial. It also substantiates our 
previous idea that Bloom is concerned about preserving the family name. 
 Music is co-determined and referential through memory. As Crowe explains, 
“Music becomes linked with all aspects of memory, especially the emotion state that 
[was] present.”74 Chris Ackerley argues that Bloom mistakes Simon’s rendition of 
Flotow’s “M’appari” for Bellini’s “Tutto é sciolto,”75 or alternatively, that Bloom 
listens to the Flotow still “under the emotional sway of the Bellini.”76 In either case, 
Ackerley implies that Bloom’s interpretation of Simon’s “M’appari” is influenced by 
the melancholy “Tutto é sciolto” to some degree. Despite the influence of this more 
sombre aria, Bloom proceeds to match the music he hears to memories of happiness, 
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referencing the song’s lyrics against his memory of meeting Molly. Bloom 
remembers “Lips laughing” (U 11:355) and the emotion of laughter typically leads to 
the feeling or “phenomenological tone”77 of joy. The line “–Each graceful look” 
recalls for Bloom the “First night when first I saw her” (U 11:354–5). Similarly, the 
line “– Charmed my eye” compels Bloom to think of Molly, singing “In Old Madrid,” 
“At me. Luring. Ah, alluring” (U 11:355). These parallels are unique to Bloom and 
his personal memories. Bloom makes sense of this song through his memories of 
feeling joy. Bloom’s positive interpretation of “M’appari” is also evident in his 
omission of the first words “not one” in the lyric “[not one]…ray of hope” (U 
11:354). This omission, whether mindful or not, points to an underlying positivity in 
Bloom’s interpretation of this song.  
 A situated standpoint on emotion reveals Bloom is less sad and despondent, and 
more hopeful in his perseverance. He has not conceded defeat. Bloom’s optimism is 
substantiated by his tendency to pick up on lyrics that reinforce positivity, and to 
align music, whether happy or sad, with happy memories. A cognitive approach to 
“Sirens” as structured by Spinoza’s foundational thoughts on emotion has formulated 
new ideas about how emotion (as distinct from feeling) is constitutive of character. A 
situated approach to emotion shows how a character’s thoughts in the head will not 
suffice in a reading of character emotion. Extending the investigatory view even 
further to examine how emotions synchronically unfold upon a social and material 
storyworld allows us to more fully comprehend character emotion, not as a fixed state 
of mind, but as adaptable, intentional, and interpersonal acts. This new vantage point 
allows us to appreciate Joyce’s presentation of Bloom as less passive than 
traditionally assumed. As we have seen, Bloom’s restrained surveillance of Boylan 
points to an active receptivity – not only is Bloom interested, organised, and 
concerned, he strives for self-preservation, reaffirmation, and the continuation of his 
identity as husband and father. Bloom is not masochistic, complicit, or combative, as 
previously claimed; rather, he is driven, goal-orientated, and strategic. Finally, 
reappraising Bloom’s emotion has revealed a more global overarching intentionality 
– one that Bloom’s surveillance of Boylan, his affective action with the string, and his 
active receptivity all contribute towards. What Bloom ultimately aims at (and what he 
always returns to) are the things he holds “Too dear too near to home sweet home” (U 
11:374). 
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ATTRIBUTING	  BLOOM’S 	  BEHAVIOUR	   IN 	  “CYCLOPS” 	  
As the preceding chapters have shown, reading fiction is an exercise in attribution. 
The reader automatically attributes “mind” to fictional characters as model persons. 
Attribution theory is concerned with how we assign thoughts, beliefs, and intentions 
to minds (including our own), based on dispositions and actions.1 Paving the way, 
Palmer’s Social Minds (2010) and Zunshine’s Why We Read Fiction (2006) show 
literary theorists already effectively using attribution theory along narratological 
lines. These groundbreaking works explore how readers, narrators, and characters 
attribute mind to characters, and also to themselves.  
Borrowing from studies in attribution theory and discursive psychology, this 
chapter differs from previous narratological research in attribution, incorporating a 
cognitive-cultural model of attribution. At its initial stages, my approach sought to 
simply follow previous criticism, primarily aiming to establish how the narrator, the 
characters, and the reader attribute intentions, thoughts, and beliefs to Joyce’s 
protagonist Leopold Bloom. However, new directions in attribution theory have also 
prompted this chapter to move in a new direction. Investigators in attribution theory 
have more recently discovered links between cultural practice, discourse, and 
attribution.2 New research shows how the repeated and sustained behaviours of 
cultural practice shape neural pathways, which in turn mediate qualitatively different 
inference processes. Likewise, discursive events further calibrate cognitive beliefs 
about social structures to influence perspectives, judgments, and the formulation of 
shared understandings and meanings.3 As such, this chapter focuses on cultural and 
discursive practices as situational factors, which incontrovertibly contribute towards 
shaping different cognitive styles of attribution.  
This chapter advances from previous studies of attribution in fiction, and 
explores how this link between attribution and culture is made manifest through 
Joyce’s stylistic choices. As this chapter demonstrates, the shifting perspectives in 
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“Cyclops” – from the first-person style and perspective of the unnamed narrator, to 
the third-person style of the thirty-three parodies – work to represent two different 
cognitive styles. These two cognitive styles, represented by individualistic versus 
collectivistic, or independent versus interdependent models of mind respectively, are 
essentially determined by culture. Studies examining cultural influences on 
attributional tendencies found that people belonging to Western individualistic 
cultures are more likely to automatically assume disposition accounts for behaviour. 
In contrast, those from Eastern collectivistic cultures are more likely (and more 
correctly so) to attend to situational constraints on behaviour, which typically exert a 
greater influence over our actions.4 In effect, this research demonstrates how 
individualistic cognitive styles are more likely to result in a certain kind of cognitive 
bias. This bias, known as the fundamental attribution error,5 describes the tendency 
to overestimate individual disposition and underestimate situational influences when 
accounting for behaviour. 
Drawing on this theory, this chapter demonstrates how Joyce’s individualistic 
unnamed narrator’s version of events draws predominantly on person-based 
attributions over situational factors. The unnamed narrator’s version is the product of 
a single individual belonging to an individualistic culture. On the other hand, Joyce’s 
third-person stylistic asides foreground the situational and discursive factors that 
might contribute toward character behaviour, since these parodic set-pieces represent 
socially and institutionally constructed ideas. Ideologies developed from newspaper 
reports, public records, legal contracts, and so on, point to a more socially interested 
construction of events. The parodies therefore work interdependently to establish 
shared understanding through context and provide contrast to the independent first-
person narration.  
At first glance, the synthetic dimensions of Joyce’s parodies seem to 
problematise a cognitive approach that relies upon the mimetic representation of 
character. Ulysses criticism adopts the term “arranger”6 to reflect the synthetic 
dimensions of Joyce’s narration more generally. The arranger is typically viewed as 
Joyce’s primary literary device or his “initial style.”7 As a literary device, the arranger 
is unavoidably synthetic, since it selectively frames the text to best achieve Joyce’s 
vision. However, as noted in my introductory chapter, Joyce’s vision was to show 
“the inner construction, the pathological and psychological body which our behaviour 
and thought depend on.”8 Consequently, the arranger in Ulysses frames the text 
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thematically using narrative techniques, orthography, and shifts in temporality that 
better mirror both a material and a psychological reality. These techniques are best 
evident in “Cyclops,” where the arranger clearly constructs parodies (or 
interpolations) that adopt the idiom of the scene. Rather than detract from mimesis, 
these interpolations work effectively to thematically record the pub’s multilayered 
sociocultural situation as it is determined by discourse. 
Typically fiction deals with attribution at three separate interpretive levels: 
those of character, narrator, and reader.9 Comparably, Joyce’s “Cyclops” necessitates 
that we depart from a standardised reading of attribution for two reasons. First, the 
stylistic parodies diegetically contribute towards character attribution and thus require 
a separate level of analysis. Second, the homodiegetic narrator – a narrator who is at 
the same time a character, situated within his own story – requires that the reader to 
treat character and narrator at one single level of analysis. As a result, this chapter 
evaluates how attribution in “Cyclops” intersects at three different perceptual 
positions or levels – the perspective belonging to Joyce’s narrator, the perspective 
provided by Joyce’s parodies, and finally, the reader’s perspective. Consequently, 
three corresponding sections organise this chapter. The first section examines 
character attribution and individualism, and underscores problems regarding character 
reliability and bias. In this section I consider the implications of these problems in 
terms of Joyce criticism more generally. The second section argues that Joyce’s 
parodies provide for the reader a second perceptual position for attribution. This 
section focuses on how the parodies effectively present a situated perspective through 
discourse. These narratorial shifts foreground the discourses undercutting this episode 
and Ulysses as a whole, designating the “overall orchestration”10 of a complete set of 
dispositives, voices, and language styles, each reflecting in turn a related set of 
discourse strategies, perspectives, and judgments. Last, the final section of this 
chapter discusses reader attribution and aims to rectify the problem of character bias. 
This last section places the first section’s findings (which details how the characters 
perceive Bloom) alongside existing critical perceptions of Bloom, in an attempt to 
uncover which, if any, of Bloom’s traditionally accepted traits unjustifiably stem 
from a character bias.  
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Section	  One:	  Narrator/Character	  Attribution	  and	  Individualism	  
The	  “Tinge”	  of	  the	  Community	  	  
Joyce scholarship interested in Bloom’s characterisation often fails to differentiate 
between how the characters in “Cyclops” perceive Bloom and how the reader 
subsequently perceives Bloom. Clearly, many of the characters in the bar scene have 
a notable “dislike”11 for Bloom, which inevitably taints how he is portrayed in 
“Cyclops.” Critics often paint Bloom in similar hues and this chapter aims to evaluate 
the degree to which a character bias has misled traditional scholarship. Where the 
patrons of the bar remark that Bloom is “prudent” (U 12:392), “humane” (U 12:408), 
“talkative” (U 12:410), “a dark horse” (U 12:435), a “knowall” (U 12:408), and a 
swindler (U 12:419), Joyce scholarship similarly views Bloom as “prudent,”12 
“humane,”13 “complacent and miserly,”14 and as an “outsider,”15 a “dark horse,”16 or 
“someone marginalized in Dublin society.”17 Contradictorily, Bloom is also viewed 
as “sensitive”18 and generous.19 Margot Norris accounts for Bloom’s many 
contradictory attributes, writing that many of Bloom’s perceived dispositions become 
“tinged” by his community or through the perceptions of fellow characters. Norris 
writes that while we perceive Bloom as “shrewd, sober, careful with money, and 
therefore in reasonably solid financial shape in spite of his series of jobs … these 
virtues are also tinged with an underside in the estimation of his community, that 
Bloom is cagey, secretive, possibly stingy, and not always savvy when it comes to the 
ways of the world.”20  
Developing Norris’s caution regarding “the tinge of the community,” this 
section aims to reframe both the narrator’s and the characters’ estimations of Bloom 
through a situational lens. Doing so allows us to interrogate how pervasive and far-
reaching this character-based “tinge” really is and whether it has unfairly influenced 
traditional views on Bloom’s character. As this chapter progresses, we will continue 
to review some of these commonly accepted “truths” about Bloom’s character (as 
identified in this section) and question how much of his characterisation in Joyce 
scholarship is based on misinformed cues – cues originating from the characters’ 
limited perspectives and related bias, over what can be more accurately gleaned from 
a situated perspective. As this chapter progresses, it moves away from the narrator’s 
personified perspective to ground Bloom’s behaviour in a situated perspective. In 
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doing so, this chapter simultaneously gains a greater awareness of the relativism of 
person perception21 and a more accurate perspective on character.  
Individualism	  	  
The characters frequenting Barney Kiernan’s on the afternoon of June 16th 1904 are, to 
recall Herman’s term, “model persons” – they are “models of mind” or fictive people 
that we can best understand by applying our knowledge about real people in the real 
world. Joyce constructs the characters in “Cyclops” as “textually grounded models of 
individuals-in-a-world.” The world these individuals inhabit reflects Joyce’s 
conception of Dublin in 1904. Given where Joyce was writing from, it is not surprising 
that the cultural shifts of fin-de-siècle Europe permeate his historical perspective. Joyce 
records the increasing tensions between individualism and collectivism using parallel 
narrative styles. The primary style pertains to the unnamed narrator, whom Joyce 
formulates as a modern and independent individual. The narrator’s person perception, 
attention, and reasoning (as evident through his first-person perspective) coincide with 
social science’s concept of individualism. The character-narrator represents an 
individual who is “conceptualized as bounded and separate from others. As such, [he] 
is defined by … internal attributes such as traits, abilities, intentions, and desires.”22 As 
previously mentioned, recent studies show that an individualistic culture containing 
independently oriented individuals tends to view the mind as internal and individual 
rather than external and communal. Likewise, independently orientated individuals will 
attend more to people as figural objects and pay less attention to context.23 The 
characters in “Cyclops” are assertive, self-reliant, and autonomous, and thus 
independently orientated. Predictively, as this chapter demonstrates, successful “mind-
reading” and “sharing of minds” (or intersubjectivity) rarely occurs in the bar scene 
and misattribution is frequent.  
For a person to read another person’s mind – their emotion, thoughts, and intent 
– they must consider how that person’s mind is situated. Likewise, to successfully 
attribute a character’s mind in fiction, we must consider the mind as socially 
distributed, environmentally extended, and embodied. As this section shows, the 
narrator in “Cyclops” often moves beyond an inherently internalist perception of mind 
when he takes account of his fellow characters’ embodied minds. Margot Norris 
likewise picks up on the narrator’s extremely observant people-watching skills,24 
highlighting, for example, the narrator’s description of Lenehan “with a face on him as 
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long as a late breakfast” (U 12:420). However, the narrator’s attention consistently 
remains person orientated. He therefore remains susceptible to the bias of an 
individualistic culture that maintains an independent view and often neglects to 
consider other correlating situational cues. Consequently, a review of the narrator’s 
first-person perspective confirms a predilection to attribute behaviour to individualistic 
factors, or in other words, to commit the fundamental attribution error.  
At this point it pays to mention that this section of the chapter does not seek to 
determine if the characters’ or the narrator’s ideas about Bloom can in fact be 
substantiated as long-term character traits.25 I approach this issue in the reader 
attribution section, and argue that the distinction between disposition and character 
trait is both a crucial and conditional measure. This section simply looks to determine 
if there is an overestimation of disposition, or a cognitive bias occurring (as 
attribution theory and ideas about individualism would dictate) and aims to raise 
questions about how this might affect Bloom’s portrayal at a more global level. 
Therefore no bold claims are made about Bloom’s character as the following subtitles 
in this section provokingly suggest. Rather, taking a cue from Joyce, I use these 
subtitles satirically, contravening expectations to stress caution against making claims 
that someone (be it fictional character or real person) can be a particular “type” of 
person.  
Bloom	  is	  a	  Shifty	  “Type”	  of	  Person	  
The most famous occurrence of character-to-character misattribution in “Cyclops” is 
the “Throwaway” incident, where the characters in the bar incorrectly deduce that 
Bloom has won money on the Gold Cup – a horse race held at the Ascot that day. As 
a result, the characters attribute Bloom’s departure from the bar (his behaviour) to an 
inherent secrecy or underhandedness and a related stinginess (a disposition). Rather 
than look to situational factors, the characters in this scene believe Bloom’s intention 
for leaving the bar is to collect his winnings in secret so he can avoid buying them all 
a round of drinks:  
—I know where he's gone, says Lenehan, cracking his 
fingers. 
—Who? says I. 
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—Bloom, says he. The courthouse is a blind. He had a 
few bob on Throwaway and he's gone to gather in the 
shekels. 
—Is it that whiteeyed kaffir? says the citizen, that 
never backed a horse in anger in his life? 
—That's where he's gone, says Lenehan. I met 
Bantam Lyons going to back that horse only I put him 
off it and he told me Bloom gave him the tip. Bet you 
what you like he has a hundred shillings to five on. 
He's the only man in Dublin has it. A dark horse. 
—He's a bloody dark horse himself, says Joe. 
                      (U 12:435) 
As Vincent Cheng explains, when the citizen calls Bloom a “whiteeyed kaffir,” he 
alludes to “a traitorous black African” from Kipling’s Boer War poems.26 The 
characters in “Cyclops” are therefore not only quick to characterise Bloom as a dark 
horse; they attribute Bloom’s pretence (his courthouse “blind”) to an inherent 
underhandedness. The characters attribute Bloom’s departure to individualistic 
factors and pay little attention to the many notable situational factors that are more 
clearly contributing towards his behaviour.  
A dispositional bias is further represented in the unnamed narrator’s numerous 
descriptions of Bloom’s movements. The narrator perceives Bloom as furtively 
“sloping in,” “skeezing round,” “peeping in,” and “slidering off” (U 12:390–91) and 
in doing so he further contributes to Bloom’s dark countenance. These descriptions 
account for Bloom’s embodied mind – his mind as manifest in movement, gesture, 
and expression. However, the narrator’s failure to consider the social and 
environmental situation – to look past the person – means that, like the other 
characters, the narrator frequently falls victim to a dispositional bias. Essentially, as 
with the other characters, the narrator finds it easier to accept that Bloom is simply 
this “type of person” – an underhanded Jew – than to look past the person and 
question the situational factors. To complicate the matter further, the social 
stereotyping of Bloom as a “sneaky Jew” inevitably taints the narrator’s perspective, 
to automatically alter how he perceives Bloom’s movements. It is thereby difficult to 
ascertain if Bloom’s “sloping,” “peeping,” “slidering,” and “skeezing” are verifiably 
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accurate descriptions of his movements and his related embodied mind, or if 
descriptions such as this are already skewed by the narrator’s cognitive bias. 
A more holistic view that encompasses the whole situation allows us to 
attribute Bloom’s apparent shifty movements and abrupt departure from the bar to his 
present situation rather than to any characteristic shiftiness. Bloom makes his sole 
intent for frequenting the bar clear to the other characters the minute he walks 
through the door, and asks if Martin Cunningham is there (U 12:391). Taking this 
into account, we can easily establish that Bloom’s peeping in is not surreptitious, but 
rather, Bloom is simply checking to see if Cunningham is inside. Sick of “prowling” 
(U 12:387) the streets waiting, Bloom decides to wait inside the bar. However, as 
Bloom opens the door to enter the pub, he encounters the citizen’s growling dog, 
Garryowen. The citizen’s “reassurance” that his dog won’t eat Bloom (U 12:391) just 
serves to further alert Bloom to the dangers of an attack. The narrator’s description of 
Bloom’s entrance as “skeezing round the door” (U 12:391) is directly related to 
Bloom’s hesitance to enter. Bloom’s action is caused by situational factors (Bloom’s 
cautionary measure of the dog) rather than dispositional factors which would imply a 
characteristic movement. Likewise, the narrator’s use of “slope” to describe how 
“Bloom slopes in with his cod’s eye on the dog” (U 12:391) presents a similar case. 
For a start, the word “slope” is a double entendre. The verb “slope” means to move 
unobtrusively in an attempt to avoid notice or “to depart surreptitiously, sneak off”27 
but it also means “to move or proceed in, an oblique direction.” 28 So while Bloom’s 
“sloping” inadvertently suggests that he moves surreptitiously, it is more likely that 
his “sloping” represents his effort to angle around the growling Garryowen. A 
situated perspective attributes Bloom’s movement to situational factors over identity 
markers to show that Bloom moves cautiously (not surreptitiously). For a dark horse, 
who the characters claim to know little about, Bloom is more up-front about his 
motives and less shifty in his movements than the narrator’s retelling might suggest.  
Of the three interpretive levels for attribution, the level of character attribution 
is evidently the most limited in terms of perspective. As model minds, the characters 
are cultural constructs both shaped by and limited to the social storyworld. As Palmer 
explains, “The storyworld is aspectual in the sense that its characters can only ever 
experience it from one particular perceptual cognitive aspect at any one time.”29 The 
general gossip in the bar indicates that the characters do in fact know a number of 
things about Bloom – his career, his wife, and his family. It is commonly known that 
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Bloom is a “freemason” (U 12:387), that his father “poisoned himself” (U 12:438), 
and that his only son died in infancy (U 12:439). John Wyse alleges that Bloom has 
connections with “Sinn Fein” (U 12:438) and the narrator knows that Bloom lost his 
job at the cattle market for being a “Mister Knowall” and “giving lip to a grazier (U 
12:408). The narrator also knows a remarkable amount about the Blooms’ time at the 
City Arms Hotel, notably how Molly would often “be in rivers of tears … crying her 
eyes” over Bloom “waltzing around” (U 12:408) and how Bloom took to “Lying up 
in the hotel … once a month with headache like a totty with her courses” (U 12:439). 
The narrator recalls that Bloom tried to get written into the will of an old lady who 
was also staying at the City Arms, and describes Bloom’s attempts to get on her soft 
side by “mollycoddle[ing] playing bézique … and not eating meat of a Friday (U 
12:395). He also knows that Bloom has a friend in court who helped him “get off” for 
selling “bazaar tickets or what do you call it royal Hungarian privileged lottery” (U 
12:406). Despite this accumulation of community knowledge, the Dubliners continue 
to view Bloom as a mere silhouette shadowed in darkness, even as they continually 
cast him in increasingly unfavourable light. 
There is a good deal of community (or social gossip) that might encourage a 
greater degree of situational awareness among the Dubliners. However, despite their 
collection of assumed truths about Bloom’s previous and present situations, the 
characters still feel he is a dark horse, an insidious outsider, and someone about 
whom little is known. Moreover, the characters continually underestimate situational 
factors when accounting for Bloom’s actions in this scene – this despite their 
background knowledge. The fact the citizen asserts Bloom has “never backed a horse 
in anger in his life” (U 12:435) does not influence how the men react to Bloom’s 
departure from the bar. Disposition continues to orientate their attention and their 
reasoning – the characters continue to reason it is more likely Bloom has gone to 
collect his winnings. Furthermore, aspectuality ensures that while the characters may 
know a variety of things about Bloom’s background, his Jewishness consistently 
trumps all other considerations. In lieu of situational context, the characters continue 
to reason that Bloom is a “type of person” – a Jew who would lie about his actions in 
an attempt to avoid “putting up a pint of stuff like a man” (U 12:439). Bloom’s 
situational context provides evidence of past generous acts that many of the men in 
the bar are privy to. Norris similarly notes how “Martin Cunningham, Jack Power, 
and John Wyse Nolan all know that Bloom has contributed a generous amount of 
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money to the Dignam family collection”30 and yet no one counters Lenehan’s remark 
that Bloom is capable of defrauding “widows and orphans” (U 12:438). The fact that 
Bloom is meeting Cunningham, on behalf of Dignam’s widow, is conveniently 
forgotten. Likewise, Hynes conveniently fails to recall that Bloom previously lent 
him three bob, which he has yet to repay. Bloom’s acts of generosity are continually 
displaced by his perceived underhandedness. Even the citizen’s avowal that Bloom 
never bet on a horse in his life is not considered relevant background information to 
necessitate a cognitive reassignment. Rather, the characters’ culturally grounded 
predilection to commit the dispositional bias consistently contravenes all other 
factors. 
Bloom	  is	  a	  Prudent	  “Type”	  of	  Person	  
Another way the characters might account for Bloom’s rapid departure from the bar is 
to consider situational factors. A careful look at the concurrent situation and the 
timing of Bloom’s departure would allow them to detect that Bloom’s exit is 
strategically timed. Bloom exits mid-conversation, just after he makes a bold 
statement and a potentially controversial claim. He states that love “is really life” (U 
12:432) and before anyone can respond he “pops off like greased lightning”:  
—Love, says Bloom. I mean the opposite of hatred. I 
must go now, says he to John Wyse. Just round to the 
court a moment to see if Martin is there. If he comes 
just say I’ll be back in a second. Just a moment. 
Who’s hindering you? And off he pops like greased 
lightning.        (U 12:432) 
The situation dictates this is the perfect time for Bloom to make an exit. Bloom 
prudently leaves before he is obliged to engage further in the debate and defend his 
contentious claim. In doing so, the citizen and other patrons do not get the chance to 
fight back – a necessary outlet for their rising frustration.  
The patrons are further frustrated by Bloom’s covert behaviour since they are 
subsequently denied the chance of a “shout.” The longer the men are denied their due, 
the more they focus on Bloom’s miserly refusal to buy a round of drinks. Again, the 
men in the bar blame Bloom’s behaviour – his neglect to buy a round of drinks – on 
individual factors. They believe he is inherently the “type” of person who will not 
stand them a drink. A stereotype often associated with Jewishness is prudence. The 
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Oxford English Dictionary defines “prudent” as “Of a person: acting with or showing 
forethought; having or exercising sound judgement in practical or financial affairs; 
circumspect, discreet, cautious; far-sighted.” Similarly, the “moneylender” figure that 
contributes to the Jewish stereotype is depicted as prudent: as “intelligent and 
shrewd.”31 When Bloom first enters the bar and refuses a drink, saying “he wouldn’t 
and he couldn’t and excuse him no offence and all to that and then he said well he’d 
just take a cigar” (U 12:392), the narrator attributes this refusal to an inherent 
prudence: “he’s a prudent member and no mistake” (U 12:392). Bloom’s refusal to 
buy himself (or anyone) a drink further substantiates his Jewishness – his prudent, 
standoffish stinginess – and reinforces this stereotype. Just as the narrator exhorts 
“Mean bloody scut … There’s a jew for you! All for number one” (U 12:443), the 
characters cannot move past Bloom’s perceived Jewishness to attribute his actions to 
anything else.  
Bloom	  is	  a	  Talkative	  “Type”	  of	  Person	  
The characters perceive Bloom as prudent in matters of money and sobriety. 
However, it is likely they would agree that Bloom’s prudence does not extend to an 
exercise of sound elocutionary judgment in this scene. As John Gordon noted in a 
recent paper called “Deterrent Effect and So Forth and So On,” in “Cyclops” Bloom 
repeatedly butts in and cannot shut up.32 This observation reflects the narrator’s 
perception of Bloom as a chatty know-it-all in this scene. However, further 
complicating the matter is the way in which the narrator frames his opinion. The 
narrator’s views are formulated in such a way as to suggest a long-standing 
impression and a history of Bloom. Although Bloom is demonstrably voluble in this 
particular pub scene, the narrator’s opinion about his talkativeness is based on a 
previously established expectation. The first time Bloom begins to talk, the narrator 
notes that Bloom “of course … comes out with the why and the wherefore and all the 
codology of the business” (U 12:393; emphasis mine). The narrator’s “of course” 
indicates he is not surprised by Bloom’s enthusiastic lecture. Likewise, he repeats the 
marker “of course” when he expresses his impatience: 
And of course Bloom had to have his say too about if 
a fellow had a rower’s heart violent exercise was bad. 
I declare to my antimacassar if you took up a straw 
from the bloody floor and if you said to Bloom: Look 
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at, Bloom. Do you see that straw? That’s a straw. 
Declare to my aunt he’d talk about it for an hour so he 
would and talk steady.                          (U 12:410) 
The narrator attributes Bloom’s voluble behaviour to a disposition for talking 
and indicates he expects Bloom to behave this way. In a similar fashion, when the 
narrator describes how Bloom cuts in “with his but don’t you see?” (U 12:395) and 
“starts with his jawbreakers about phenomenon and science and this phenomenon and 
the other phenomenon” (U 12:393; emphasis mine), the use of the personal pronoun 
“his” indicates that Bloom typically uses this type of dilated discourse – these 
“jawbreakers” belong to Bloom since they are clearly marked as his. Again, the 
narrator identifies Bloom as having a penchant for spouting about phenomena, 
repeating the word “Phenomenon!” (U 12:394, 395, 396) six times to underscore his 
exasperation and disdain for Bloom’s garrulous intellect. Similarly, the unintelligent 
narrator further condemns Bloom’s knowledge, calling it “his old goo” (U 12:402; 
emphasis mine). 
It is worth noting that this impressive anthology of Bloom’s logorrhoea is 
restricted to the narrator’s perception and expectation. The other characters in this 
scene do not explicitly identify Bloom as a talkative person. However, as already 
noted, the narrator details an impressive range of background knowledge about 
Bloom and is thereby familiar with him. Although Bloom’s behaviour in this scene 
provides a basis for the narrator’s perception, it does not account for the narrator’s 
expectation. This leads us to question what the narrator’s assumption is based on. 
Unlike Bloom’s shiftiness, his talkativeness is not preconceived through a Jewish 
stereotype. Jews are not typically perceived to be chatty people. Nor is it largely 
reflected in any of the narrator’s background knowledge of Bloom. Admittedly, the 
narrator does mention that Bloom previously exhibits a predilection to instruct (not 
talk), recalling how Bloom waltzed around showing Molly how to do “it” (U 12:408). 
However, it seems unreasonable that the narrator would base his expectation on this 
semi-relevant, isolated event. Furthermore, as we will see in the reader attribution 
section, a broader perspective does not reveal any additional extant examples of this 
type of behaviour from Bloom. While we might recall Molly’s frustration at Bloom 
earlier the same day: “O rocks! … Tell us in plain words” (U 4:77), again, this is 
semi-relevant since Molly’s frustration is not directed at Bloom’s talkativeness but 
rather his use of “codology” or a certain mode of talk. Therefore it appears that the 
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narrator’s expectation for Bloom’s talkativeness is based on scenes external to the 
text (if they exist at all). To further investigate if such instances exist, we must turn to 
situations external to the bar scene. Consequently, this question is further discussed in 
the second section of this chapter. 
For now, we question what situational factors are contributing towards Bloom’s 
verbosity in this scene. One possibility includes Bloom’s fear of the dog and his 
consequent uneasiness. Effectively, the citizen’s invitation for Bloom to enter the bar 
is easily rekeyed and interpreted as a challenge. Bloom is unable to retreat outside 
and away from the dog without appearing both rude and cowardly. Notably, Bloom’s 
initial chatter coincides with the narrator’s mention that “the old dog” has begun 
“smelling him” (U 12:393). However, this theory quickly loses validity if we consider 
how Bloom’s logorrhoea continues after Bob Doran saves Bloom, distracting 
Garryowen by “hauling and mauling and talking to him in Irish” (U 12:394–95) and 
giving him some water. A second, less disputable factor contributing to Bloom’s 
behaviour is in-group social dynamics. Bloom may predict that the other characters 
hold a low opinion of him, regardless of the citizen’s invitation, which is interpreted 
as something other than a genuine welcome. The longer Bloom remains at the bar, the 
more likely that he picks up on his fellow patrons’ blatant rudeness and persistent 
racial slurs. Bloom’s social anxiety is potentially substituted by a nervous excitement, 
which originates in the situation itself, and causes him to become a chatterbox – his 
inability to shut up simply exacerbates the situation. The more the situation builds 
tension, the more responsive Bloom is to it, and the more he talks himself into an 
ever-expanding hole. 
A third explanation for Bloom’s chatty behaviour in “Cyclops” develops on the 
previous possibilities to reveal a final quintessential situational factor – that being 
Bloom’s social stratagem. Paradoxically, Bloom overtalks in this scene for the same 
reason he undertalks in others. In this particular scene Bloom is strategically 
positioning himself within the conversation rather than against it. Unlike in earlier 
scenes, Bloom is, for the first time that day, socialising with a large group of up to ten 
men (give or take a few, due to the comings and goings of the pub). In previous 
interactions, he mostly talks with two or at most three other characters. In smaller, 
more intimate company, topics of conversation are more likely to progress to personal 
or intimate subjects. As the next section discusses in greater depth, Bloom remains 
mostly reticent in these types of conversations. He is more inclined to listen and less 
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inclined to initiate talk. With larger groups, however, topics of talk remain more 
general and accessible to the entire group. Group topics typically include current 
events, politics, and sports, even the weather. In previous interactions Bloom’s 
stratagem is to act disinterested, thus allowing him to opt out and ignore undesirable 
questions. However, with less chance that the topic of conversation is gong to extend 
to Molly or any of Bloom’s other familial and private concerns, Bloom chooses 
talkativeness as his tactic. Bloom calculates that in larger groups there is less risk the 
conversation will take an undesirable turn, but if it does, he is better to have a hand in 
it (so to speak). If he is regularly contributing to the conversation he can continually 
readjust the direction to a more general, philosophical, or hypothetical level.  
Sport as a topic for conversation would seem a safe subject in terms of Bloom’s 
personal privacy. Unlike suicide, Jewish figures, or music, Bloom cannot foresee a 
link between lawn tennis and his family. However, when the conversation shifts 
slightly to encompass betting on sport, Boylan’s name unsurprisingly comes up. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, Bloom displays a high sensitivity to Boylan 
throughout the course of the day. In all previous encounters with Boylan (be it his 
person or just his name), Bloom consistently displays marked emotional responses – 
his heart rate rises and his movement tendencies change. As we do not have access to 
Bloom’s internal dialogue in this scene, in line with previous readings his emotional 
reaction is evident through the pitch of his expression:  
—Talking about violent exercise, says Alf, were you 
at that Keogh-Bennett match? 
—No, says Joe. 
—I heard So and So made a cool hundred quid over it, 
says Alf. 
—Who? Blazes? says Joe. 
And says Bloom: 
—What I meant about tennis, for example, is the 
agility and training the eye. 
—Ay, Blazes, says Alf. He let out that Myler was on 
the beer to run up the odds and he swatting all the 
time. 
—We know him, says the citizen. The traitor's son. 
We know what put English gold in his pocket. 
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—-True for you, says Joe. 
And Bloom cuts in again about lawn tennis and the 
circulation of the blood, asking Alf: 
—Now, don’t you think, Bergan? 
—Myler dusted the floor with him, says Alf.   
         (U 12:412) 
At the first hint of Boylan’s name Bloom immediately jumps in and attempts to 
redirect the conversation. Bloom’s internal alarms are going off and raising the pitch 
of his elocutionary effort. Accordingly, he cuts in a second time despite the fact the 
other men are clearly not interested and blatantly ignore him. Bloom demonstrates his 
desperation when he finally resorts to specifically singling out Alf in an effort to get 
someone on board to steer the conversation away from Boylan. However, Alf 
continues to ignore him, a further indication of the little regard he has for Bloom. 
As the above example shows, continually contributing to a conversation places 
Bloom in a more advantageous regulatory position for mediating the communicative 
process. Bloom’s participation allows him to redirect the conversation when the topic 
manoeuvres unfavourably close to home. Unfortunately for Bloom, lawn tennis is the 
wrong topic to encourage. Subsequently the men doggedly persist on their chosen 
path and inevitably the topic reaches Molly: 
I hear he’s running a concert tour now up in the north. 
—He is, says Joe. Isn’t he? 
—Who? says Bloom. Ah, yes. That’s quite true. Yes, 
a kind of summer tour, you see. Just a holiday. 
—Mrs B. is the bright particular star, isn’t she? says 
Joe. 
—My wife? says Bloom. She’s singing, yes. I think it 
will be a success too. 
He’s an excellent man to organise. Excellent. 
 (U 12:414) 
Bloom, ever the conversational strategist, reverts to answering questions with 
questions, a rhetorical device formulated to feign disinterest. However, he has already 
been too involved in the conversation until this point to successfully revert to a 
stratagem of acting disinterested or distracted. Instead, Bloom employs a second 
rhetorical device, repetition, in an attempt to “sell” his fraudulent feelings. Salesman 
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Bloom believes that for any advertisement to work “you must have repetition. That's 
the whole secret” (U 12:419). However, the narrator is not fooled. He quickly 
connects the dots and says to himself: “Hoho begob … That explains the milk in the 
cocoanut and absence of hair on the animal’s chest. Blazes doing the tootle on the 
flute” (U 12:414). Fortunately for Bloom, before he is further questioned, the 
conversation is interrupted by the arrival of J. J. O’Molloy and Ned Lambert. Since 
O’Molloy is an attorney, the topic of conversation changes to court cases, a safer 
discursive territory for Bloom.  
Bloom	  is	  an	  Argumentative	  “Type”	  of	  Person	  
The social situation accounts for much of Bloom’s talkativeness in “Cyclops.” In 
addition, Bloom’s concern for privacy and his related tendency to strategically 
position himself either in or out of conversations, also affects his behaviour. 
However, social stratagem does not account for Bloom’s antagonistic or 
argumentative behaviour in “Cyclops.” The narrator suggests that Bloom is 
argumentative, commenting on “his argol bargol” (U 12:436; emphasis mine) and 
stating: “Didn't I tell you? As true as I’m drinking this porter if he was at his last gasp 
he’d try to downface you that dying was living” (U 12:427). Bloom’s markedly 
argumentative actions in this scene substantiate the narrator’s observations. He argues 
with the citizen about capital punishment (U 12:395), contributes to an argument that 
J. J. and the citizen are having about law and history with the provocative comment 
“—Some people … can see the mote in others’ eyes but they can’t see the beam in 
their own” (U 12:422–23); he argues the point with the bartender and refuses a drink 
(U 12:392); and then excitedly talks about persecution and injustice, rebelliously 
claiming that the race he belongs to “is hated and persecuted. Also now. This very 
moment. This very instant” (U 12:431–32). Likewise, Bloom’s inflammable retort 
about “Christ being a Jew like me” (U 12:445) marks behaviour that further 
substantiates the narrator’s previous comment. Again, the narrator does not attribute 
Bloom’s argumentativeness to situational factors, but states that Bloom simply is this 
“type” of person.  
Unlike the reader, the narrator does not have access to Bloom’s previous 
experiences that day. The narrator’s first and only encounter with Bloom occurs 
immediately preceding this scene, when he spots Bloom “counting fish” (U 12:384) 
at the market before entering the bar. He did not watch Bloom hold his tongue, hide 
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in shadows, bury a friend, muddle jokes, and overlook insults. Nor does he observe 
Bloom’s more recent restrained reconnaissance of Boylan at the Ormond. Without an 
extended perspective the narrator is unable to perceive further factors that are 
contributing to Bloom’s argumentativeness. In the next section of this chapter I argue 
that Bloom’s behaviour is determined by cumulative situational factors. Bloom reacts 
to his previous and present circumstances – to barbed comments, persecution, the 
citizen who embodies this persecution, and the death of a friend. Most especially, 
Bloom reacts to the idea that right at that very moment Blazes Boylan is at his home 
(from which he is exiled) with his wife (with whom he is unreconciled).  
Section	  Two:	  Collective	  Discourses	  
Collectivism	  
This second section shows how attribution is fundamentally embedded in larger 
social structures. The thirty-three parodies in “Cyclops” work to foreground 
situational factors through discourse. The third-person form of the parodies further 
reframes attributional processes by expanding on the aspectuality of the characters. 
These intersections in the narrative show Joyce panning back from the monocular 
vision of the narrator, back from the characters’ singular and fixed vision of identity, 
and back from the microcosm that is Barney Kiernan’s pub. Instead, the parodies 
incorporate the multiperspectivity and the overall orchestration of shared knowledge 
through public discourses. Joyce offsets events from the narrator’s personified 
perspective using socially constructed collective accounts, such as newspaper articles, 
medical reports, public records, and legal contracts. In this way, these interpolations 
in “Cyclops” represent a second cognitive style – a way of thinking that branches 
from collectivism.  
Moving to a more holistic level of attribution in this second section, this chapter 
suggests that the interpolations in “Cyclops” represent a move from an individualistic 
stance to a collectivistic stance – from an autobiographical account to that of social 
discourse. At the same time, this discursive shift denotes a shift in cognitive style: 
from internal to externally orientated perspectives; from focused to holistic attention; 
from analytic to holistic reasoning; and from the dispositional bias in person 
perception to a more situated account of behaviour. 
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A collectivistic stance on attribution tends to view behaviour as relational and 
contingent to the social environment. In the previous section we saw how Joyce 
constructs his characters using a cognitive-cultural frame that points towards 
individualism. The characters are presented with individualistic modes of perception. 
In keeping with attribution theory’s definition of individualism, these characters are 
constructed as internally orientated, having “strong preferences for freedom, 
uniqueness, autonomy, and personal goal pursuit.”33 The sharing of minds between 
bar patrons is rarely successful and the characters are frequently misattributing 
Bloom’s mind and succumbing to a cognitive bias. Constructing his characters in this 
way allows Joyce to anticipate what social science classifies as the independent 
model of the self. Again, as Jeri Johnson so wonderfully puts it, “There is a way 
[Joyce] … seems to continue to anticipate the things he cannot have known.”34  
This cognitive theory works at many different levels in Joyce’s text. It is a 
subtext that situates Joyce’s text in time and Joyce’s characters in a storyworld, but it 
also works at a figurative level to develop the Odyssean parallel. The narrator’s “I” 
recalls the one-eyed Cyclops, but it also serves to underscore the implicit 
individualism and one-eyed perspective prevailing in an increasingly westernised 
Dublin. Joyce highlights singularity in the bar scene, but then switches to a collective 
perspective, using discourse to accentuate the social and situational factors. John 
McLaren aligns this perceptual disjunction with the Odyssean parallel of the one-eyed 
Cyclops, describing Bloom as “the two-eyed man” who encounters “the one-eyed 
Dubliners at Barney Kiernan’s.”35 Likewise, Budgen remarks how the one-eyed man 
“has no thanks for the man who tells him that the shape he thinks is flat as cardboard 
is in reality round, or that there are such things as half-tones, values and nuances of 
colour … The one-eyed man may be king in the realm of the blind, but the two-eyed 
man is nothing but a nuisance in the kingdom of the one-eyed.”36 Bloom’s frustration 
that the other characters cannot “grasp” his point (U 12:396) is evident through his 
repetition of “but don’t you see?” (U 12:393). 
Joyce highlights Bloom’s binocular vision over the Dubliner’s monocular 
vision or single sightedness. Earlier in “Lestrygonians” Bloom ponders the concept of 
“parallax” exploring how the sun’s disk appears displaced when seen from two 
different points of view” (U 8:211). Bloom’s binocular vision, over the Dubliners’ 
single-sightedness, is unwittingly epitomised by the narrator who pinpoints Bloom’s 
repeated phrase “but on the other hand” (U 12:395). That Bloom is symbolically 
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portrayed as both two-handed and two-eyed is a direct contrast to the citizen, who is 
predominantly described with one eye and one hand. When we first meet the citizen, 
for example, the narrator describes how “he rubs his hand in his eye” (U 12:381). 
Terry tells the citizen to take the drink in his “right hand,” and when he throws the 
biscuit tin at Bloom, the narrator observes how the citizen “drew his hand and made a 
swipe and let fly” (U 12:446). For the citizen, doubleness is a nuisance. He disdains 
any man who is “a half and half … that’s neither fish nor flesh” (U 12:416) and 
strives to retain “an illusion of singular identity that neither Bloom nor he actually 
possess.”37 The citizen, with his stereotypes and prejudices, neglects to see identity as 
a dynamic process. In contrast, Joyce presents Bloom as a half and half – he 
embodies an intersection between East and West, man and woman, collectivist and 
individualistic stances. Bloom, as the modern flâneur, embodies the westernised ideal 
of the individual. However, Bloom’s Jewish identity markers, his daydreams 
invoking Eastern lands, his strong accord for familial duty, and his favour of social 
harmony also connect him to the East and to a collectivist stance.  
Foregrounding	  Situational	  Factors	  
Frank Budgen perceptively describes the narrative structure in “Cyclops” as a type of 
cubism where “Every event is a many sided object.”38 While earlier episodes of 
Ulysses present a less synthetic narrative, in “Cyclops” many “aspects lie side by side 
in the same picture.”39 Rather than look to one aspect to find sense, the reader must 
take all aspects together to find sense through difference. In “Cyclops” each side of 
an event is informed by a different discursive style, which in turn represents a 
different stance or social structure. While narrative theory shows how the stylistic 
shifts in “Cyclops” work to develop antithesis and irony, a cognitive approach to 
narrative further develops these foundational ideas to show how the parodies in 
“Cyclops” present a parallel perspective, which foregrounds situation over 
disposition. Moreover, a cognitive approach concerned with social identification and 
processes of identity highlights the extent to which discourse constructs character.  
The parodies frame for the reader the socially constructed discursive 
underpinnings of character. The aside “The last farewell” (U 12:386), which 
describes the execution of a revolutionary rebel using highly stylised sentimental 
language, demonstrates how this character construction occurs. This aside provides a 
situated account of the citizen’s exclamation: “—Sinn Fein! says the citizen. Sinn 
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Fein amhain! The friends we love are by our side and the foes we hate before us” (U 
12:396). Without the context provided by the interpolation, a reader would 
automatically attribute this nationalistic sentiment to the citizen’s character, as a 
character trait, rather than to the social and historical antecedents. The first couple of 
sentences of this interpolation adequately demonstrate the type of discourse used to 
better contextualise the citizen’s statement:  
The last farewell was affecting in the extreme. From 
the belfries far and near the funereal deathbell tolled 
unceasingly while all around the gloomy precincts 
rolled the ominous warning of a hundred muffled 
drums punctuated by the hollow booming of pieces of 
ordnance.          (U 12:396) 
This style of language impresses upon the reader a sense of drama and tragedy. The 
language evokes pathos in the reader – it is poignant and passionate. These discursive 
elements create a mode of communication – while the content is relevant, it is the 
stylistic discursive form that more clearly accentuates and articulates meaning. When 
placed alongside the narrator’s person-orientated attention, this version contrastingly 
draws attention to the situational factors informing the citizen’s overtly romantic and 
nationalistic sentiment. Providing this different version inverts the cognitive bias. In 
this way, Joyce’s parodies force the reader to acknowledge the degree to which 
idiosyncratic cultural myths as discourse contribute toward the citizen’s behaviour. 
The fact that a nationalistic disposition, over time, has developed into a character trait 
for the citizen is incidental. Rather, this foregrounding of culture through discourse 
further enforces the degree to which all behaviour is, first and foremost, situated. 
Collective discourses such as public records and legal contracts are, as Potter 
and Edwards state, “admirably appropriate for a study of issues of attribution.”40 
Discursive psychology finds adversarial contexts and other similar contexts – where a 
full account and accurate recall is required – a “useful halfway stage between 
laboratory and world,”41 especially when attributional issues such as establishing 
blame and causality are at hand. Suitably, the first interpolation in “Cyclops” takes 
form as a segment of text constructed in the style of a legal contract. Like the 
previous example, this example demonstrates how this additional perspective locates 
an intersection between dispositional and situational accounts. The segment of text in 
question dismantles the subjectivity of the unnamed narrator and formulates a more 
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objective perspective with regards to the legal entitlement of a Jewish merchant, 
Moses Herzog. As the narrator and Joe Hynes walk towards Barney Kiernan’s, the 
narrator describes to Joe how for the past fortnight, he has been working for the “little 
jewy,” contracted as a debt collector. The narrator has been unable to get a penny out 
of an old plumber named Geraghty and suggests it’s disputable as to whether the 
plumber does in fact owe the money anyway. The narrator plays along with Joe’s 
anti-Semitic humour, calls the merchant a “notorious bloody robber” (U 12:377), and 
both imitates and laughs at the “little jewy” (U 12:377). Effectively, the narrator’s 
rehash of events colours the reader’s opinion about whether Herzog is in fact entitled 
to the debt he wants paid. The parody’s perspective, formulated through public 
discourse, works to counter the narrator’s subjectivity by objectively listing facts to 
demonstrate Herzog is legally entitled and justified in collecting this debt. Rather than 
accepting the Jewish stereotypes enforced by the characters’ bias, the reader’s 
judgment is reinformed by collective knowledge and thereby situated. This effectual 
reframing of the scene counters the imbalance of the characters’ cognitive bias and 
points to a disjuncture in person perception. Likewise, this parody signals for the 
reader the existence of a prominent anti-Semitic sentiment, which greatly influences 
character perception throughout the entire episode.  
For the most part, the parodies do not encroach upon the characteristic idiom of 
the narrator. While there are some marginal overlaps, the narrator and the parodies 
are markedly distinct. After all, the narrator’s idiolect is interconnected to his 
individualistic cognitive style. It characterises him as belonging to both a particular 
culture and a particular time. Comparably, the cognitive style reflected through the 
parodies often intersects or competes with the narrator’s cultural mode of self. The 
narrator automatically assumes the cognitive style most often associated with a 
Western individualistic culture, and consequently is independently orientated and 
dispositionally biased. In contrast, the perspective afforded by Joyce’s parodies 
represents the underpinnings of the collective mind and social discourse, and thereby 
more adequately situates events through an encompassing sociohistorical lens. 
Allowing the parodies and the narrator the same idiolect would effectively weaken 
the validity of these parallel cognitive styles and undermine Joyce’s corresponding 
narratorial devices.  
While the parodies do not directly inform the reader about Bloom, they 
inevitably work to construct Bloom’s character by pointing to the collective 
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discourses that underpin the scene, and consequently his character. By negotiating 
between competing perspectives, the parodies indirectly add to what we know about 
Bloom’s character. As the below example demonstrates, the emphasis achieved 
through discursive formation further foregrounds the degree of Bloom’s inflated and 
incessant talk in this scene. The first half of the extract gives an adequate idea of the 
imagery invoked: 
The distinguished scientist Herr Professor Luitpold 
Blumenduft tendered medical evidence to the effect 
that the instantaneous fracture of the cervical 
vertebrae and consequent scission of the spinal cord 
would, according to the best approved tradition of 
medical science, be calculated to inevitably produce 
in the human subject a violent ganglionic stimulus of 
the nerve centres of the genital apparatus   
                                         (U 12:394) 
The above interpolation alludes to Bloom using a German derivative of his 
name, Herr Professor Luitpold Blumenduft, thereby furthering the discursive 
construction of a scientific report. Resituating Bloom into scientific discourse allows 
this parody to evoke the narrator’s underlying impression that Bloom’s intellectual 
chat is inappropriate in the current social situation. When the narrator deems Bloom’s 
discursive practice to be inappropriate, this parody reflects his feelings by satirising 
them through discourse. A second example of this occurs when Bloom and Bob 
Doran converse: 
—Let me, said he, so far presume upon our 
acquaintance which, however slight it may appear if 
judged by the standard of mere time, is founded, as I 
hope and believe, on a sentiment of mutual esteem as 
to request of you this favour.               (U 12:406) 
This parody grounds the conversation through ornate language in order to foreground 
the narrator’s impression of Doran: “Choking with bloody foolery” (U 12:406). The 
extract clearly shows character diction at odds with register. Both Bloom and Doran 
are depicted using formal language and well-articulated phrases – not the social 
discourse you would expect in a local bar and certainly not the discourse expected 
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from Doran, who, as the narrator indicates, is “trying to walk straight. Boosed at five 
o’clock.” (U 12:406).  
Attribution and all forms of perception and judgment are fundamentally 
grounded through cultural and discursive processes. In this way, Joyce’s parodies 
employ discourse as a form of sense making, framing social structures relevant to the 
narrator and concurrent events. Collective knowledge or public discourses underpin 
all meaning-making processes. Ultimately, Joyce’s parodies serve to represent the 
collective aspect of attributional processes by foregrounding collective discourses. A 
cognitive reframing of the parodies reveals the depth of Joyce’s narrative and furthers 
Schneidau’s claim that “What was real to … [Joyce] was the enormous latent 
potential in the act of narration.”42  
The parodies negotiate the intersection of competing perspectives through 
competing cognitive styles. Consequently, the reader becomes aware of the factors 
that are missing from the narrator’s personal perception, reason, and attention. 
Section	  Three:	  Reader	  Attribution	  –	  Countering	  the	  Cognitive	  Bias	  
Situated	  Dispositions	  
The final section of this chapter moves to discuss reader-to-character attribution. This 
section revisits the main points gained through examining the parallel perspectives of 
both Joyce’s characters and his parodies. The aim of this section is to analyse the 
accuracy of the subsequent claims, which suggest Bloom is prudent, talkative, and 
argumentative, a dark horse and a swindler. However, I begin this section with a 
minor side step, necessary for moving forward. As the outline of this chapter reflects, 
the behaviour of fictional characters is accounted for at three different levels of 
cognitive attribution: Joyce’s narrator’s perspective, the perspective gained from 
Joyce’s parodies, and the reader’s perspective. However, to further complicate 
matters, this chapter also recognises that character behaviour is not only attributable 
at different levels, but it is also indistinctly attributable. The idea that behaviour is 
caused by either disposition or situation is fundamentally problematic.  
Fortunately, the reader is better equipped to tease out this tension between 
disposition and situation. Unlike the aspectual character-to-character attribution, the 
reader has the advantage of knowledge and perspective. Awareness of the 
fundamental attribution error undermines its innateness, forcing readers to look again 
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and reconsider situational factors in all fictional works. Additionally, the ability to 
contextualise behaviour within the overarching context of time further reframes 
attribution for the reader. Time is a necessary measure for comparison and the key to 
understanding the indeterminate relationship between disposition and situation. 
The fundamental attribution error dictates that situational factors are 
underestimated, while dispositional factors are overestimated, when people interpret 
the behaviour of others. While the theory itself is valid (and repeatedly proven 
through numerous studies),43 it inescapably sets up an unfavourable and problematic 
binary. A shortcoming of research on the very notion of the fundamental attribution 
error is that it often downplays the instability and indeterminateness of dispositions. It 
is important to acknowledge that factors contributing to behaviour are inescapably 
both situational and dispositional. Dispositions are inherently situational, both 
shaping and being shaped by environmental factors. For example, a person routinely 
placed in frightening situations will gradually develop over time a fearful disposition. 
This same fearfulness predicts future situational changes for the individual, such as 
increases in physical fortitude and social distance. It might even affect intellectual 
preferences – the things he or she will choose to watch, listen to, and read. Habitual 
actions attributed to disposition are predilections already stained by past situations. In 
consequence, the question this chapter must now ask is to what degree character 
action is attributable to disposition or situation. It is no longer a question of either/or 
– the line is increasingly blurred. Correspondingly, the difference between disposition 
and situation is less a question of polarity and more a concern for temporality. 
Behaviour influenced by the present situation is situational; however, behaviour 
resulting from disposition, arguably, is also situational – incrementally accountable to 
past situations. Palmer similarly points to the importance of contextual time when 
reading character, stating it is “by interpreting episodes of consciousness in the 
context of disposition that the reader builds up a convincing and coherent sense of 
character.”44 This chapter suggests that Bloom’s behaviour in “Cyclops” is stained by 
the many situations he encounters earlier in the day. Furthermore, Bloom’s behaviour 
in “Cyclops” can be tied to his situational background more generally – the social 
construction of his community, culture, and upbringing.  
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Character	  Types	  and	  Stereotypes	  versus	  Character	  Traits	  
The problem of dispositional permanence further underscores the need to avoid using 
articulations that countermand the conditional and dynamic nature of identity, and 
relatedly, the permeability of character. This chapter’s previous subheadings were 
employed satirically to further highlight how problematic the word “type” is when 
talking about identity. To avoid the static overtures implicit in the formulation 
“Bloom is a certain ‘type’ of person” (concurrent with recognising identity as a 
process and not a fixed state of being), this thesis more generally has employed words 
such as “tendencies” or “traits” over words such as “nature,” “kind,” or “type,” to 
further suggest the relativistic conditioning of character and reconcile a dispositional 
bias.  
Just as the first chapter discusses positioning theory and how people take up 
positions as fluid parts or roles, this current chapter uses cognitive theory to examine 
how dispositions are fluid tendencies determined by particular situations.45 This thesis 
aligns Bloom’s dispositions to his situational reactions, positions, or states, in an 
effort to highlight this idea of dispositional relativity. It might help to imagine 
character disposition and character trait sitting at opposite ends of a spectrum – while 
the disposition end marks character inclinations that are highly permeable, relative, 
and situational, the character trait end marks more enduring, consistently occurring 
tendencies. The idea of a continuum that is contingent upon temporality is further 
reflected in Gilbert Harman’s definition of a character trait as “a stable, broad 
disposition to act in certain ways which persists over long periods of time.”46 
Correspondingly, the purpose of this section is to review the previous 
character/narrator attributions using the broad spectrum of time (the context of 
Ulysses) to further investigate claims made about Bloom’s character traits.  
Accordingly, although this chapter focuses on Joyce’s “Cyclops” episode, this 
section must necessarily incorporate various situations from other episodes to enable 
comparison. Broadening our scope to encompass the whole day enables us to follow 
Bloom’s continuing consciousness and effectively “join up the dots.”47 Palmer 
introduces the term “continuing consciousness” to describe “the ability to take a 
reference to a character and attach it to a presumed consciousness that exists 
continually through the storyworld.”48 Palmer suggests that the continuing 
consciousness frame is a crucial component for comprehending character and that the 
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absence of such a holistic approach makes recognition of the whole fictional mind 
difficult to achieve.49 This frame helps us to account for Joyce’s construction of 
Bloom as one coherent character – a persuasive singularity occurring within 
variousness and extending throughout time.50  
In the first section I argued that character-to-character attributions are 
inescapably individualistic and aspectual, thereby they are doomed to fall victim to a 
dispositional bias. Joyce’s characters in “Cyclops” are modelled on people who exist 
in an individualistic culture. Furthermore, Joyce’s characters are aspectual – they do 
not have the ability to obtain a greater perceptual scope that might counterbalance the 
automatic bias integral to individualism and independent modes of self. Joyce’s 
characters’ overestimation of individualistic or person-based factors occurs 
irrespective of the accuracy of their claims. Again, this section does not seek to define 
Bloom as a particular “type” of person, but rather, it aims to examine Joyce’s 
construction of a continuing consciousness and measure the degree to which a 
dispositional bias might misinform both the characters’ and the reader’s perception of 
Bloom.  
Is	  Bloom	  a	  Dark	  Horse?	  
Bloom’s perceived obscurity is undermined by the fact that the characters themselves 
demonstrate they know more about Bloom than they would if he really was an 
unknown outsider. For someone about whom little is known, Bloom is presented in 
the bar scene as overtly candid and vocal with regards to both his intentions and 
views. However, even though it is apparent that the characters overestimate 
individualistic factors and concurrently mis-attribute Bloom’s intent for leaving the 
bar, this is not to negate Bloom’s obscurity or foreignness. Rather, this previous 
finding simply highlights an instance where the individual was the focal point (over 
the situation). This mis-attribution occurs regardless of whether presumed 
dispositions are revealed to be consistent with long-term character traits. Reviewing 
previous instances throughout Ulysses shows that Bloom’s reserve and outsider 
mentality are heavily influenced by situational factors. As we will see, Bloom’s 
outsider status is socially constructed and self-sustained. Moreover, Bloom 
strategically exploits inconspicuousness as both a protective measure and a mode of 
privacy.  
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At this point a clear definition of what it means to be a “dark horse” is helpful. 
The OED defines a “dark horse” as someone “[o]f whom or which nothing is 
generally known; about whose powers, etc., the public are ‘in the dark’.”51 We can 
also trace the term back to horse-racing slang, where a dark horse is “a horse about 
whose racing powers little is known; hence fig. a candidate or competitor of whom 
little is known or heard, but who unexpectedly comes to the front.”52 The characters’ 
perception of Bloom as a dark horse derives from a Jewish stereotype. Conceptually, 
Jewishness is analogous to foreignness, darkness, or otherness. It is relatable to the 
“culturally dispossessed and possessed, [who are] both shifting and … perceived as, 
shifty.”53 The “powers” of the Jewish are “little known” due to religious and 
ritualistic differences. Similarly, as moneylenders and merchants, the Jewish “came to 
the front” financially. Bloom as a dark horse is therefore socially constructed through 
a Jewish stereotype.  
In a previous example, I described how fearfulness could gradually develop to 
influence future behaviours. This theory is further substantiated by studies done by 
Steele and Aronson that demonstrate “that minority group members typically 
underperform in situations where a stereotype of low ability is evoked.”54 Other 
studies in discourse analysis “demonstrate how, through conversational interactions 
and institutional positioning, identities are in effect imposed on individuals.”55 
Likewise, discursive interaction produces identities, which in turn affect social 
behaviours. In line with this research, Bloom’s Jewish identity is continually 
constructed through his social actions and interactions. Discourse, social stereotypes, 
and his own “subsequent sensitivity to Otherness”56 impose upon Bloom a social 
conception of Jewishness, thus forming an identity marker which otherwise might not 
exist. Bloom is only a dark horse insofar as he is Jewish, and he is only Jewish 
insofar as he is socially constructed by his society.  
The men in “Cyclops” base their person perception on individualistic models. 
As a result, rather than relating behaviour to situated tendencies – which would 
suggest a situated, reactionary, and malleable process – the men relate behaviour to 
“types” that both categorise and define, and that lead to prejudice. Thus, prejudice is 
more likely to guide the Dubliners’ self-conception and intergroup orientation, and 
they are less likely to undertake a cognitive reassignment of Bloom from a maligned 
outsider status. As such, this chapter argues that Bloom is constructed by his 
community as a fixed entity, ossified on the outside – permanently on the periphery. 
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Moreover, not only is Bloom’s character incrementally achieved and reinforced by 
his social situation; it is also reinforced by his own choices, actions, and motivations. 
Bloom’s outsider mentality is self-sustained and maintained as a social stratagem. In 
effect, Joyce highlights the precariousness of person perception, underscoring how 
easy it is to focus on the individual state that is pregnant with prejudice and to 
overlook the collectively incremental and dynamic process of identity.  
Is	  Bloom	  Talkative?	  
In “Cyclops” Bloom is talkative and a know-it-all. Both behaviours contradict the 
view that he is at the same time a “dark horse.” Surely a characteristic of someone 
about whom little is known would be silence and/or other antisocial behaviours? A 
further factor undermining Bloom’s chatty behaviour in this scene is Bloom’s 
otherwise characteristic silence – a trait more commonly reflected and substantiated 
through Joyce scholarship. There is no shortage of commentary on Bloom’s silent and 
antisocial behaviour: in a recent paper on “Active Silences,” Fritz Senn spoke about 
the “cosmic silence” in “Oxen” and the “silence of infinite space” in “Ithaca.”57 Gerry 
McDonnell points to Bloom’s Jewish “exile in the silence of his own thoughts;”58 
Patrick A. McCarthy discusses Bloom’s “silent reading:”59 Holly E. Parker 
emphasises Bloom’s “relinquishment of language”60 to find his true self and 
“enlightenment in silence;”61 and Scott J. Ordway’s chapter “Music, Meaning, and 
Sonata Form in the ‘Sirens’ Episode of Ulysses” focuses on Bloom’s solitude and 
silence in “Sirens.”62 Similarly, both Garry Leonard and Jesse H. McKnight describe 
Bloom’s “evident social awkwardness or awkward attempts at accord and 
sociability.”63 Comparably, there are few critics who suggest that Bloom’s silence 
and social awkwardness are uncharacteristic. Notably, Sanford Pinsker does question 
why Bloom’s “uncharacteristic” silence in “Sirens” has not yet generated an article 
entitled, “Why Bloom Doesn’t Speak to the Sirens?”64 and Susan Mooney hints that 
in “Sirens” “the usually garrulous voice of Bloom is marked by inferiority and 
silence.”65 However, both Mooney and Pinsker are the exceptions to the rule. 
Moreover, they both fail to develop these claims further – it seems their articles have 
“quite other fish to fry.”66 Not only has there been limited scholarship opposing 
Bloom’s reticence, but until now there have also been few attempts at explaining why 
Bloom should behave in such a markedly different, or seemingly uncharacteristic, 
way in the “Cyclops” scene (compared to other scenes in Ulysses). Nor has anyone 
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attempted to explain why the narrator anticipates Bloom’s extensive verbiage in 
“Cyclops.” Advancing our view to encompass Bloom’s previous situations reframes 
Bloom’s perceived talkativeness in “Cyclops” and offers some explanations.  
Earlier in the day, just after 1 p.m., Bloom enters Davey Byrne’s bar intent on 
getting a “light snack” (U 6:216). Bloom chooses to eat at this “moral pub” because 
the owner “doesn't chat” (U 6:217–18). Unfortunately for Bloom, Nosey Flynn (a 
character conveniently named) also happens to be at Davey Byrne’s, tucked away in 
his “nook” (U 6:218). As discussed in the previous chapter, on “Lestrygonians,” 
Bloom may feel obliged to partake in conversation with Nosey due to the fact that he 
is restricted to the bar area and must stay there for as long as it takes to eat his food. 
Notably, he does not stay a minute longer than required and on only two occasions 
does Bloom initiate conversation: when he orders his food – “Have you a cheese 
sandwich?” (U 8:218) – and when he wishes to pay for his food – “—How much is 
that?” (U 8:219). Bloom’s other seven speech acts in this scene are all in response to 
questions. As previously discussed, Bloom’s frequent glances at both the clock on the 
wall and his watch (U 8:227) reflect his anxiety to leave the bar. Bloom’s 
timekeeping enables him to feign disinterest and avoid superfluous social interaction 
by indicating he has somewhere else to be. Bloom’s watch in this scene (and in 
others) is a tactical prop used in much the same way that people today use their cell 
phones to avoid undesirable social interaction.  
Bloom frequents a bar for the second time that day at approximately 4 p.m. He 
rather impulsively decides to dine with Richie Goulding after running into him 
outside the Ormond Hotel. As the previous chapter discusses, Bloom decides to dine 
with Goulding so he might spy on Boylan. He reasons he can “Sit tight there. See, not 
be seen” (U 11:341). Once inside the bar Bloom and Richie are described as “married 
in silence” (U 11:347): “Bloom sang dumb” (U 11:356) until Richie talks a bit and 
Bloom listens (U 11:357), only contributing the necessary responses. As argued 
previously, Bloom’s minimal social engagement and high level of material 
engagement in this scene substantiate that his thoughts are elsewhere. Again, Bloom 
utilises a material prop as a tactical measure to further avoid social interaction and 
talk. His prop, this time a newspaper, effectively shuts off Richie Goulding’s view 
and also any further social interaction – “He held unfurled his Freeman. Can’t see 
now” (U 11:360). If we recall that the Freeman was a broadsheet, the largest of 
newspaper formats, Bloom’s unfurling of his Freeman is certainly an intrusive act (to 
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the point of being rude). Finally, Bloom reflects little regret that he must leave his 
companion’s company, desiring a quick exit and to “get out before the end” (U 
11:370). At roughly 5 p.m., Bloom leaves Richie at the Ormond Hotel and makes his 
way to find Cunningham, whom he intends on meeting. He therefore leaves one 
drinking establishment and goes directly to another, that being Barney Kiernan’s. 
However, as all three examples demonstrate, Bloom does not enter these venues to 
drink or to socialise. Bloom shows no particular interest in these establishments as 
social venues; to the contrary, his visits are functional and short – characterised by 
prolonged silences, sobriety, and antisocial behaviour.  
A third comparison can be made using the carriage ride scene from “Hades.” 
Recalling the idea of activity types, this scene is a clear contrast to the “Cyclops” bar 
scene. Where the first activity type in “Hades” is a funeral procession located within 
the symbolic microcosm of the funeral coach, the second activity type in “Cyclops” is 
a social gathering that occurs in the socially constructed space of a public bar. 
However, as my second chapter argues, when compared with other characters 
similarly constrained by socially constituted, space- and time-bounded events, Bloom 
is socially awkward in “Hades.” He does not dispel the initial silence, although highly 
discomforted by it; he needs two attempts to shut the door firmly (or thinks on this 
action twice); his serious expressions act as a socially inhibited and inhibiting mask, 
as do his vacant glances; and further estrangement ensues when he muddles a Jewish 
joke. Bloom’s attempt at a joke is the only time he displays any eagerness to talk. 
However, this eagerness results from his unease at the direction the conversation has 
suddenly taken, rather than a desire for social inclusion.  
Comparably, in “Cyclops” the narrator perceives Bloom as annoyingly chatty 
and a “knowall.” As the first section shows, Bloom contributes greatly to the 
conversation, and at times attempts to direct it. Why does Joyce choose to construct 
Bloom this way? As the previous examples show, unlike earlier episodes in Ulysses, 
in “Cyclops” we have no access to Bloom’s inner speech – there is no stream of 
consciousness or description from a third-person narrator to depict how Bloom 
responds to the storyworld. Therefore, to adequately convey to the reader Bloom’s 
distress at the mention of Boylan’s name (for example), Joyce must use a different 
method. As previously mentioned, Bloom’s cutting into the conversation at the 
mention of Boylan’s name is less conspicuous and more feasible if Bloom is already 
contributing to the conversation. Joyce models his characters and their fictional 
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conversations on real people and their observed non-fictional discursive events. Thus, 
Bloom’s participation in social and discursive events in a social storyworld is subject 
to the same social expectations and discursive rules that exist in Joyce’s world. It is 
unlikely that any person (fictional or real) could inconspicuously interrupt a 
conversation after having acted disinterested up until that point. Furthermore, Joyce 
does not depict Bloom reverting to his previous tactic of silent disinterest because it 
would limit how the reader perceives Bloom in this scene. The external focalisation 
of a biased narrator would render a silent Bloom unreadable. Rather, Joyce constructs 
the verbal Bloom in ways that further highlight Bloom’s strategic tendencies. As 
previously discussed, Bloom’s discourse frequently incorporates rhetorical devices 
and other regulatory techniques as described through contemporary discursive 
psychology.  
An element of formulaic design underpins Bloom’s talkativeness in “Cyclops.” 
However, what remains unanswered is how the narrator’s expectation of Bloom’s 
talkativeness arises. The reader may similarly anticipate Bloom’s verbosity, having 
grown accustomed to the pace and rhythm of his inner speech. Kiberd is correct in his 
defence of the narrator’s complaints of Bloom’s chattiness – the narrator simply 
“voices the reservations which some readers will have felt about the density of the 
interior monologue in earlier sections, where there seemed at times to be a line 
devoted to every passing second.”67 It is clear that on this day, June 16th 1904, Bloom 
is more notably silent and antisocial. However, if we consider Molly’s imminent 
affair, it is also clear that this day is somewhat of an exception. Accordingly, the 
reader must look further afield and attempt to trace this disposition through Bloom’s 
entire continuing consciousness. And where better to discover multiple mentions of 
Bloom in past contexts than in Molly’s inner speech? Just as Molly and Bloom 
together form mental circularity, this thesis likewise circulates from Bloom to Molly 
in order to situate Bloom’s dispositions. In “Penelope” Molly recounts how Bloom 
was always “talking to … [Milly] … lately at the table explaining things in the paper” 
(U 18:910) and likewise, she remembers him “talking his usual trash and nonsense” 
(U 18:886). Molly also echoes the narrator’s use of “jawbreakers” when she 
remembers Bloom coming “out with some jawbreakers” (U 18:893). Molly recalls 
having a “standup row over politics” with Bloom, which he “began … not me” (U 
18:878), and then states that she “couldnt put him into a temper still he knows a lot of 
mixedup things especially about the body” (U 18:878). Taken together, these two 
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observations point toward Bloom’s love of a good debate as well as his mild 
temperament. Here Molly picks up on Bloom’s love of talking and spouting all types 
of information, but also on the fact that that he is not easily angered and will typically 
disengage when things get heated. This is a summary of Bloom ill reflected by his 
behaviour this present day. Molly, like the narrator, anticipates a side of Bloom 
notably absent from the episodes of Ulysses.  
When taken in the context of Bloom’s day, his chatty behaviour is 
demonstrably an isolated occurrence or positioning in “Cyclops,” due to both socially 
strategic and reactionary situational factors. However, the fact that both the narrator 
and Molly anticipate Bloom’s talkativeness, and that Molly provides further past 
examples, suggests Bloom’s talkativeness is an enduring character trait. In contrast, 
Bloom’s silence and antisocial behaviours, as commonly esteemed in Joyce 
scholarship, are more extensively situated and due to recent emergent tensions – 
Molly’s imminent affair most notably. Moreover, the community’s increasing 
rudeness and anti-Semitism are a second situational factor contributing to Bloom’s 
uncharacteristic silences in Ulysses. Bloom’s outsider status and social aversion are 
socially constructed and self-sustained, exemplifying how similar reoccurring 
situations develop dispositions into more enduring character traits over time. 
Similarly, as Molly’s ruminations show, there is a notable disjuncture between 
Bloom’s social behaviour on this day and Bloom’s social behaviour in the past. That 
Bloom has a more social, verbose side is further substantiated by Steinberg’s review 
of the Blooms’ early married years. Molly and Bloom are notably social between the 
years 1889 and 1893 – being “sociable with a circle of Jewish friends” and having 
social or business relations with a further “twenty-four individuals or couples.”68 
Molly’s lament about her present loneliness, reflected by her desire “to have an 
intelligent person to talk to” instead of “always listening to him [Bloom]” (U 18:922), 
suggests that the couple are now less socially orientated. Of course this is not to say 
Bloom was an overtly social or talkative person before the present day. Rather, it 
suggests that situations that fostered talkative and social behaviour occurred more 
regularly in his past. In contrast, Bloom’s present situation is facilitating a very 
different type of behaviour. It appears Joyce has captured for the reader an apex in 
Bloom’s character development – moving from a character that tended towards 
openness to a character increasingly willing to shut out the community, moving 
progressively to the periphery.  
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Is	  Bloom	  Argumentative?	  
In the first section of this chapter I stated that Bloom’s antagonistic behaviour in 
“Cyclops” is determined by cumulative situational factors. A review of Bloom’s day 
points to multiple factors that might contribute to Bloom reaching a breaking point in 
“Cyclops.” While the characters do not and cannot (due to aspectuality) relate 
Bloom’s behaviour to prior events, the reader is placed in a more advantageous 
position to do just that. As Gordon recently discussed, in “Cyclops” Bloom is “in a 
bad mood” because it “is five o’ clock and he still cannot go home.”69 Gordon 
effectively situates Bloom’s mood and behaviour and suggests Bloom’s 
uncharacteristic speech acts in this scene are Bloom responding indirectly to Boylan. 
Likewise, this chapter suggests that the situation Bloom has just come from, his 
reconnaissance mission in “Sirens,” has further fuelled his frustration. In “Sirens” 
Bloom found himself caught in a “double-bind,”70 being compelled to sit and watch 
with no option for action. He astutely recognised that confronting Boylan in a public 
bar would only further fuel malicious gossip about Molly. In addition, a confrontation 
would have limited his future options and forced decisive action. As Bloom’s 
frustration amasses, so does his sense of helplessness. Just as Bloom used material 
objects to better process his emotions in “Sirens,” his argumentative behaviour in 
“Cyclops” is also an outlet for his frustration.  
Gordon is not the first to suggest that such antagonistic behaviour is 
uncharacteristic for Bloom. Patrick Parrinder similarly underscores how “Joyce 
endorses Bloom’s non-violent and non-aggressive behaviour”71 throughout Ulysses 
and Jaye Berman Montresor states that Bloom is “uncharacteristically aggressive” in 
both “Cyclops” and “Circe.”72 However, to the best of my knowledge, Gordon’s 
paper is unique in that it attempts to find an explanation for Bloom’s uncharacteristic 
behaviour in “Cyclops.” Gordon points to the Odyssean parallel to further explain 
why Joyce constructs Bloom uncharacteristically in this scene, simply stating that in 
“Cyclops” Bloom is out of character like Odysseus.73 Joyce is indeed playing with the 
mythic dimension of the text, but he is also playing on the morphic dimensions of 
identity, and relatedly, person perception. Bloom’s irrational and confrontational 
behaviour rearticulates the malleability of character. A reactionary repositioning 
shows Bloom morphing from one disposition to another. Bloom is restrained, 
perceptive, and rhetorically strategic, but he also displays antagonism and 
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irrationality when he loses self-control. In “Cyclops” Joyce contravenes the reader’s 
expectation of Bloom’s characteristics, effectively forcing the reader to look again – 
to look beyond the person to find other factors contributing to behaviour. Thus, Joyce 
presents his characters as socially situated and writes against the dispositional bias. 
Conclusion	  
A cognitive approach concerned with socially situated cognition, and more 
specifically attribution theory and discursive psychology, reveals that Joyce’s 
narrative works at different levels to communicate the sociohistorical shifts and 
emergent tensions developing between traditional and modern societies, between 
interdependent and independent models of self, and between individualism and 
collectivism. Cognitive research further reveals how a cognitive bias relates to 
cultural modes and to corresponding cognitive styles. Whether Joyce’s intention or 
not, his text both responds to and represents these cultural shifts and related cognitive 
processes. This chapter has shown how Joyce’s use of parallel or competing narrative 
styles in “Cyclops” simultaneously represents different cognitive styles. In 
consequence, through recognising the ontological implications of attribution – 
especially with regards to attention, reason, person perception, or a worldview – the 
reader is able to more fully appreciate how Joyce constructs character, finding 
explanations through cognitive science for the ways in which Joyce’s narrative speaks 
volumes through style. Modern cognitive theory has allowed the reader to validate the 
many cognitive undercurrents resonating through Joyce’s narrative – undercurrents 
many people (like Joyce) already instinctively intuit. Likewise, this recent research 
enables readers to discover how Joyce expresses more through language than 
language theory alone can account for.  
This chapter aimed to discover if a character bias unfairly influences Joyce 
scholarship. A situated perspective has shown not only the extent to which Bloom’s 
mind is socially situated, but how many of the “truths” about Bloom’s traits are 
improperly based on dispositional factors. I discussed how the characters’ perception 
of Bloom’s Jewishness is inseparable from his perceived prudence and his status in 
the community as a “dark horse.” Moreover, we saw how a cognitive mode for 
person perception related to individualistic culture fosters these types of stereotypes. 
Such prejudice is likely to guide the construction of social in-groups and out-groups. 
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An independent culture steeped in individualism will focus attention and substantiate 
reason via the individual over the situation. Bloom’s outsider status is socially 
situated, culturally constructed, and self-sustained. Little has been said about the 
socially strategic dimension of Bloom’s outsider status. This chapter highlights how 
Bloom exploits his outsider status to enforce a boundary between his personal life and 
society. Bloom strategically places himself outside of society in an effort to sidestep 
sticky social situations and to exonerate himself from social expectations of intimacy, 
thus further protecting his privacy. Unless Bloom’s social situation changes, this 
aspect of Bloom is also unlikely to change.  
Similarly, this chapter has demonstrated that Bloom’s talkativeness is also 
socially strategic. Cognitive research concerning discursive events underscores the 
degree to which Bloom’s discursive acts are tactical – a discussion missing from 
Joyce scholarship. Joyce scholarship tends to concentrate on Bloom’s silences and his 
social ineptness. In contrast, this chapter and this thesis as a whole demonstrate that 
Bloom’s social interactions are expertly calculated and contrived. Over the course of 
his day Bloom strategically positions himself in or out of conversations. Moreover, 
Bloom’s levels of talk are directly related to his negotiations with, and responses to, 
his environment. Bloom’s chattiness versus his silence in Ulysses ultimately reflects 
his concerns for privacy and for steering the topic of conversation away from home. 
Bloom’s current concern for Molly’s honour exasperates his concern for privacy, thus 
further explaining his tactical talking throughout the day – why he both under- and 
overtalks. This chapter has shown a notable difference between Bloom’s previous 
social and discursive practices and those situated on June 16th 1904. Accordingly, the 
narrator does not unfairly influence traditional criticism in this respect; rather, 
traditional criticism has unfairly neglected this aspect of Bloom’s character. Even 
Joyce points to Bloom’s communicativeness, describing how the narrator admires 
Bloom for “being a better man … [and] also more cunning, a better talker, and more 
fertile in expedients.”74 
Finally, this chapter has progressively revealed a clear relation between 
disposition and situation, showing how all dispositions are to some degree situational. 
Even Bloom’s more enduring character traits have the ability to develop and change 
over time and are influenced, even if to a lesser degree, by different situations. This 
chapter has brought a different perspective on character, one that penetrates the 
notion of character to raise epistemological questions about how we can really ever 
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know a character. Viewing characters as model persons enables us to find theoretical 
solutions through real-mind science. Incontrovertibly, what can be known about 
character is dependent upon many different variables – once these variables are 
accounted for, weighed, and contextualised, a more accurate perspective on character 
emerges. I say “more accurate” because we can never completely overcome the 
subjectivity of this interpretive practice. Accordingly, my thesis as a whole works to 
decode character and analyse how character is constructed – it does not promise to 
provide easy or definitive answers about character. Rather, it is interested in the 
narrative devices Joyce uses to create Bloom as a model person, and subsequently, in 
how cognitive science can further illuminate, respond to, and rearticulate both how 
and why these devices work they way they do.
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CODA	   : 	  REGROUNDING	  A 	  S ITUATED	  APPROACH	   IN 	  
‘TELEMACHUS’ 	  
Human character was best displayed in the commonest acts of 
life […] Characters lay not in the doing or not doing of grand 
action but in the peculiar and personal manner of performing a 
simple one.1                                     - Frank Budgen 
 
 
In treating character mimetically, this thesis has examined ways a character’s mind is 
situated in and accomplished by their speech acts and discourse, body and behaviour, 
environment and material reality. Asking where a character’s mind is situated 
generates fresh insight on character through establishing new connections between a 
character’s language, their expressive behaviour, and the social storyworld. A situated 
mind approach has provided a greater depth of understanding about Joyce’s character 
Leopold Bloom, when compared with more traditional analyses of character. This 
final chapter demonstrates how this same cognitive framework also works in reading 
Joyce’s character, Stephen Dedalus. However, this chapter’s primary objective is 
theoretical rather than interpretive. It is constructed as a “coda”; unlike the body of 
my thesis, it does not seek to further illuminate character. Rather, it aims to provide a 
model for future investigations and to demonstrate how a situated mind approach can 
yield insights about all fictional minds constructed as model persons. In effect, this 
chapter revisits most of the cognitive theory used throughout the body of the thesis, 
such as emotion science, discourse analysis, and embodied cognition. While 
interpretive insight is not my primary goal, the insight that is gained from this chapter 
works to further substantiate both the value and versatility of my approach. 
Essentially, a situated mind approach to Ulysses is concerned with how 
character language and behaviour are determined by situational factors. This 
approach relies on a mimetic treatment of character, advancing from more traditional 
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treatments of character, which view character and plot as completely interdependent. 
Rather, a cognitive model for analysing character works to decode character, first by 
determining how character is encoded. As such, this thesis primarily examines how 
Joyce’s narrative contributes to his construction of character in Ulysses. It follows 
thematic threads to focus on instances where concept and meaning are shared 
intermentally between characters or where meaning and value are achieved 
intramentally through reflexive self-positioning. While discursive psychology and 
positioning theory help to explain Joyce’s characters’ expressive language, emotion 
science, neuroscience, active externalism, and embodied cognition also help to 
explain Joyce’s characters’ expressive behaviour. The cognitive model this chapter 
foregrounds is organised by this notion of expressive behaviour. It reintroduces 
Herman’s “mind-body-language nexus,” as discussed in the second chapter, to 
demonstrate how a character’s language is inalienably interconnected to their 
embodied behaviour within a social and material environment. 
This thesis has discussed how expressive behaviour communicates both 
personality and thought. Marie Lorenz contributes further to this discussion, defining 
expressive behaviour as “a reflection of the structure of personality in its relatively 
stable traits and dispositions, insofar as they are shown by external behaviour such as 
movement.”2 It is the thinking body that expresses itself.3 Thought and personality 
are therefore inalienably embodied since “being embodied and located in the 
extended world of time and space is not only a necessary precondition for thought, it 
is, rather, its very basis.”4 People express much of their thought and personality in the 
objects they create and in the way they move and speak. In a similar way, people 
think and gain understanding about the material world through the embodied use of 
material objects. Just as Wittgenstein “characterised meaning as use,”5 this chapter 
(like this thesis globally) is interested in how meaning is achieved and communicated 
through embodied acts. How the reader perceives an object in the storyworld depends 
upon each character’s use of that particular object. Likewise, how the reader 
interprets character dialogue depends upon the character’s use of each word, since a 
word’s meaning can change depending on whether it is used ironically, sarcastically, 
seriously, mockingly, and so forth. In Joyce’s “Telemachus” episode, Stephen and 
Buck ground meaning and communicate using objects in their immediate 
environment as discursive tools. Although the reader is provided with a subjective 
account of Stephen’s mind through his stream of consciousness, it is Stephen’s 
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expressive behaviour in situ – his action and interaction in a social storyworld – that 
is the observable and objective component of his mind.  
Discursive	  Events	  and	  Triangulation	  
The	  Nickel	  Shaving	  Bowl 
In Ulysses, Stephen’s character is first introduced in the “Telemachus” episode. In this 
episode Joyce constitutes his protagonist corporeally, using the familiar objects of 
Stephen’s home environment to situate his character. Joyce constructs both Stephen 
and Buck spatially through the overarching space of the social storyworld and through 
shifts in body stance, ocular vantage, and discursive positioning. Each character uses 
features of their environment to “triangulate” their thoughts and feelings.6 Just as the 
body thinks, triangulation demonstrates how objects in the environment can likewise 
do the thinking for a person. The process of triangulation is achieved through what 
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson call conceptual metaphors, but this is not to be 
confused with symbol systems. As Lakoff and Johnson explain, symbol-system 
realism is a disembodied and detached way of representing the world. Symbol 
systems enhance the divide between mind and world as implicit in Cartesian duality, 
since the symbol is viewed as an internal representation of an external world.7 
Triangulation, by contrast, involves embodied, distributed, and extended cognition. It 
is a system reliant upon the fact that metaphorical concepts only become meaningful 
by virtue of bodily experience and intersubjectivity. Unlike symbol systems, 
triangulation depends on intentionality and use, as well as the user’s ability to 
manipulate the object to achieve communicative goals.  
To interpret triangulation in “Telemachus” it is useful to recall Blum Kulka’s 
discussion of discursive events. Taking account of how meaning is situated within 
activity types, how meaning is keyed, and how meaning is achieved through culturally 
conventionalised generic resources is especially relevant for triangulation. All of the 
previous three discursive events contribute to a thematic frame, which in turn 
contributes toward successful triangulation. Triangulation could not occur without a 
thematic frame, since the thematic frame establishes the general theme of the 
conversation and “the semantically congruent entities that together determine the 
conversational world of discourse.”8 Thematic frames are integral to successful 
intersubjectivity. In this way, both triangulation and thematic frames work 
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synchronously, since triangulation both depends upon and contributes to the joint 
understanding of a conversational world of discourse.  
The first few lines of “Telemachus” effectively demonstrate how a thematic 
frame both determines, and is determined by, triangulation:  
Stately, plump Buck Mulligan came from the 
stairhead, bearing a bowl of lather on which a mirror 
and a razor lay crossed. A yellow dressing gown, 
ungirdled, was sustained gently behind him by the 
mild morning air. He held the bowl aloft and intoned: 
—Introibo ad altare Dei.                 (U 1:1)  
Buck’s intonation of “Introibo ad altare Dei” is at odds with his current activity type. 
As Thornton explains, Intriobo ad altare Dei is “the beginning of the Ordinary of the 
Mass: ‘I will go unto the altar of God’.”9 Rather than contribute to his activity type – 
the activity of shaving – these words contribute instead to the framing of a particular 
communicative event. Both Buck’s words and actions allude to the Catholic Mass. By 
purposefully “bearing” his shaving bowl and holding it aloft, Buck manipulates the 
meaning of this object through use. He uses the shaving bowl of lather to triangulate 
meaning. However, triangulation relies upon a third component, that being Stephen 
and his shared knowledge of this particular religious practice. This shared knowledge 
is a generic resource (to recall Blum Kulka’s term) that Buck uses to frame the 
conversation. Religion is a sensitive topic for Stephen, who refused to kneel and pray 
at his mother’s deathbed. Aware of Stephen’s sensitivities, Buck avoids a direct 
mention of the topic, using discursive tools and the external resources he has at hand. 
Just as “conjugality” is a thematic frame in the carriage ride scene in “Hades,” 
Catholicism is constructed as a thematic frame for this particular social interaction in 
“Telemachus.” Buck’s activity type (which sets up discursive expectations), the 
generic resource of Catholic Mass, and Buck’s shaving bowl (used as a performative 
prop) all contribute towards the construction of this thematic frame.  
Triangulation and the concurrent construction of this thematic frame allow Buck 
to broach a sensitive topic. The thematic frame of Catholicism acts as a discursive 
bridge for Buck, who has questions regarding Stephen’s morality. As Thomas Sawyer 
argues, Buck “sees [Stephen] as morally depraved”10 and wants to question Stephen 
on his apparent moral depravity as demonstrated by his refusal to pray for his dying 
mother. However, the construction of this particular thematic frame is significant for 
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yet another reason. Catholic ritual also allows Buck to position Stephen as inferior 
since it reminds Stephen, who is a native Irish Catholic, of Buck’s more dominant 
position as an Anglo-Irish Catholic. Buck uses objects within the immediate 
environment to position himself as superior in his attempt to infiltrate Stephen’s 
defences on a subject Stephen is sensitive about. In mocking Stephen, Buck uses 
humour to displace serious subjects with approachable ones. In a similar way, 
triangulation opens a conversational door in a moderate and measured manner.  
The	  “Snotgreen”	  Sea 
Just as Buck uses his bowl of lather to manipulate meaning and communicate with 
Stephen, he likewise uses the sea as an external resource to facilitate joint attention 
and shared thinking. In typical Buck style, rather than pass a pensive or passive 
comment about the sea, he formulates his speech act in a way that best establishes his 
hierarchical authority: 
—God! he said quietly. Isn't the sea what Algy calls 
it: a grey sweet mother? The snotgreen sea. The 
scrotumtightening sea. Epi oinopa ponton. Ah, 
Dedalus, the Greeks! I must teach you. You must read 
them in the original. Thalatta! Thalatta! She is our 
great sweet mother. Come and look.    (U 1:3) 
Buck adopts the authoritative position of Teacher (“I must teach you”). He directs 
Stephen to “Come and look” and reasserts his higher social status by flaunting his 
Protestant education and his ability to recite Greek in the original.11 Buck cleverly 
uses Algernon Charles Swinburne’s poem “The Triumph of Time” as a springboard 
for his conversational agenda, since this poem compares the sea to a “mother.” 
Relying again on a generic resource (the shared knowledge of a poem), Buck 
incorporates yet another dimension into his discursive dynamic. He combines the 
topic of the “mother” with the already established thematic frame of Catholicism. 
Using these discursive tools as a conversational opening, Buck is now better 
positioned to approach Stephen about his refusal to pray at his mother’s bedside: 
—The aunt thinks you killed your mother, he said. 
That’s why she won’t let me have anything to do with 
you. 
—Someone killed her, Stephen said gloomily. 
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—You could have knelt down, damn it, Kinch, when 
your dying mother asked you, Buck said. I’m 
hyperborean as much as you. But to think of your 
mother begging you with her last breath to kneel 
down and pray for her. And you refused. There is 
something sinister in you …                 (U 1:4) 
Buck cannot comprehend Stephen’s past actions. In this scene, triangulation works as 
a discursive primer. It enables Buck to direct the conversation in an unobtrusive way. 
Likewise, invoking shared meaning through external resources enables Buck to 
position himself as superior. Playing the roles of teacher, priest and military officer 
allows Buck to approach these topics from an authoritative position. 
Understanding how these discursive events contribute to triangulation, or how 
triangulation can contribute to a thematic frame, helps the reader better understand 
why Stephen’s friend Buck appears to callously mock him in this episode. Even 
Buck’s comment “The aunt thinks you killed your mother” is typically interpreted as 
callous,12 or to use Margot Norris’s words, seen as a shocking “non sequitur.”13 In her 
book Who Chose This Face For Me?, Elisabetta Cecconi highlights the difficulty in 
understanding Buck’s behaviour, admitting that: 
The reader may find it difficult to understand the 
reason why Buck continues to mock Stephen when his 
interlocutor’s conversational behaviour has clearly 
shown that he does not appreciate it at all. Since the 
reader does not have access to Buck’s mind and since 
the authorial voice remains unobtrusive through the 
text, it is difficult to detect Buck’s real intention in 
performing mocking acts of this kind.14 
In response to Cecconi’s comment, a cognitive reappraisal of character has 
helped to unveil Buck’s “real intention in performing mocking acts of this kind.” As 
this chapter has shown, triangulation allows Buck to broach subjects Stephen is likely 
to resist. In addition, discursive events turn Buck’s mocking into a double-edged 
sword: not only do they enable him to displace serious subjects with approachable 
ones, but they also work to reestablish Buck’s dominance in this relationship through 
discursive positioning. The reader can therefore discern that rather than being a “non 
sequitur,” Buck’s comments about Stephen’s mother’s death are gradually built up to 
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the use of discursive tools and triangulation. A cognitive reappraisal reframes Buck’s 
actions, demonstrating, in contrast to Norris’s interpretation, his tactful and cautious 
approach. Buck employs discursive tools and uses objects in his immediate 
environment to establish dominance, manipulate meaning, and create conversational 
openings, so he can better approach and communicate his concerns regarding 
Stephen’s past behaviour.  
Active	  Externalism	  
If Buck does see Stephen as sinister and “morally depraved,” it makes sense that he 
would demonstrate a sense of caution towards his housemate. Buck’s caution towards 
Stephen becomes increasingly evident as he continues to interact with Stephen and 
with the objects in his environment. Not only do conceptual metaphors occur to 
ground shared meaning, as with triangulation, they also occur as intrapersonal 
cognitive processes, manifesting as a close coupling between user and object. As 
discussed in the second chapter, people off-load cognitive processes and abstract 
concepts onto external objects within their local environment. The local environment 
is frequently used as an external resource through user-artefact dynamics.15 This 
thesis identifies many instances of this scaffolding process, as it is represented in 
Ulysses. Previous chapters discuss active externalism and focus on the relationship 
between Leopold Bloom and the objects in his local environment. Assuming the 
reader treats character mimetically, Bloom is seen to off-load meaning at an 
intrapersonal level to his hat, a piece of string, crustcrumbs, and even a doyley. In a 
similar way, this chapter discusses how Buck off-loads meaning onto his razor blade 
and how Stephen grounds meaning and processes his problems using numerous 
material artefacts. 
Buck’s	  Razor	  Blade	  
In this episode, Buck often has a knife or a blade in his hand (U 1:3, 1:14). 
Correspondingly, it is no coincidence that Buck’s nickname for Stephen is “Kinch” – 
a name Richard Ellmann suggests “bears aural resemblance to the sound made by a 
cutting knife.”16 In her chapter “Stephen’s Handles,” Sara K. Crangle argues that 
“Kinch” describes more generally “an instrument of death, arrest, or control.”17 Buck 
confirms both these interpretations by stating “O, my name for you is the best: Kinch, 
the knife-blade” (U 1:3). This explanation occurs as part of an illuminating sequence 
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of events. Immediately preceding this explanation, Buck discusses Haines’s feelings 
of unease regarding Stephen’s ungentlemanliness (U 1:2). The reader follows Buck’s 
progression of thought, which moves to connect Haines’s wariness towards Stephen 
with his own. This idea is further substantiated by Buck’s subsequent action. 
Immediately following his designation of “Kinch, the knife-blade,” Buck “shaved 
warily over his chin” (U 1:3; emphasis mine). Likewise, when Stephen asserts that if 
Haines “stays here I am off” (U 1:3), rather than frown at Stephen (the cause of his 
displeasure), Buck frowns instead “at the lather on his razorblade” (U 1:3). Every time 
Buck mentions Kinch he becomes more aware and wary of the blade with which he 
shaves. After Buck finally confronts Stephen about his refusal to pray at his mother’s 
deathbed and admits his belief that “there is something sinister” (U 1:4) in Stephen, 
Buck murmurs to himself “— But a lovely mummer! … Kinch, the loveliest mummer 
of them all!” (U 1:4),18 whilst continuing to shave “evenly and with care, in silence, 
seriously” (U 1:4). Joyce’s presentation of Buck as silent and serious, directly 
contrasts how he is typically portrayed in Ulysses. This works to further emphasise 
Buck’s present uneasiness. Although Buck attempts to hide his unease and bolster an 
authoritative position by forcing a tolerant smile and reverting to a mocking tone, 
Buck’s embodied mind (as depicted through his concurrent careful use of his blade) 
betrays his inherent unease.  
Just as Bloom connects his thoughts on “Order” with the ordering of his 
immediate environment in “Sirens,” Buck’s thoughts in this scene are made manifest 
through kinetic analogy: he is depicted as thinking through movement. Buck’s mind 
associatively connects the danger of cutting himself with his razor blade to his 
wariness of Stephen, the knife blade. Suzette Henke picks up on similar connections, 
observing how Buck chides his “rebellious tie” (U 1:19), “stiff collar” (U 1:19), and 
“dangling watchchain” (U 1:19) for their insubordination.19 Stephen is similarly 
depicted in Ulysses as rebellious and stiff. Stephen watches from the periphery and 
bides his time. Joyce’s representation of Buck’s cognitive processes in this scene – his 
depiction of Buck attributing or off-loading meaning through simultaneous embodied 
action onto material objects – is a typical example of how “cognitive processes 
depend, in surprising and complex ways, on the organism’s use of external 
resources.”20 As discussed in greater depth in chapter two, cognitive tasks are more 
effectively achieved when transformed into external, manipulable, material 
representations. Kristian Tylen and John J. McCraw further explain, “Just as a 
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carpenter requires different tools for different tasks, people use objects and artefacts in 
distinctive ‘functional assemblies’ to enact cognitive processes.”21 Consider for 
example how in “Hades,” Bloom processes the problem of his wife’s imminent 
infidelity, his daughter Milly’s sexuality, and his insecurities about fathering a son by 
off-loading onto certain features of his environment hats, theatre hoardings, even 
crustcrumbs. Similarly in this scene, Buck negotiates his relationship with Stephen by 
manipulating objects within his local environment. These objects create cognitive 
shortcuts through manipulation and representation and effectively contribute to 
Buck’s sense-making and problem-solving processes. 
Stephen’s	  Bowl	  
In literary terms, cognitive shortcuts enabled by external resources are best 
understood as thematic threads of meaning unfolding throughout Joyce’s narrative. 
So far, this chapter has mostly examined how Buck communicates with Stephen 
using material objects and discursive tools. This is because Buck is the most active 
and communicative of the two characters in “Telemachus.” Stephen is more regularly 
depicted as silent and brooding. However, Stephen’s actions – whether physical acts 
or discursive acts – become increasingly frequent throughout both this episode and 
Ulysses more generally. This change in Joyce’s representation of Stephen highlights 
his character’s development. Stephen’s character becomes more active in a material 
world as he incrementally shifts from self-centred self-criticism to active externalism 
and intersubjectivity. Rather than remaining passive and inactive, Stephen 
increasingly becomes more active (even volatile) as the day progresses. As previously 
discussed, Joyce captures for the reader an apex in Bloom’s character development – 
moving from a character that tended towards openness to a character increasingly 
willing to shut out the community, moving progressively to the periphery. Similarly, 
this chapter argues Stephen’s character is also in flux, but developing in an opposite 
direction. Joyce depicts Stephen as a character moving increasingly toward action and 
interaction. Although these actions and interactions are predominantly antagonistic 
and reactive, they nonetheless signal a shift in character development.  
Stephen’s first significant action22 in “Telemachus” involves Buck’s nickel 
shaving bowl. As previously discussed, Buck’s shaving bowl allows him discreetly to 
introduce a particular topic of conversation through his parody of the Mass. However, 
after it has served its purpose, Buck leaves his nickel shaving bowl on the parapet 
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when he heads downstairs for breakfast (U 1:12). As soon as Buck abandons this 
object, the original conceptual metaphor no longer determines it. Previously, the bowl 
facilitated the achievement of shared meaning through an interpersonal process, but 
with Buck removed from the interaction, the shaving bowl’s meaning is now 
determined intrapersonally – by how Stephen alone chooses to use it. When Stephen 
spots the shaving bowl abandoned on the parapet, he consequently faces his own 
resentment. He must decide whether or not to bring it back downstairs. If he chooses 
to remain inactive and ignore it, he effectively chooses to continue his remonstration 
against both Buck’s friendship and his stipulated servitude. In accordance with Buck’s 
earlier parody, Stephen associates this nickel bowl with “the boat of incense then at 
Clongowes” (U 1:12) when he acted as a server at mass. However, as his current 
thoughts demonstrate, Stephen also associates the nickel bowl with “forgotten 
friendship” (U 1:12). Stephen infuses the bowl with additional intrapersonal meaning 
– meaning which is unique to him.  
Stephen carefully deliberates on the course of action he should take, holding the 
bowl “in his hands awhile, feeling its coolness” (U 1:12). These meditative acts, 
Stephen’s feeling of the bowl’s dimensions, its coolness, his “smelling the clammy 
slaver of the lather” (U 1:12), demonstrate that his rebelling is an act that was 
specifically forbidden when he was a server at mass (since servers were not allowed to 
hold the boat of incense); but more importantly, they show Stephen returning the bowl 
to materiality – back to being a mere object. By concentrating on its physical 
attributes, Stephen rids the bowl of the conceptual meaning imbued through Buck’s 
earlier parody. In consequence, Stephen’s decision to act and return the bowl to the 
locker should not be read as Stephen conforming to a subservient role. Rather, it 
should be read as Stephen asserting himself. Stephen clearly recognises his agency 
and his independence since he thinks, “Why should I bring it down?” (U 1:12); and he 
subsequently acknowledges that he has a choice, “Or leave it there all day” (U 1:12). 
Leaving the bowl abandoned as an artless gesture of protest goes against Stephen’s 
strategic and brooding tendencies. Ultimately, Stephen’s decision to act in this scene, 
by picking up and returning the bowl, gives him the opportunity to defuse the bowl of 
its meaning and close a conceptual door Buck has opened.23 Stephen consequently 
completes the parody of the mass and agrees to play the role of acolyte, to highlight 
the parody’s inconsequence. As his thoughts reflect, he is “another now and yet the 
same” (U 1:12). To keep resisting is inconsequent.  
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Stephen rejects the storyline in which Buck seeks to position him. Like Buck, 
Stephen exploits the resources of his environment to open (or close) discursive moves 
through the creation of mental “short cuts.” Not only does Stephen off-load onto the 
bowl the burden of “forgotten friendship” and servitude, he also off-loads onto the 
bowl the burden of his mother’s death, likening the nickel bowl to “the bowl of white 
china which had stood beside her deathbed” (U 1:4). The bowl becomes part of a 
much larger inventory of objects Stephen associates with his mother – images such as 
“green sluggish bile” (U 1:4); “old featherfans, tasselled dance cards … amber beads 
… A birdcage” (U 1:10); “Her glass of water … a cored apple … Her shapely 
fingernails” (U 1:10). These images demonstrate how “memories beset [Stephen’s] 
brooding brain” (U 1:10) to take form as memory motifs. Stephen’s mother is reduced 
to material objects and mental mappings, which are constructed as images. These 
images are signposts for his cognitive processing, in that they help him to navigate his 
environment, his social interactions, and his memories. Just as the dog’s home in 
“Hades” generates a progression of thoughts that remind Bloom of his suicidal father, 
what Stephen chooses to consciously note and how he interprets these objects in 
“Telemachus” reveal much about his mood, his insecurities, and his interests.  
Stephen’s	  Ashplant  
Another object Stephen relates to, but on a more familiar and functional level, is his 
ashplant. Stephen uses his ashplant, the most sacred of trees in Celtic mythology,24 as 
a weapon to ward off the world – it is an extension of his own underlying antagonism. 
As Crangle notes: “Stephen’s own stick takes on the aspect of a sword, a killing tool 
prompting associations with knifely Kinch; it also becomes his ‘augur’s rod’ … 
thereby emphasizing Stephen’s overly confident sense of himself.”25 Crangle echoes 
Kiverstein and Clark’s previous distinction of active externalism – as a process reliant 
upon both a close coupling and “functional unity”26 between user and object – when 
she identifies the importance of the ashplant in terms of Stephen’s “intimately 
embodied and intimately embedded”27 mind. Stephen names his ashplant “his 
familiar” (U 1:23), and “as his familiar, the ashplant is something intimately 
known.”28 In “Telemachus”, Stephen does not use his ashplant with as much 
aggression or assertion as he does in later episodes. Stephen’s initial inertness in 
Ulysses is matched by his stick’s immobility. Like Stephen it “leans” in its place, and 
“trails” (U 1:23) behind – it is inactive, inert, listless, and subservient. In 
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“Telemachus” Joyce describes all objects connected with Stephen in a similar way. 
Even Stephen’s Latin Quarter hat is described as “A limp black missile” (U 1:19; 
emphasis mine). The hat’s limpness matches Stephen’s embodiment in this scene. 
That it is missile-like is solely due to Buck’s active use of it – the hat flies “out of his 
talking hands” (U 1:19). Again, Buck’s active embodiment contrasts with Stephen’s 
weary inactivity in this episode. 
Joyce’s description of Stephen’s hat as a missile, fired from Buck to Stephen, 
also incrementally contributes to Joyce’s militaristic language in this episode. The 
reader first encounters this theme with Buck’s command “Back to the barracks” (U 
1:1). However, it is Joyce himself who primarily endorses the theme of battle and 
combat, assigning to “Telemachus” in the Linati schema Il figlio spodestato alla lotta, 
which means “The dispossessed son in combat.”29 Joyce’s use of militaristic language 
in this episode serves to underscore the tension between Buck and Stephen – a point 
frequently commented on within Joyce criticism.30 Likewise, the storyworld 
contributes to this theme since the characters are situated in the Martello Tower, a 
defensive fort fully equipped with “gunrest” (U 1:1) and “parapet” (U 1:2). Buck’s 
spatial coordinates and his movement in this scene demonstrate again how action and 
environment can contribute to a thematic frame. Buck draws attention to the gunrest 
through his spatial coordinates – he mounts (U 1:1), skip[s] off (U 1:2), and then 
comes over (U 1:3) the gunrest. However, once he is back inside the tower the 
storyworld does not provide such obvious militaristic props. Instead, it is Joyce’s 
description of Buck’s movement that continues to contribute to this theme. Buck 
“lunges” towards his “messmates” (U 1:14); impales a thick slice of bread (U 1:14); 
then projects the missile that is Stephen’s hat.  
Stephen’s thoughts in this episode are similarly battle-orientated. He thinks he 
has been “Parried again” (U 1:6), and shields his “gaping wounds” (U1:8) from 
Buck’s continued onslaught of words. However, unlike Buck, Stephen’s movements 
are not combative in this episode. It is not until the later in the book that Stephen’s 
warlike thoughts progressively become manifest through external expression. 
Throughout Ulysses Stephen’s use of his ashplant becomes increasingly combative. In 
“Proteus” Stephen takes “the hilt of his ashplant, lunging with it softly, dallying still” 
(U 3:63). Although Stephen’s use of his ashplant is soft and slow, this sparring 
movement, in conjunction with his thought, “Yes, evening will find itself in me, 
without me” (U 3:63), suggests that he is preparing for a later battle. As evening 
	  172	  
encroaches, Stephen comes to realise that he will need his sword at his side if he is to 
rebel against his “two masters” (U 1:24). Stephen recognises that his craft and 
cunning can only take him so far. His ashplant, in contrast, works to facilitate his 
embodied resistance to servitude through other more “aggressive” actions.31 
Accordingly, Stephen redetermines the meaning of his ashplant throughout the day. 
Early in the morning Stephen names his ashplant his “familiar” (U 1:24), then only a 
few hours later it is his “augur’s rod of ash” (U 3:60) and his “ash sword” (U 3:45). 
Stephen’s name for his ashplant changes to match his meaning and intent. By mid-
afternoon Stephen calls his ashplant his “casque and sword” 32 (U 9:246), and then 
later, in the climatic brothel scene, he uses it to smash a chandelier (U 15:683). In 
“Telemachus” when Stephen intends to remain distant and trail behind Buck and 
Haines, his ashplant trails behind him. Then in the “Circe” episode, when Stephen 
intends to “bring you all to a heel” (U 15:683), he uses this same object aggressively 
in an attempt to bolster his confidence. He “flourishes” (U 15:565) his ashplant, 
“thrusts” (U 15:565) it, takes to the dance floor with it, then uses it to smash a 
chandelier – dramatically enacting his words: “Non serviam!” (U 15:682).  
Gaze	  Behaviour	  and	  Emotion	  
As previously discussed, Buck and Stephen’s interaction on top of the Martello Tower 
is negotiated through spatial shifts. These shifts in both spatial and discursive 
positioning are integral to Joyce’s characterisation strategies. A cognitive standpoint 
allows the reader to recognise how spatial and discursive shifts are fundamental for 
expressing both meaning and personality. Buck discursively positions himself in 
dominant roles. Buck is also more dominant spatially – his body imposes upon and 
makes greater use of the physical space. Compared with Stephen, Buck’s movements 
are much more frequent and forceful. Where Stephen is depicted as moving slowly 
and “wearily” (U 1:2), Buck’s movements are described as self-determined, abrupt (U 
1:4), and quick. Comparably, Stephen tends to move mostly in response to, or as a 
result of, Buck’s discursive directions or physical actions. Stephen wearily follows 
Buck, but only halfway (U 1:2), preferring to watch from a distance. Buck’s 
momentum, his dynamism, and his “control over the surrounding space”33 contrast 
with Stephen’s subordinate and limited movement – ultimately demonstrating how 
descriptions of movement contribute to how the reader perceives each character.  
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In a similar way, shifts in ocular vantage and visual space can also contribute to 
characterisation. As discussed in chapter three, the modality of vision as a component 
of the embodied mind generates new insight on character by investigating 
connections between gaze, personality, and expressive behaviour. It is not surprising 
that Buck’s gaze behaviour directly contrasts Stephen’s in this scene. Just as 
Stephen’s gaze behaviour matches his slow and stilted movement, Buck’s more 
“mobile” gaze behaviour matches his sprightly actions. The narrator’s description of 
Buck “peer[ing] sideways up” (U 1:1) best encapsulates his dynamic visual shifts. 
Throughout Ulysses characters’ eyes are active – they advance from a static 
description concerned with superficial appearance to depict character expression, 
emotion, and intent. While Joyce may not disclose the colour of Stephen’s eyes, for 
example, the reader is granted a more in-depth perspective on his character through 
descriptions of Stephen’s gaze behaviour. Leaning, Stephen “look[s] down on the 
water (U 1:4); he stops “halfway” (U 1:2) to sit and watches from “the edge of the 
gunrest” (U 1:2); and resting his elbow, he gazes at the “fraying edge of his … coat 
sleeve” (U 1:4). Joyce connects the adverbs “sit,” “rest,” and “lean” to the predicates 
“edge” and “halfway” to present Stephen’s character through his gaze behaviour as 
slow, dispirited, weary, and distant. 
As a discursive space, the Tower parapet (offering a 360-degree view of the 
surrounds) presents few constraints on the characters in terms of visual resources that 
can both facilitate and shut down communication through gaze behaviour. While 
Buck uses the view of the sea to direct the conversation and promote shared meaning, 
Stephen, in contrast, uses the same view as a mode of social escapism. Stephen avoids 
directly responding to Buck’s mockery by standing at “his post” (U 1:9) and gazing 
towards the sea. Just as Bloom uses a passing woman, the clock in Davey Byrne’s, 
The Freeman in the Ormond bar, and his pocket watch to avoid eye contact and shut 
down sociability with Mrs Breen, Nosey Flynn, Richie Goulding, and Blazes Boylan 
respectively, the sea is a visual resource that allows Stephen to avoid sociability with 
Buck. 
Stephen’s slow and static gaze behaviour further substantiates an argument for 
his lethargic behaviour. In response to Buck’s accusation “there is something sinister 
in you” (U 1:4), rather than respond or retaliate, “Stephen … leaned a palm against his 
brow and gazed at the fraying edge of his shiny black coat-sleeve” (U 1:4). Stephen’s 
avoidance through his gloomy response matches his simultaneous gaze behaviour. 
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Again, Stephen acts negatively – he focuses his gaze on his frayed clothes rather than 
yielding to Buck’s play for intimacy. Although Stephen’s gaze does gradually shift 
from his “cuffedge” (U 1:4), it shifts in distance, not direction. Stephen looks past his 
frayed sleeve to see instead the distant sea, “the ring of bay and skyline” (U 1:4). 
Following Buck’s accusatory remark, Stephen sets his gaze in the one direction. He 
refuses to look at Buck, hearing only his “wellfed voice” (U 1:4). It is not until Buck 
finally folds away his razor (U 1:5) and again mockingly accuses Stephen of killing 
his mother that Stephen turns his gaze from the sea to Buck’s “plump face with its 
smokeblue mobile eyes” (U 1:5).  
Stephen’s growing emotional response to Buck’s persistent accusations is 
evident through his shifting gaze behaviour. Stephen goes from initially avoiding eye 
contact, and subsequently any form of reversibility or intimacy, to presently observing 
Buck’s “smokeblue” eyes. Stephen’s gaze behaviour suggests he now seeks more 
information from Buck. To further substantiate this argument, it is worth noting that 
Joyce depicts Buck’s gazing behaviour in this same way in this scene. When Buck 
seeks information and a response from Stephen, his communicative intent is matched 
by his simultaneous gazing behaviour – he turns “his great searching eyes from the 
sea to Stephen’s face” (U 1:4). Similarly, Stephen’s present gaze behaviour suggests 
something has triggered his interest. Where previously Stephen chose to avoid 
looking at Buck and subsequently refused to further the conversation, he now looks 
directly at Buck’s eyes, arguably in an effort to ascertain his meaning.  
Stephen’s present gaze behaviour suggests that something has triggered his 
emotion and subsequent need for appraisal. In the previous passage, Stephen’s 
response to Buck’s initial accusation is to note how “a Pain that was not yet the pain 
of love frets his heart” (U 1:4). Stephen then remembers a dream he had in which his 
mother came to him after death. He responds to this memory by shifting his gaze out 
to sea, which in turn triggers further memories and images of his mother – “the bowl 
of white china … beside her deathbed” (U 1:4) containing the “green sluggish bile” of 
her vomit. All these things contribute to Stephen’s present emotion. Buck’s accusation 
and Stephen’s gaze on the sea are both external triggers, whereas Stephen’s memories 
and dreams are internal or perceptual triggers.34 Together, this sequence of events has 
set Stephen’s emotion in motion through invoking memories of his mother and his 
associated feelings of guilt.  
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Stephen’s sense of appraisal – or to recall Thompson’s term, his emotion’s 
affective salience – can emerge as part of the precipitating process, but it is also 
symbiotic and transitional, adjusting according to his meaning-making processes in 
post hoc appraisal. To effectively appraise his emotion, Stephen must contextualise 
the original emotional triggers. Since Buck’s accusation is the initial trigger (although 
substantiated in turn by additional factors), it makes sense that Stephen’s affective 
salience be read alongside Buck’s initial accusation and his rebuke that there is 
something sinister in Stephen. If, for example, Buck’s comment was intended 
innocently in jest, how Stephen reacts to and interprets this trigger changes 
significantly. As previously discussed, eyes can project emotion and intent (whether 
wittingly or not) whilst also absorbing external information. Just as Buck is later 
depicted as showing his “anxiety in his eyes” (U 1:7), Stephen’s sudden change in 
gaze behaviour – his sudden shift to look directly at Buck’s eyes – suggests he seeks 
to observe Buck’s projected emotion and intent. Stephen’s gaze behaviour is a goal-
orientated response to his emotion. It demonstrates his desire to obtain more 
information so he can better interpret the significance of this event and readjust 
affective salience accordingly.  
However, when Stephen looks to Buck, Buck places his shaving mirror in front 
of Stephen’s face and forces him to look at his own reflection instead. By forcing 
Stephen to see himself as “[Buck] and others see [him] (U 1:5), Buck offers Stephen 
another perspective and a second measure for his emotion. This suggests that the 
information required for Stephen to effectively appraise his emotion is not relevant to 
whether or not Buck speaks in seriousness. Rather, Stephen’s emotion is best 
appraised through his own self-reflection. Looking from Buck’s face to his own face 
suggests that Buck’s accusation likewise echoes Stephen’s own self-reproach. Rather 
than blame Buck for his rising emotion, Stephen must face his own moodiness, since 
it is his mood (or his background emotion) that continues to haunt him over a long 
period of time. Just as each character interprets the music in “Sirens” differently, how 
Stephen makes sense of his emotion in this scene depends on his relative disposition 
and mood. As previously discussed, emotional appraisal is a form of skilful 
engagement with the world. In this scene, Stephen’s gaze in the mirror becomes part 
of his sense-making process, in what Colombetti terms a “bodily cognitive-emotional 
form of understanding.”35 In this way, the mirror facilitates Stephen’s emotional 
appraisal. It allows him to recognise the true cause of his emotion and to better 
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understand the significance and underlying causality attached to this event. In 
“Sirens” Bloom’s emotional appraisal, in response to sighting Boylan, directly relates 
to how he interprets the word “coincidence.” Likewise, Stephen’s present self-
reflection, his mood, and subsequent self-blame, are directly connected to his emotion 
in both “Telemachus” and Ulysses as a whole.  
Reintroducing Thompson’s “emotion episodes” as a method for interpreting 
emotion assists in this chapter’s continued analysis of Stephen’s emotion in 
“Telemachus.” Another emotional scene in this episode is where Buck rebuffs 
Stephen’s complaint about a past offence. In response to Buck’s assuaging question, 
“—Then what is it? … What have you against me now?” (U 1:7), Stephen frees 
himself from Buck’s directing arm and confronts him about a comment that was made 
previously with regard to his mother’s death: “—You said, Stephen answered, O, it’s 
only Dedalus whose mother is beastly dead ” (U 1:8). Buck, caught off guard by 
Stephen’s accusation, loses his confident veneer. His body betrays his underlying 
nervousness as “A flush” (U 1:9) rises to his cheeks. However, Buck quickly recovers 
and attempts to evade blame by asking numerous defensive questions: “—What? 
Where? … Why? What happened in the name of God? … What did I say? I forget … 
Did I say that? … Well? What harm is that?” (U 1:7–8). Buck dodges a direct reply 
using a well-known discursive strategy – that of answering a question with more 
questions. In doing so, Buck shakes his “constraint from him nervously” (U 1:8) and 
progresses to talk “himself into boldness” (U 1:8).  
In this instance, Joyce provides the reader with a clear record of Buck’s 
emotional response to Stephen’s accusation. Stephen’s accusation is, to recall 
Thompson’s terms, the precipitating event or the trigger for Buck’s subsequent 
emotion. Not only does Buck’s rising colour indicate his shame, Joyce also represents 
Buck’s agitation through his character’s speech acts. Buck’s change in skin 
conductance (or the visceral-interoceptive embodiment of his emotion), combined 
with his jilted and sporadic defensive questions, works to reflect an increase in 
cardiopulmonary rate. Buck’s motor embodiment likewise suggests his distress. He 
performs his emotion by swinging “round on a heel” and walking “off quickly around 
the parapet” (U 1:9).  
Joyce’s presentation of Buck’s movements and use of physical space 
complements emotion science’s argument that emotions are “scaffolded by the 
environment, both synchronically in the unfolding of a particular emotional 
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performance, and diachronically in the acquisition of an emotional repertoire.”36 In 
this scene, Joyce represents emotion both through Buck’s emotional performance and 
through the storyworld, which becomes transformed in terms of what it affords Buck 
by way of emotional output. Chapter four discusses how sulking, as a manifestation of 
emotion, is a behavioural strategy that functions in relationship configuration. In a 
similar way, this chapter notes how Buck renegotiates his relationship with Stephen 
through his emotional response. Recalling Griffiths	  and	  Scarantino’s	  discussion	  of	  
how male Golden Sebright chickens only create a fuss about finding food if females 
are around, 37 Buck’s performance of emotion (his “fuss” in response to Stephen’s 
accusation) is likewise directly determined by Stephen’s immediate presence. In this 
way, Buck’s performance of emotion contributes to his overall communicative 
strategies. His emotion is substantiated by his embodied expression and his 
synchronous exclamation “—O an impossible person!” (U 1:9). Moreover, Buck’s 
motor embodiment and a consequent physical positioning of himself as separate from 
Stephen dramatise a conceptual positioning of himself as separate from this issue and 
as blameless. Not only does this increase in physical space between Buck and Stephen 
work to highlight the offence Buck takes to what he believes is an unmerited 
accusation; it also hints at a possible emotional separation occurring more generally 
within their relationship.  
Buck’s emotional response works in turn to trigger Stephen’s own emotion. In 
this way, Joyce’s characters represent inter-affectivity,38 or the sharing of affective 
states. While Stephen affects Buck with his accusation, Buck’s words in response also 
affect Stephen. Stephen describes his emotional response to Buck as “pulses … 
beating in his eyes, veiling their sight” (U 1:9), and he also feels a “fever of his 
cheeks” (U 1:9). Stephen’s cardiopulmonary rate rises to match Buck’s, and like 
Buck, a change in skin conductance brings colour to his cheeks. However, unlike 
Buck, Stephen does not physically move away. Rather, he remains seated, shifting 
only his gaze in avoidance. Stephen looks towards the “calm sea” (U 1:9) in an 
attempt to calm himself even though his vision is impaired by his rising emotion. 
When Buck eventually attempts to reengage with Stephen and defuse the situation, he 
also directs Stephen’s gaze towards the sea: “—Look at the sea. What does it care 
about offence?” (U 1:9). Again the environment becomes transformed in terms of 
what it offers Stephen by way of emotional output. Stephen processes his emotion 
using the view of the sea. Not only do the spatial coordinates of the sea’s distance 
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help to remove both these characters from their immediate emotion, but as Henke 
writes, it also invites them to “abandon judgment and to sink into the bliss of 
hedonistic materialism.”39  
Conclusion	  
Clearly, readers judge and respond to fictional characters in individual ways. It is 
only natural that readers grow most familiar with – and consequently become better 
disposed to – main characters, irrespective of their flaws and failures. Whether aware 
or not, readers are more sympathetic toward characters that have been carefully 
constructed with complete histories, family ties, and emotions. We relate to them 
better as human beings or, to recall Herman’s term, as model persons. I believe the 
subjectivity implicit in judging characters is one of the principal reasons for the 
common misrepresentation and misperception of character in Ulysses. This is 
especially the case with Stephen Dedalus, since many readers have followed his life 
story from when he was a toddler in A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man. In 
consequence, readers are more disposed to feel a type of sympathetic familiarity 
towards Stephen’s character. Familiarity and original judgments deriving from 
previously reading A Portrait can taint how the reader responds to Stephen’s 
character as Joyce depicts him in Ulysses. Unlike “virgin”40 readings of character, 
which can generate many new possibilities and productive questions,”41 familiarity 
can restrict a reader’s lateral reading perspective and cause critical opinion to become 
codified.  
Past criticism tends to view Stephen through a bifurcating lens, measuring his 
morose silence and inaction against Buck’s boisterous bustling activity. As this 
chapter discusses, Buck is typically described energetically and gaily, as smiling in 
jest or delight, while Stephen is mostly described as displeased, cold, grave, and 
weary. Buck is clearly the louder, the more imposing, and the more commanding of 
the two, playing the authoritative positions of priest, landlord, teacher, and military 
officer. Joyce scholarship often picks up on Stephen’s inferior position, noting his 
“immaturity and inexperience,”42 and that he is “moody”43 with a tendency toward 
“internalised brooding rather than action.”44 For example, Ann Kimble Loux views 
Stephen as the “victim, given to begrudging sacrifice, immolated in self-pity.”45 
Stephen is typically perceived as inactive, reticent, passive – as an afflicted victim.46 
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Most previous scholarship argues that Stephen is taciturn because he is timid, that he 
is silent and inactive because he is shy,47 passive,48 or stunted.49 While certainly not 
positive affirmations of character, such descriptions are at least sympathetic. 
A cognitive reappraisal concerned with gaze behaviour, emotion, active 
externalism, and discursive events reframes Stephen’s discursive and embodied acts 
and offers some new interpretations. Comparably, this chapter argues that throughout 
the course of Ulysses, Stephen shifts from shyness and self-reproach to independence 
and self-confidence. Understanding how Stephen establishes meaning using objects in 
his environment, such the nickel bowl and his ashplant, reveals Stephen acts more 
assertively than previously seen. While his ashplant transforms to emphasise his 
overly confident sense of himself, Stephen also clearly recognises his agency and his 
independence when he returns the shaving bowl. Likewise, a review of Stephen’s gaze 
behaviour as it relates to his emotion shows how Stephen’s initial avoidance and 
“internalised brooding” changes in accordance with his rising emotion. Stephen’s 
increased emotion is matched by an increase in eye fixation points. Rather than 
remaining passive, unaffected, and inactive, Stephen’s gaze behaviour suggests he is 
responsive.  
As the journey of Ulysses develops, so too does Stephen’s character.50 Stephen 
increasingly moves to contest the roles Buck conceives for him – those of victim, 
servant, and dogsbody (U 1:5, 1:6). This journey slowly advances over the course of 
Stephen’s life. However, Joyce depicts the entirety of this journey in the scope of just 
one day, June 16th 1904. Accordingly, his final presentation of Stephen directly 
contrasts the silent and brooding character that first appears in Ulysses. Stephen is last 
depicted singing an anti-Semitic song (U 17:808–10) and refusing Bloom’s 
hospitality. Although he has nowhere else to go, Stephen chooses to wander off alone 
into the night. Stephen chooses independence and freedom rather than submitting to 
further charity in playing the humble houseguest. Whether Stephen’s final acts are due 
to intoxication or whether they are formulated to depict his increasing assertiveness 
and independence remains open. What is clear, however, is that the shy and sensitive 
boy from A Portrait and the silent and stunted artist from the earlier episodes of 
Ulysses have developed into a markedly different character.  
Although this chapter’s primary objective was theoretical rather than 
interpretive, the above character analysis provides new insight nonetheless, 
demonstrating in turn the expositional merit of a situated mind approach. As a model 
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for future investigations of literature, a situated mind approach is concerned with how 
character language and behaviour are determined by situational factors. Accordingly, 
this chapter revisits most of the cognitive theory used throughout the body of the 
thesis to demonstrate how research derived from emotion science, embodied 
cognition, distributed cognition, discursive psychology and active externalism 
contributes to shed insight on all fictional minds constructed as model persons.  
At the same time, this thesis has argued for a transdisciplinary approach, aiming 
to bring literary studies into a mutually beneficial dialogue with the mind sciences. 
Following from Herman’s mind-narrative nexus, this thesis interweaves cognitive and 
narrative modes of inquiry and implements a diversity of investigative tools to 
question how contemporary cognitive research can further illuminate, respond to, and 
rearticulate both how and why Joyce’s narrative devices work as they do. Joyce 
realistically encodes experience and represents through narrative his characters’ 
cognitive processes. He achieves this not in the description of isolated events or static 
appearances, but rather, in presenting each character’s unique mannerisms and 
behavioural tendencies as interconnected situational acts. As this chapter 
demonstrates, where Stephen chooses to look, the things he chooses to say, his acts 
and interactions all interconnect and contribute to how Joyce constructs and develops 
his character throughout the text. Joyce’s Ulysses contributes to our understanding of 
the human psyche and this thesis has demonstrated how a mind-narrative nexus can 
enable a better comprehension and deeper understanding of the human experience as 
portrayed by fictional characters.
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of Consciousness Studies 22, nos. 1–2 (2015): 133, writes: “Inter-affectivity or mutual affection 
concerns the individuals’ experience of being moved, changed by each other in social encounters.” 
39 Henke, Joyce’s Moraculous Sindbook, 25. 
40 Norris, Virgin and Veteran Readings of Ulysses, 4. By the term “virgin,” Norris refers to an 
“innocent” reading of Ulysses, which can only occur if the reader disregards information obtained 
later in the book (which eventually clarifies earlier events) and information obtained intertextually 
(which works to contextualise events in Ulysses). 
41 Ibid. 
42 Sawyer, “Stephen Dedalus’ Word,” 206. 
43 Fritz Senn, “‘In the Original’: Buck Mulligan and Stephen Dedalus,” Arion 2, no. 1 (1992): 216, 
http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.otago.ac.nz/stable/20163517. 
44 Norris, Virgin and Veteran Readings of Ulysses, 27.  
45 Ann Kimble Loux, “‘Am I Father? If I Were?’: A Trinitarian Analysis of the Growth of Stephen 
Dedalus in Ulysses,” James Joyce Quarterly 22, no. 3 (1985): 285. 
46 Henke, Joyce’s Moraculous Sindbook, 17. Henke also notably places Stephen as Buck’s “victim.” 
See also Thomas F. Staley, “Stephen Dedalus and the Temper of the Modern Hero,” in Approaches 
to Ulysses: Ten Essays, eds. Thomas F. Staley and Bernard Bernstock (Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 1970), 24, who explicitly states, “Stephen is a victim.” 
47 Kiberd, Ulysses and Us, 42–43. Kiberd argues, “shyness is especially notable in Stephen, who all 
day will either say too little (as in this scene) or too much (as in his later monologues).” See also 
Staley, “Stephen Dedalus and the Temper of the Modern Hero,” 10, who claims that Stephen’s 
“shyness” is “still present and continues to make up much of Stephen’s character” in Ulysses. 
48 Staley, “Stephen Dedalus and the Temper of the Modern Hero,” 24. While Staley does acknowledge 
that Stephen “makes his rejections clear through enactment,” he also argues that on another level 
Stephen still “remains passive.”  
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49 Henke, Joyce’s Moraculous Sindbook, 15, writes that Stephen “inhabits a closed, almost paranoid 
world of physical and mental asphyxiation.” 
50 Marvin Magalaner, “The Humanization of Stephen,” Mosaic 6, no. 1 (1972): 64. The idea that 
Stephen “develops” in Ulysses is largely debated. This is due to Joyce’s own sentiment that Stephen 
“has a shape that cannot be changed” (Joyce, cited in Magalaner). This chapter gathers evidence to 
refute Joyce’s statement, showing Stephen progressively moving more and more towards outward 
action – in the form of both retaliatory physical and verbal acts. Magalaner agrees that Stephen does 
develop in Ulysses, writing “my own impression is that, no matter what Joyce thought he was doing 
in Ulysses with the character Stephen Dedalus, what he in fact did was resurrect a new and living 
Stephen.” 
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